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Abstract
The traditionalist historiography of nineteenth-century Mexico produced a simplistic
binary view of the period in which politics were characterised by a clear-cut
liberal/conservative divide. According to this interpretation, the liberals were repeatedly
depicted as the patriotic forefathers of the great reformist liberals of the mid-century
Reforma period, whilst the conservatives were presented as the treacherous defenders of
the dark forces of reaction. A revaluation of the fragmented politics of Mexican
liberalism during the critical decade of the 1840s, focussing in particular on the actions
and ideas of moderate political thinker and actor, Mariano Otero, provides a much
needed nuanced understanding of the political issues, factions, and tendencies of the
time. It highlights for one, the nature of the divisions that prevented Mexican liberals
from presenting a united front, even during the traumatic Mexican-American War
(1846-48). It also forces us to revise the view that there were only two political factions
or worldviews during this period.
This thesis examines, therefore, Mexican moderate liberalism in the 1840s
through the figure of Mariano Otero (Mexico, 1817-1850), never quite fully researched
in the historiography. A moderate liberal ideologue, politician, lawyer and essayist, he
was politically active during the turbulent decade from 1841 until his death in 1850. He
served as congressional deputy in 1842 and 1846, senator from 1847-1849, and
government minister in 1848. Author of the seminal Ensayo sobre el verdadero estado
de la cuestión social y política que se agita en la República Mexicana (1842), and
architect of the 1846 Acta de Reformas that reformed the 1824 constitution, he is lauded
as the father of the Juicio de Amparo a legal recourse which provided the individual
with a means of protection from the abuses of the state.
This thesis thus approaches the subject by offering an in-depth biographical
study of Otero and an analysis of the political ideology that informed his writings and
actions. By contrasting Otero’s political ideas with those others that were in vogue and
showing how these were, in turn, put into effect, bearing in mind a backcloth of political
and military alliances that was constantly changing, the aim of this study is to allow the
reader to understand the nature of Otero’s political standpoint as well as that of
Mexico’s mid-century moderados in context. The Otero that emerges from this revision
is a man of firm convictions, a committed constitutionalist, unwavering in his belief in
federalism as the answer to Mexico’s ills but forced to compromise to achieve his
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aims. This was a man who in attempting to shape the time was himself shaped by it.
Certainly no such cut and dried portrait as that previously portrayed emerges.
1Introduction
The early national period in Mexico has been described as “one of the great unexplored
territories of Mexican history,” a view backed by Timothy Anna who referred to that
very same period as “the black hole of Mexican historiography.” 1 It is unsurprising
therefore that these decades have come to be known as the forgotten years. 2
Furthermore, for a long time the view prevailed that the newly independent nation had
been “a dreary landscape taken to be populated by self-serving dictators and military
nabobs; a whirlpool of political disintegration, economic decay, general
backwardness.”3 Slowly this view has been rejected as historians began to realise “que
si México surgió como país con la promulgación de la Independencia, esto no significó
el surgimiento inmediato de un Estado nacional; fue necesario un periodo formativo de
las bases para la unificación nacional, la cual ha sido ubicada por diversos especialistas
hasta finales del siglo XIX.”4 As this view spread, political historians shifted their focus
from attempting to understand the causes of the alleged disintegration, to “actual
political ideas, movements, groups, individuals and governments which emerged and
developed from independence to the revolution.”5
As recently as 1999 Vazquez lamented that “hasta ahora, el primer periodo
independiente se ha pintado solamente como de cacicazgos, caudillos, dictaduras,
1 Eric Van Young, “Recent Anglophone Scholarship on Mexico and Central America in the Age of
Revolution (1750-1850),” The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol.65, No.4 (Nov., 1985), p.731,
and Timothy E. Anna, “Demystifying Early Nineteenth-Century Mexico,” Mexican Studies/Estudios
Mexicanos, Vol.9, No.1 (Winter, 1993), p. 119.
2 Josefina Z. Vázquez, “Los años olvidados,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 5, No. 2
(Summer, 1989), p. 314.
3 Anna, “Demystifying”, p. 120.
4 Hira de Gortari Rabiela, “La política en la formación del Estado Nacional,” Revista Mexicana de
Sociología, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1982), p. 263.
5 Will Fowler, “Introduction: The ‘Forgotten Century’: Mexico, 1810-1910’,” Bulletin of Latin American
Research (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996), p. 1.
2revoluciones y luchas entre federalistas y centralistas y liberales y conservadores.”6 This
was largely due to the liberal tradition which insisted on superposing “las metas de los
liberales y conservadores de la época de la Reforma” on “las luchas aún indefinidas de
monarquistas y republicanos, centralistas y federalistas, yorkinos y escoceses,
imparciales, hombres de bien y progresistas, etc.”7 Much has been done, especially in
the last 20 years, to move away from this monochromatic liberal/conservative
interpretation of the politics of the early national period. When political factions and
ideologies had been studied Erica Pani laments that “los esfuerzos por ubicar a
dinámicos actores históricos en categorías estáticas han sesgado, no pocas veces,
nuestra visión y nuestras expectativas.”8 Historians such as Josefina Z. Vazquez, Will
Fowler, Michael Costeloe, Erica Pani, Cecilia Noriega, Timothy Anna, Jaime Rodriguez
O., Alfonso Noriega and Pedro Santoni, among others, have attempted to define or re-
define the political factions and the political men of those years.9 Timothy Anna argues
that this shift in the historiography is a result of the fact that historians are willing to
grant “nineteenth-century political leaders the simple respect of recognizing that they
may have held genuine political principles.”10
In addition, legislative historians, like Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño have highlighted
the fact that despite the constant revolts and rebellions and the traditional image of these
years as being tumultuous and characterised by caudillos, one of the principal
characteristics of the years between 1821 and 1855 was in fact “la estabilidad del poder
legislativo, después de todo el poder dominante durante medio siglo, ya que la dictadura,
6 Josefina Z. Vázquez, “Centralistas, conservadores y monarquistas 1830-1853,” in William Fowler and
Humberto Morales Moreno (Eds.), El conservadurismo mexicano en el siglo XIX (Puebla: Benemérita
Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Sant-Andrews University, Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, FFYL,
1999) p. 115
7 Vázquez, Josefina Z., “Los años olvidados,” p. 314.
8 Erika Pani, “Las fuerzas oscuras’: El problema del conservadurismo en la historia de México,” in Erika
Pani, Conservadurismo y Derechas en la Historia de México (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica,
2010), I, p. 20
9 For full texts, see bibliography.
10 Anna, “Demystifying,” p.137.
3antes de la de Porfirio Díaz, fue excepcional, temporal y no logró imponerse
nacionalmente.”11
Moving into the 1840s, the decade that particularily concerns this thesis, Noriega
and Pani lament that it
constituye una época profundamente problemática cuya dimensión ha quedado
oscurecida en la historiografía por la tragedia que significó la derrota frente a
Estados Unidos. Los años que precedieron a la guerra estuvieron marcados por
la búsqueda, a la vez desesperada e infructuosa, por dar solución a la
inestabilidad política, por hallar aquella “Constitución” que asegurara orden y
libertad a la joven nación.12
They also point out that the years leading up to the war with the United States were
marked by “el impasse constitucional, la tentación de la dictadura, la rearticulación del
proyecto monarquista, la restauración del federalismo y el surgimiento de un
conservadurismo consciente.”13 It was men like Mariano Otero who agonised over the
introduction of these systems of government, who sought the ironclad constitution to
end Mexico’s woes. This was the time when “la ideología y los fundamentos del Estado
mexicano moderno” were being defined, leading Córdoba Ramirez to argue that
se trató de un periodo pleno de procesos, de enfrentamientos y de decisiones que
involucraron actores dentro y fuera de las inciertas y cambiantes fronteras
naciones. En este sentido, estudiar el proceder de los individuos dentro de las
colectividades, dígase facciones, partidos, masas y elites, es tan valioso como el
análisis de éstas para entender la dinámica del momento.14
This move to study the period and the context by focusing on an individual is by no
means new.
The writing of historical biography, however, is often dismissed in favour of a
history which “purged of fables would focus on processes, rather than personalities, and
11 Josefina Z. Vázquez, “Centralistas,” p. 116.
12 Cecilia Noriega and Erika Pani, “Las propuestas ‘conservadoras’ en la década de 1840,” in Pani,
Conservadurismo y Derechas, I, p.175.
13 Ibid.
14 Diana Irina Córdoba Ramírez, Manuel Payno: Los Derroteros de un Liberal Moderado (Michoacán: El
Colegio de Michoacán, 2006), p. 11.
4on interests, rather than on individuals.” 15 This is considered as a reaction to the
“biographies of great men” school of thought, dealing only with rulers and heroes,
embodied more than by any other, by the writings of Thomas Carlyle.16 In recent
decades, however, there has been a return to studying the individual, and biography has
now taken on the role of “adjudicating between its single, singular subjects, and their
times, their cultures, the collective humanity they represent.” 17 Since the 1990s, a
perceptible shift can be identified from an emphasis on social history to “a
concentration on individual life experiences and how they could be probed for deeper
meaning; […] an endeavour to discern through the lives of individuals or families the
broader contours of the social and cultural landscape.”18 Mexican historiography has
followed this general trend and it is now accepted that
para entender la vida política del pasado también es necesario estudiar a los
actores particulares y analizar los acontecimientos que marcaron la época en
cuestión. De este modo, se puede apreciar que el funcionamiento real de la vida
política, así como su evolución y desarrollo, dependieron tanto de los procesos y
estructuras de este medio, como de los imaginario y acciones de los diferentes
protagonistas,19
culminating in a move to approach the nineteenth century in Mexico through the study
of key individuals.20 These biographical studies are closely tied to a concept of a ‘total
15 Harold Brackman, “‘Biography Yanked down out of Olympus’: Beard, Woodward, and Debunking
Biography,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), p. 406.
16 Thomas Carlyle was of the belief that “Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in
this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men”, Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes and Hero Worship
and the Heroic in History (London: Chapman and Hall, Strand, 1849).
17 Reed Whittemore, “Biography and Literature,” The Sewanee Review, Vol. 100, No. 3 (Summer, 1992),
pp. 382-383.
18 Ronalf Hoffman, “Preface,” in Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, & Frederika J. Teute (Eds.), Through
the Glass Darkly; reflections on personal identity in Early America (North Carolina; London: University
of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. vii-viii.
19 Catherine Andrews, Entre la espada y la constitución: el general Anastasio Bustamante, 1780-1853
(Tamaulipas: Universidad Autónoma de Tamaulipas, H. Congreso del Estado de Tamaulipas, LX
Legislatura, 2008), p. 9.
20 Some of the most important recent biographical works include; Will Fowler, Santa Anna of Mexico
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), Guy P. Thompson with David G. LaFrance,
Patriotism, Politics and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the
Puebla Sierra (Wilmington, DE : SR Books, 1999), Brian Hamnett, Juárez (London: Longman, 1994),
Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz (Harlow [etc.]: Longman, 2001), Laura Solares Robles, Una revolución
pacífica: biografía política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1789-1851 (Mexico City: Instituto de
Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora, Acervo Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores,
5history’ whereby the actions of the individual and their justification for said actions
allow the historian to explore and understand both intimately, and through the
individual, and on a general scale, through their context, to ascertain how a given
element of society faced the problems of their day. It is the aim of this thesis to use this
approach to examine Mariano Otero, Mexican politician and ideologue.
This raises the obvious question; why Mariano Otero? Who was he? What was
the importance of his contributions to the budding nation? Known, primarily through
the historiography as a legislator, this was not his only sphere of influence. He was
politically active at a national level for a short ten years and yet he played a leading role
in the events between his arrival in the capital from his native Guadalajara and his early
death during the 1850 cholera epidemic. These were turbulent times, when internal
power struggles gave way to a desperate battle for survival in the face of the US
invasion. Acknowledged an inspirational orator by friend and foe alike, he was also a
shrewd politician and quickly became a central player in the Mexican political arena.
Otero belonged
a una generación de políticos e intelectuales conocida como la generación de la
reforma, que nació con la independencia, se formó al mismo tiempo que se
establecía la república, y en algunos casos se incorporó al proceso de formación
del Estado mexicano con su participación activa en la política y la vida
intelectual de las ciudades provinciales y del Distrito Federal.21
It was this generation that that would go on to take part in the Guerra de Reforma, and
write the 1857 Liberal constitution and produce leaders such as Presidents Ignacio
Comonfort and Benito Juárez. Otero’s contemporaries included politicians of such
calibre as Lucas Alamán, José María Luis Mora, José María Tornel, Antonio López de
Santa Anna, Valentín Gómez Farías, Mariano Arista, José María Lafragua and Mariano
Consejo Estatal para la Cultura y las Artes del Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1996), Córdoba
Ramírez, Manuel Payno.
21 The original quote refers to Ponciano Arriaga, and can be found in Sergio A. Cañedo Gamboa and
María Isabel Monroy Castillo, Ponciano Arriaga, formación de un liberal 1811 – 1847 (San Luis Potosí,
Mexico: Gobierno del Estado, Archivo Histórico del Estado de San Luis Potosí, 2008), p. 10.
6Riva Palacio. Compared with these men, Mariano Otero’s part in nineteenth century
history may have been brief but it was a dynamic one. Between 1841 and 1850, he
proposed and amended two constitutions, represented the nation as a congressional
deputy, and later as a senator, held the office of Minister of Internal and Foreign Affairs,
and became the ideological standard bearer of the Moderate movement, and he was
scarcely into his thirties when he died.
Nonetheless, as can be seen in Chapter 1, which will present an in-depth review
of the available historiography, Otero has been generally overlooked. What studies do
exist present a hazy picture of an Otero in a vacuum, with no sense of his place in the
events of his time yet Otero’s actions, ideas and participation in the events of that
decade were widely discussed by his contemporaries. Historiographically, they have
been studied by several disciplines. One of his most important accomplishments, his
Ensayo sobre el verdadero estado de la cuestión social y política que se agita en la
República Mexicana (1842) has been hailed as one of the great pieces of writing of the
first half of the nineteenth century. Its importance lies in its novel approach to the study
of history as an explanatory stepping stone in understanding the present and, thereby,
indicating remedies to bring about a better future. The legal discipline examining
Otero’s output and his work on several constitutions as a lawyer and as a legislator,
concentrated particularly on Otero as the father of the Juicio de Amparo. The law —
which is included in Article 25 of the 1847 Acta, and is the first national definition of an
individual’s rights, vis à vis the state— is still in use today but this is an aspect of his
work that this thesis does not propose to study, preferring to explore the wider and less
well known connotations of his moderate views, his staunch federalism and
constitutionalism and the apparent ambivalences within them, and the legislation they
produced. It also focused on the Acta de Reformas which Otero presented in congress
7as a reform to the 1824 constitution, reinstated by the government in 1846. This Acta
and the Voto particular de la minoría Otero placed before congress in 1842 are the
reasons why he has been acknowledged as a brilliant constitutionalist. They are an
integral part of studies on the development of Mexico as a nation-state and were of
considerable influence, even seven years after his death, in the process leading to the
writing of the 1857 liberal constitution. On the whole, however, Otero has been seen by
historians as an insubstantial figure in the background of the central personage or event
under study without being adequately evaluated in his own right. This thesis is an
attempt to remedy this.
The first part of Chapter 1 looks at Otero’s “official” biographer, the historian
and politician, Jesús Reyes Heroles, and seeks to revaluate his contribution to the
current image of Mariano Otero. The remainder of the chapter addresses the different
aspects of Mariano Otero’s thought as presented by historians, including the
historiography of the Ensayo, and his importance to legislative historians. The
information in this chapter will underscore the point of this thesis that, although much
has been written about Mariano Otero, no coherent portrait of the man has yet emerged.
Most of the available historiography pinpoints either one single aspect or a specific time
in Otero’s life and, therefore, provides an incomplete, fragmentary and often
contradictory picture. This thesis proposes to discover Mariano the man and politican,
through a complete re-examination of his life, and through his political ideology, its
moulding by the events of the time or its compromises to accommodate them, to an
understanding of his importance, or otherwise, in the forging and guiding of the new
nation at a critical point in its evolution.
Chapter 2 provides a biographical sketch, the aim of which is to present to the
reader with an overall view of the life of Mariano Otero. Following a brief glance at his
8earlier years in Jalisco, it pays close attention to the 1840s, the decade of his intense
political activity. In addition, it analyses the national scene, delineating the rise and fall
of governments, the convening and dissolving of congresses and, the most crucial event
of all – the war with the United States from 1846 to 1848. These were the events
shaping Mexico and, in doing so, shaped the men whose business it was to build a new
nation. The biography takes the first few steps towards forming a “total” view of Otero
as a man who was more than a politician. The chapter uses his personal correspondence,
and other primary and secondary sources to paint a picture of his family life, of the
personal trials he faced and the losses he endured. At the same time, Chapter 2 provides
the historical context in which he lived, showing how the events of the decade affected
his day to day life.
Having established a chronology of Otero’s life, Part II of this thesis will present
an analysis of his political thought, clarifying his ideological position by analysing the
ideas and ideals he expressed in his writings, newspaper articles, letters, and in his
appearances in congress and in the senate. Jesús Reyes Heroles’ compendium of Otero’s
works has been invaluable in this task, and has been expanded and complemented by
letters, press articles, and congressional transcripts.
The early section of Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the moderado
faction, for if Otero is to be taken as the archetypal moderate –and his contemporaries
referred to him as such– it is imperative to ascertain exactly what it meant to be a
moderado in the 1840s, and which, if any, of his actions or beliefs belie or enhance
what may possibly be an oversimplification of his political stance. In addition, it will
delineate Otero’s método, outlining that his approach to the analysis of the problems of
Mexico was historical, and highlighting the emphasis he placed on sociological factors.
Following a thematic approach, the second part of Chapter 3 will provide a general
9overview of Otero’s position on the great issues of the decade as he, and his
contemporaries, saw them; the colonial legacy and the repercussions of the struggle for
independence, the social question, the distribution of property, the decaying state of all
branches of government and the divisiveness caused by factional politics. In addition
this chapter will briefly introduce three key questions that Otero faced and which will
form the basis of the subsequent chapters; the position of the clergy in the early national
period, the interference of the military in the affairs of the state and the question of the
most suitable system of government.
Chapter 4 explores the role of the military, as seen by Otero, in the early national
period, and during a time of heightened local military intervention in all levels of
Mexican life, and punctuated by the US invasion. Otero accepted the necessity of a
standing army but was adamant that it should not, under any circumstance, be permitted
to participate in politics. Examining colonial roots for the importance of the army, he
blamed the military for much of the unrest that plagued Mexico in the years after
independence and firmly believed that if there was to be any hope of progress the
army’s immediate response with a show of arms to all it disagreed with and its
usurpation of high political office to achieve its ends would need to be curbed. It would
have to be constitutionally curtailed and its role confined to defending the nation from
external attack. Internal defence would be provided by a National Guard and a police
force would be responsible for local and citizen security. Otero’s views and opinions on
the army are vital in defining his ideological position. This chapter highlights his
moderate stance, concluding that he was willing to compromise his political beliefs in
the interest of slow, moderate, reform which would not excite a backlash.
Chapter 5 examines Otero position on the Church and religion, looking initially
at the apparent contradiction of Otero’s Roman Catholic faith with his anticlericalism. It
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will explore his analysis of the historical position of the Church, its internal divisions
and the reasons he identified for its gradual loss of power. It will also explore his belief
that whereas the Church had been losing influence since colonial days, its enormous
wealth still made it a player to be reckoned with, in addition to attracting the attention of
an impecunious army needing financial backing to its local revolts, its more serious
military engagements with the United States and its meddlesome pronunciamientos
intended to pursue its own agenda, interpreted as that of its current leader and his
supporters. It goes on to present his views on Church influence in different areas, in
education, in daily life through its enormous property holdings, before moving on to
specific examples of his having to deal directly with the issues of clerical intervention in
politics. One such area was the government’s right to sell mortmain properties. Though
Otero believed that separation of Church and state was unquestionable, it becomes
apparent in this chapter that as far as he was concerned, the power of the Church was
already in decline and as such required little or no direct intervention.
Finally, Chapter 6 explores Otero’s solutions to the problems that Mexico was
facing from the point of view of his insistence on the introduction of a federalist system.
Again the first part of the chapter is dedicated to Otero’s historical analysis of
federalism, his criticism of the centralist constitutions of 1836 and 1843, and his
objections to constitutional proposals being discussed in the 1840s. In addition, this
chapter highlights the effects of his position as representative for the state of Jalisco,
renowned for its radical federalism, exploring the history of Guadalajaran federalism
and the influence of men like Prisciliano Sánchez on Otero’s political views. A radical,
uncompromising stance is obvious throughout –Otero was determined Mexico should
be federalist and was willing to go to great lengths to attain this but once again his
moderation becomes evident in his constant reiteration that it was not simply a question
11
of re-introducing the federalism of 1824, it was essential that it should be a form of
federalism entirely suited to the circumstances of the 1840s.
The figure that emerges from the biography is that of a devoted family man, a
jovial friend and a shrewd politician. Coupled with the thematic analysis of his ideology
it becomes clear that Otero was a man who shaped the events of the decade as much as
he was shaped by them. The moderation of his political ideology was born of necessity,
so despite the fact that he held radical views on the clergy, the army or the state, it was
evident to him that reform would not progress unless each step was carefully calculated.
It was this willingness to temper his views and re-examine and temper his goals to
prevent any backlash that identified him as typically moderate. He, and his fellow
moderates were men of conviction; they were not turncoats, nor were they indecisive;
they held clearly defined ideals and goals but were united, above all, in their pragmatic
approach to politics and in their willingness to engage in realpolitik even when doing so
meant that, like Otero, they would not see the results of their labour in their lifetimes.
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Part I.
The myth, the man.
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1.
The myth.
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the relevant
historiography pertaining to Mariano Otero, in order to understand how he has been
portrayed since his early death in 1850. The first available biography was published in
1937, by F. Jorge Gaixiola, and no other major work appeared until Jesús Reyes Heroles’
2-volume compilation, with its extensive introductory study, in 1967. 22 Otero was not
ignored in the interim, as specific articles, biographical sketches, and references to him
did appear from time to time. However, Reyes Heroles made Otero’s work accessible to
historians who were able to study his letters, speeches, articles, parliamentary activities,
and essays more conveniently. Reyes Heroles also positioned Otero firmly within the
1960s liberal historian’s view of the early national period. More recently, in the last two
decades, Otero has been singled out for reappraisal by historians such as Will Fowler
and Cecilia Noriega Elío and it is from these works that his true importance in the first
half of the nineteenth century was fully recognised.23
Although a parliamentarian in both congress and Senate, he was not a merely a
politician for he was also a lawyer, lawmaker, journalist and hombre de bien. He was,
for instance, the prime mover in the introduction, on a national level, of the Mexican
22 F. Jorge Gaxiola, Mariano Otero: creador del juicio de Amparo (Mexico City: Cultura, 1937). Though
this was indeed the first full biography published, the work falls within two categories. It is a text
exclusively about Otero, and yet, at the same time, it focuses only on his role in the creation of the Juicio
de Amparo. Jesús Reyes Heroles, Mariano Otero, Obras (Mexico City: Editorial Porrua, 1967).
23 Will Fowler highlights Otero’s importance as a key figure among the moderados in his chapter on the
proposals of the moderate factions in Mexico in the Age of the Proposals as well as in his article “El
pensamiento político de los moderados, 1838 - 1850: el proyecto de Mariano Otero,” in Brian
Connaughton et. al (eds.), Construcción de la legitimidad política en México (México: El Colegio de
Michoacán, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto
de Investigaciones Históricas, 1999) and Cecilia Noriega Elío underlines his importance as a politician
and ideologist see Cecilia Noriega Elío, El Constituyente de 1842 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1986) and her chapter “Mariano Otero,” in
Juan A. Ortega y Medina, Rosa Camelo, Historiografía mexicana. Vol. 3, El surgimiento de la
historiografía nacional (Mexico City: UNAM, 1997).
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amparo legislation, which has meant that Otero’s role as a legislator has widely been
lauded by legislative historians and lawmakers as being of key importance in the
formation of modern Mexican legislation. As such, any review of the research on Otero,
must encompass other disciplines. It is for this reason that this chapter reviews the
historiography thematically, as opposed to adopting a chronological approach. It does so
by approaching the subject from three viewpoints. The first encompasses the handful of
works published specifically about Otero; Reyes Heroles, with his Mariano Otero,
Obras, Guillermo Tovar de Teresa, with his Cartas a Mariano Otero, and F. Jorge
Gaxiola, with Mariano Otero: creador del juicio de Amparo. 24 Here the writers
examine Otero as a politician and ideologue but without neglecting other aspects of his
life, his education and influences, his contributions to legislation and his writings and
speeches. The second section covers those authors who focus on a single aspect of
Otero’s work, as a politician, as a legislator, as a writer, or those who concentrate on a
single aspect of Otero’s career, such as the Juicio de Amparo, where Otero’s juridical
role is often examined with no reference to his other works. Also included in this
section are those works that analysed a specific element of Otero’s work or ideology
without being part of a chronological narrative, such as Adriana Berrueco García who
examines him as a jurist, José Francisco Zavala Castillo who concentrates on the Juicio
de Amparo and Will Fowler who presents Otero within the context of the moderates.25
This section will also examine the historiography of Otero’s Ensayo. Charles Hale,
Enrique González Pedrero, and David Brading all examine his best known work, either
24 Guillermo Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero 1829 – 1845 (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de
Antropología e Historia: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1996). Gaxiola, Mariano Otero.
25 Adriana Berrueco García, Veinticinco forjadores de la tradición Jurídica Mexicana (Mexico City:
UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones históricas, 2006). José Francisco Zavala Castillo, ¿Fórmula Otero?
Exégesis del Artículo 25 de la Acta de Reformas de 1847 (Mexico City: FUNDAp, 2005). Fowler, Mexico
in the Age of the proposals and “El Pensamiento Político,” and, by the same author “Dreams of Stability:
Mexican Political Thought during the ‘Forgotten Years’. An Analysis of the Beliefs of the Creole
Intelligentsia (1821-1853),” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Sep., 1995).
15
as a social critique or as representative of his ideology. 26 The remaining section briefly
notes those works where Mariano Otero is mentioned as a participator in the key events
of the early national period, thereby indicating his importance but without dwelling on
him as a central figure. Many of the most important general histories of the period do
mention him and his participation in crucial events, among them those written by
Michael Costeloe, Moisés González Navarro, Pedro Santoni.27 Others mention specific
details or events. Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, and Charles Hale,
all explore his role during the Mexican-US war.28 Eduardo Noriega uses Mariano Otero
to define the conservative groups of the period.29 José Miguel Quintana, Thomas Ewing
Cotner, Laura Solares Robles, all include him as a leading player in their biographies of
some of the great men of the period. 30 Silvestre Villegas Revueltas examines his
methodology. 31 Cecilia Noriega Elio assesses his role in the 1842 congress. 32 All
produce snippets of information but none contextualise their conclusions and he is never
quite in focus in their studies, he is merely a facilitator or an opportune player in the
general scheme of things.
26 Charles A. Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano en la Época de Mora, 1821 – 1853 (Mexico City: Siglo
Veintiuno Editores, 1987). Enrique González Pedrero, País de un solo hombre: El México de Santa Anna
(Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003). D. A. Brading, “Creole Nationalism and Mexican
Liberalism,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2. (May 1973).
27 Michael Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico 1835 – 1846. Hombres de Bien in the Age of Santa
Anna (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1993). Moisés González Navarro, Anatomía del
Poder en México 1848 – 1853 (El Colegio de México, 1977). Pedro Santoni, Mexicans at Arms. Puro
federalists and the politics of war 1845 – 1848 (Texas: Christian University Press, 1997).
28 Josefina Z. Vázquez, (Ed.), México al tiempo de su guerra con Estados Unidos (1846 – 1848) (Mexico
City: Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, El Colegio de México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997).
Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, “El Congreso y la guerra con los Estados Unidos 1846 – 1848,” in Vázquez,
México al tiempo. Charles A. Hale, “The War with the United States and the Crisis in Mexican Thought,”
The Americas, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Oct., 1957).
29 Eduardo Noriega, Pensamiento conservador y conservadurismo mexicano (Mexico City: Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1993).
30 José Miguel Quintana, Lafragua: Político y romántico (Mexico City: Colección Metropolitana, 1974).
Cotner, The Military and Political Career of José Joaquín de Herrera (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1949). Solares Robles, Una revolución pacífica.
31 Silvestre Villegas Revueltas, El Liberalismo Moderado en México 1852 – 1864 (Mexico City:
Universidad Nacional de México 1992)
32 Noriega Elío, El Constituyente.
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Foremost in the first section, dealing with those writing specifically on Otero, is
Reyes Heroles. His compendium of Otero’s works includes an Estudio Preliminar
which, according to the author, is intended to provide a “visión general” of Otero. It
also outlines “su contribución al proceso histórico nacional,” “los rasgos salientes de su
concepción y método” and, finally, offers us “noticias sobre su vida.”33 Reyes Heroles
places Otero in a second generation of liberals, which he describes as being those who
had never experienced the old colonial order, having been born during the struggle for
Independence, and yet found its lingering vestiges stalling all their efforts at creating a
new order.34 He sees Otero as a figure that, as a possible result of his premature death,
was sidelined by the events of the second half of the nineteenth century. This was why
Reyes Heroles postulated that the image we had of him was unbalanced. He argued that
there had been only two historiographical views of Otero and that they were the cause
of this distortion. The first, as described by Guillermo Prieto, was that of the jolly youth
hunched over his El Siglo XIX editorials, a vivacious compañero, and magnificent
orator capable of improvising three-hour speeches. This view Reyes Heroles contrasted
with the dry and precise lawyer, creator of the Juicio de Amparo, whose political actions
and ideological standpoints are seen either as peripheral to this one act or even ignored
completely.35 Until Reyes Heroles’ Estudio Preliminar, these were indeed the main
ways in which the figure of Otero was presented. Although he appeared in many
primary accounts of the mid-nineteenth century it was never as anything more than just
another player, another politician, a participant in events. He was not a topic of great
33 Reyes Heroles, Mariano Otero, Obras, I, p. 9.
34 By second generation, Reyes Heroles is referring to those who were not politically active during the
War of Independence and who did not become so until the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The
first generation would encompass those who fought in the war or who took an active part in the political
upheavals immediately following Independence, participating in the first congresses and the writing of
the first laws and constitutions of newly independent Mexico. These included, most notably, some of the
most important figures of the time; Lucas Alamán, José María Luis Mora, Valentín Gómez Farías,
Manuel Gómez Pedraza. Reyes Heroles, Mariano Otero, Obras, I, p. 10.
35 Ibid., I, pp. 10-11.
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national discussion as were personalities such as Santa Anna or Benito Juárez. With the
exception of Gaxiola’s book, Reyes Heroles was the first author to grant any
prominence to Otero. Prior to his Estudio in 1967, he had published the three volumes
of his El Liberalismo Mexicano, in which he mentioned Otero, concentrating
exclusively on the Ensayo.36 Throughout the work he outlined the main points before
going on to offer a succinct analysis of “el método de Otero.” Initially he merely
paraphrased the Ensayo. However he also took the next step, analysing the Ensayo in
terms of Otero’s pioneering methodology for political and social research. 37 This
método he defined as a move from a subjective analysis of events to an objective
analysis of Mexico’s past, and it is this approach that Reyes Heroles suggests was
groundbreaking. Reyes Heroles added that once this shift in analysis was accomplished,
Otero sought to define social class and highlight the role it played in political, social and
economic events. In order to achieve this, he wanted to identify and analyse the factors
that influenced class relations as well as the contradictions, consequences and influence
that they had on society as whole. Finally, Reyes Heroles argued, Otero wanted to use
the information he had garnered to assist the reader in seeing what lay in store for the
young country.38 Reyes Heroles’ analysis of the Ensayo is, however, fairly superficial.
He went into no depth and simply summarized Otero’s main points, dividing the Ensayo
into basic, accessible, sections. In these, he specifically highlighted the social aspects of
Otero’s work focusing on the relationships of the clergy and the army with society, as
well as underlining Otero’s description of class divisions and the importance of the
distribution of property. Charles Hale argued that in his writings Reyes Heroles was
concerned particularly with drawing attention to “la herencia del ‘liberalismo social’ del
36 Reyes Heroles, El liberalismo Mexicano (Mexico City: Facultad de Derecho: UNAM, 1958). Chapter
III, Las Fuerzas en Pugna, is the main section dealing with Otero, pp. 89-137, including, on page 137 a
reproduction of a grabado of Mariano Otero, one of the few surviving images of the man.
37 Ibid., I, p. 89.
38 Ibid., II, p. 92.
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siglo XIX para el México revolucionario.”39 Francisco Valdés Ugalde goes so far as to
state that it was Reyes Heroles, in 1854, that introduced the concept of ‘liberalismo
social’ into the official discourse of the Mexican government.40 As such, Reyes Heroles’
emphasis on Otero’s Ensayo is understandable, describing it as he did as “un examen
magistral de la sociedad colonial al consumarse la independencia y de las
modificaciones sufridas por ésta en los primeros años de la independencia.”41
Writing in 1958, Reyes Heroles, considered that Otero had not been studied
appropriately, attributing such oversight to the fact that his Ensayo had not received the
attention it deserved. This is one aspect that changed dramatically in the ensuing
decades, as the Ensayo is now the most well-known of Otero’s works and, undoubtedly,
the most cited. Reyes Heroles went on to make the fundamental point, as valid now as it
was 50 years ago, that;
a los anteriores factores, que explican el poco conocimiento de algunos aspectos
del pensamiento de Otero, hay que añadir la dispersión de la obra que no se
concentra en el Ensayo, sino que se extiende a discursos, intervenciones,
legislación, artículos periodísticos y biografías, material difícil de conseguir.42
Nine years later, Reyes Heroles published his two volumes of Otero’s work and
although much of his ideology and thought was instantly more easily accessible, the
customary bias of seeing only the Ensayo, and not looking beyond it still remained in
any consideration of Mariano Otero’s social and political standpoint. Yet, it has to be
said that, even with these books, there was no easy way of studying his ideology,
39 Charles A. Hale, “Los mitos políticos de la nación mexicana: el liberalismo y la Revolución,” Historia
Mexicana, Vol. 46, No. 4, Homenaje a don Edmundo O'Gorman (Apr. - Jun., 1997), p. 828.
40 Valdés Ugalde takes it a step forward and, supporting the view that the government sought to
demonstrate that the liberal policies of the mid to late 20th century had been born in the 19th century, states
that “el ideólogo del Estado mexicano [Reyes Heroles] buscaba señalar que el liberalismo social había
surgido debido a que los reformistas liberales del siglo XIX habían topado con el problema de la extrema
desigualdad y para hacerle frente, a la vez que se ponía en marcha una economía moderna de mercado,
consideraron que era indispensable mantener en manos del Estado el control sobre las formas de
propiedad, subordinándolas a las necesidades del desarrollo social”. See, Francisco Valdés Ugalde,
“Concepto y estrategia de la ‘reforma del Estado,’” Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Apr.
- Jun., 1993), p. 326.
41 Reyes Heroles, El Liberalismo, II, p. 89.
42 Ibid., p. 113-114.
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making it difficult to formulate a straightforward and definitive view. The manner in
which his thoughts and opinions are strewn across a variety of documents, in addition to
being contained in letters and parliamentary appearances not included in these two
volumes, has meant that it is still easier to approach and analyse the one piece of work
where his thoughts are clearly set out as the one that defines his political ideology as a
whole.
In the “Estudio Preliminar” that prefaced these two volumes, Reyes Heroles did
include a great deal of biographical information on Otero and continued to expand on
the points he had presented earlier in El Liberalismo Mexicano. He still highlighted the
Ensayo and the método but took it further. By bringing together a wide selection of
Otero’s writings, speeches and letters he emphasised the need to define him through all
his actions and all his works not just a select few and, indeed, was taking first steps
towards doing just that. The work does provide a very clear and concise chronology of
the principal events in Otero’s life, and most of the gaps that exist in the information
pertaining to his early life are the consequence of the lack of available sources.
However, in the section on Otero’s political life in the capital, what information is given
is frequently not contextualised and this gives the impression that Mariano Otero was
acting in a vacuum where his political and parliamentary actions were not a
consequence of or influenced by outside events. In addition, the Estudio gave an overly
positive view of Otero. Any unfavourable aspect, such as his behaviour in the revolt of
the Polkos, if noted at all, was glossed over; there was no inquiry into the motivations
compelling his actions nor was there any move to reconcile these with his ideology. As
Reyes Heroles himself acknowledged, it is merely a work of “grandes pinceladas,” a
sketch lacking substance.
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The Estudio Preliminar and the introductory pages to each item collected in the
Obras, remain to this day, the most often quoted works on Otero. When Otero is
mentioned, be it by historians or constitutional specialists, Reyes Heroles’ analysis is
often the basis of their references. Jesús Reyes Heroles was an active member of the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and was considered one of their principal
ideologues writing a history of liberalism, as well as essays and speeches designed to
support what can be termed as the “official liberal interpretation of nineteenth-century
politics.”43 This interpretation highlights what Hale defines as the “continuidad del
liberalismo” a phrase he attributes to Reyes Heroles who he describes as “quizás el más
prominente intelectual dentro del gobierno entre los años cincuenta y setenta.”44 Hale
added that as of the early 1950s Reyes Heroles sought to reaffirm “la validez de la
perpetua revolución al asegurar la continuidad del liberalismo, es decir, la rica herencia
proporcionada por las ideas liberales para el México contemporáneo.”45 As such, in his
work, he portrayed Otero as the harbinger of those liberals who emerged after the
Revolution and, not surprisingly, sought to tie in Otero’s ideas with those held by the
victorious party. For example Reyes Heroles argued that Otero called for national
representation to reflect the makeup of society as a whole by including the different
parts that formed it.46 He further emphasised that it was this generation of liberals, to
which Otero belonged, that went on to write the 1857 Liberal Constitution and that they
had sought for the conservatives to be represented in congress and that it was the latter
that refused, hurling the country into a downward spiral of bipartisanship and eventual
bloodshed that would not end until the liberal victory at the end of the Revolution. Such
43 Charles A. Hale, “The Liberal Impulse: Daniel Cosío Villegas and the Historia moderna de México,”
The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Aug., 1974), p. 494.
44 Hale, “Los mitos políticos,” p. 826.
45 Ibid., pp. 826-827.
46 Jesús Reyes Heroles, “Discurso pronunciado en el auditorio del Comité Directivo Estatal del PRI en
Morelos, 30 Julio 1973,” in Obras Completas. Política II (Mexico City: Asociación de estudios históricos
y políticos Jesús Reyes Heroles, A.C. Secretaría de Educación Pública. Fondo de Cultura Económica,
1996), p 134.
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a narrow view did not allow any deviation –liberals good, conservatives bad.
Conservatives and conservatism were therefore rejected and reviled, or, wherever
possible ignored completely.47 Otero had to be shown to be a liberal in every aspect,
otherwise doubt could be cast on this interpretation of nineteenth-century Mexican
history. This is why there are no grey areas in Reyes Heroles’ analysis of Otero and any
that did emerge, such as his unexpected support of the Church during the war with the
United States, or his traditionalist views on suffrage, were brushed aside. When
discussing social history and Otero’s views, he argued that “estos antecedentes vinieron
a ser el sentimiento de esta eclosión que constituye nuestra revolución social, la
Revolución Mexicana.”48 Faced with a constant need to reassert the legitimacy and
correct position of the party in power Reyes Heroles frequently favoured Otero to
highlight this lineal history of Mexican liberalism that ran from the liberal victory after
the war of reform until the PRI lost power. In doing so, he not only excluded what he
considered opposing factions, such as the conservatives and monarchists, but he also
ignored any differences within the liberal faction itself.49 The Otero that will emerge
from this thesis, in contrast is above all an individual. Ideological leader of his faction,
but, nonetheless, a man whose ideas were his own and whose actions were deeply
affected by the times in which he lived.
47 In recent years there has been a clear move away from this tendency and important works have been
written on the conservative ideas and ideologues of the early national period; see Pani, Conservadurismo
y Derechas, Alfonso Noriega, El pensamiento, or Will Fowler and Humberto Morales Moreno, El
conservadurismo mexicano en El Siglo XIX (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla,
1999).
48 Jesús Reyes Heroles, “Antecedentes sociales y legales del seguro social en Mexico. 22 Julio 1961,” in
Obras Completas, II, p 455.
49 Heroles did admit that there were different factions within the Liberal movement. However he stated
that the only real division between moderates and puros was the time frame in which each wanted reform
to take place. At no point did he allow that they may have had more specific ideologies, defined by the
members of each group. Jesús Reyes Heroles. “Las Ideas democráticas en México. Independencia y
Reforma. Ensayo para la Mesa Redonda de Historia Mexicana de la Fundación Carnegie, México, Julio
de 1961,” in Jesus Reyes Heroles, Historia y Política (Spain: Editorial Tecnos, 1978), pp. 110 - 111
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Reyes Heroles’ lack of balance was noted in Guillermo Tovar de Teresa’s
introduction to his 1996 compilation, Cartas a Mariano Otero, when he acknowledged
Reyes Heroles’ study as the most important work on Otero, but accused him of
resurrecting the figure of Otero merely to “colocarlo junto a los aportadores positivos,
los liberales, de acuerdo a la historia que hace la Revolución Mexicana.”50 This stinging
criticism did not, in any way, affect Tovar de Teresa’s view on the importance of Reyes
Heroles’ work but, positioned him within the general historiography of the period, as he
sought to demonstrate why Otero had been neglected arguing that historians had in the
past “exagerado los movimientos liberales, sus ideas, construyendo una visión lineal de
los ‘buenos’ hasta dejar en el olvido a los conservadores.”51 This, Tovar de Teresa
argued, created nothing more than “una historia limitada y rígida en la que Otero,
víctima de su moderación, fue más estudiado por los juristas que por los historiadores y
politólogos.”52 Although he did not say so explicitly, he was indicating that Mariano
Otero, a moderado who was too liberal for the conservatives, was still too conservative
to be considered as a ‘real’ liberal. Indeed, it was not until quite recently that the
moderados were seen as a politically distinct group. Until then, there had been liberals
and conservatives and anyone who was neither one nor the other was merely a turncoat,
hedging his bets, as the times and events dictated. However, in the last 25 years there
has been a move away from the bipolar view of politics in the mid-nineteenth century
and a moderado group has been distinguished, with specific ideals, of which Mariano
Otero is the embodiment, and with a distinct set of goals;
Los moderados fueron aquellos que plantearon un proyecto liberal y progresista
que surgió de dentro de las filas del partido del orden. […] no quisieron imponer
un cambio que fuera demasiado drástico. Buscaban un cambio paulatino y
evolucionista que con el tiempo afianzara las reformas que creían necesarias
50 Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 18.
51 Ibid., p. 17.
52 Ibid.
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para que el país pudiera gobernarse siguiendo principios democráticos que
estarían garantizados en una constitución representativa, popular y federal.53
Tovar de Teresa went on to present a brief summary of Otero’s life as a whole,
including his role as editor of El Siglo XIX, political actions and theoretical
contributions. He was the first, through the collection of letters he edited, to highlight
Mariano Otero’s more ‘human’ side, “este Otero atiende a los amigos, a los menos
amigos y también a los desfavorecidos.”54 He was trying to piece together a flesh and
blood Otero, not just the politician, ideologue and theorist but also the lawyer, family
man and friend. Tovar de Teresa was only taking the first tentative steps in that
direction; his introduction was just that, a short and concise prologue to the day-to-day
life of Mariano Otero that could be gleaned from a section of his correspondence.
However, he did provide a general overview of the period, from 1829 to 1845, and his
selection of the correspondence invited further study.
Before moving on to those academics who deal with certain aspects of Otero’s
works or ideology, it is necessary to draw attention to the lesser known biography of
Otero - Jorge Gaxiola’s monograph, written in 1937. Where Reyes Heroles may be
accused of skating over certain aspects of Otero’s ideas or actions, Gaxiola ignores them
completely. Otero’s role in the 1842 congress, the war with the United States and the
Juicio de Amparo are the only parts of his political life that he touches upon, merely
pinpointing certain aspects of Otero’s life in a brief biographical introduction and an
equally brief conclusion detailing his death, although a sense of the whole is provided
with general information on the period. If one were to read only this biography of Otero,
one would emerge with a totally fragmented view. However, it is interesting that even
in 1937 Gaixiola was ready to argue that Otero had been forgotten by subsequent
generations. Furthermore, this biography is perhaps the first example of a
53 Fowler, “El Pensamiento Político,” p. 299
54 Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 21.
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historiographical approach to Otero that gives a brief overview of the totality of Otero’s
life, but fixates mainly on one aspect of his career, the Juicio de Amparo.
This tendency to analyse only a particular aspect of Otero’s work or ideology is
widespread in the available literature. With the move away from the monochrome view
of the liberal conservative divide, much has been done to re-define the political factions
of the early national period. Otero’s moderation, touched upon above, is no exception.
Fowler seeks to place Otero within his political context and explores his ideological
stance as a moderado by assessing his actions and writings; he succeeds in taking the
first steps towards the definition of the moderado faction. In his chapter, “El proyecto
de Mariano Otero” he defines the moderate goals, as presented by the moderates
themselves. 55 One needs to take into account, however, that this set of political goals
and aspirations can only be applied to the moderados as a cohesive group after the late
1830s, and even then, as alliances shifted and circumstances changed, individuals were
constantly redefining their ideological standpoint and political allegiances. That said,
there was a distinguishable, though not necessarily immutable moderado faction from
1838, and it was only then that the men who held similar views began to identify
themselves as such. Fowler presents Mariano Otero as the great moderate ideologue.
Otero was, after all, the only moderado to produce a cohesive proposal for moderate
reform and to outline the methods he felt could be used successfully to achieve these
goals. Fowler is in no doubt that further study is needed on Mariano Otero’s
contribution to the political events of the 1840s, as well as his personal and social
writings and parliamentary actions. This is essential in order to clarify the position of
the moderados within the decade that saw them take an active part in great political
events, often wielding the power to make or break governments, and whose legislative
55 Fowler, “El Pensamiento Político.”
25
agenda led to some of the greatest political and constitutional changes in independent
Mexico. Furthermore, it was to be this decade, the 1840s, which shaped the moderate
agenda as pursued by the three principal moderado presidents, leading to the Ayutla
Revolution and the 1857 Constitution. In order to accurately assess the importance of
any action within the period, it is necessary to show that much of what occurred was not
just squabbling between liberals, but that by the late 1830s there was a distinct and
defined group of moderados that, while still liberal, was not simply a wayward group
stemming from the puros but a cohesive unit with its own aspirations and ideologies, all
embodied in its greatest theorist, Mariano Otero.
Regardless of this reassessment, it becomes quite obvious from the start that any
research into the available historiography pertaining to Otero will necessarily lead to the
Juicio de Amparo. Seen by some as “la aportación más importante que el derecho
mexicano ha efectuado a la cultura jurídica mundial,” the Juicio de Amparo and its
origins have been widely studied by legal historians.56 The Juicio de Amparo as it was
written into the 1847 Acta de reformas ensured that for the first time in Mexico, on the
national stage, and in a national constitution, the constitutional rights of the individual
were openly protected against attacks by the state, thus the individual was amparado or
56 The quote is from José Luis Soberanes Fernández, Faustino José Martínez Martínez, Fuentes para la
Historia del Juicio de Amparo (Mexico City, Senado de la Republica, 2004), p. 9. A great deal has been
written about the Juicio de Amparo, and the repercussions of Article 25 of the Acta de Reformas, because
if this, and because it’s importance is, above all, judicial I will not be going into any depth on this topic in
this thesis. It is important to note, without going into the judicial minutiae of the Amparo legislation, that
Article 25 is important because it demonstrates Otero’s insistence that the rights of the individual be
upheld against any attack from the state and that, above all, these be clearly and openly stated in the
constitution itself and thus guaranteed. For various studies on the Juicio de Amparo, see; José Luis
Soberanes Fernández, Evolución de la ley de Amparo (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones
Juridicas, Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 1994), José de Jesús Gudiño Pelayo, Introducción
al Amparo Mexicano (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas de la Universidad de
Guadalajara / ITESO, 1993), Soberanes Fernandez, Martínez Martínez, Fuentes, Hector Fix Zamudio,
Latinoamerica: Constitución, Proceso y Derechos Humanos (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrua, 1988),
José Barragán Barragán, Algunos Documentos para el Estudio del Origen del Juicio de Amparo 1812 –
1861 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1980) and by the same autor Primera Ley de Amparo de 1861 (Mexico City:
UNAM, 1987), among others.
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protected.57 Although there are those who find earlier antecedents, most legislative
historians have agreed that this concept was first aired in the 1840s, when it was
included in the 1841 Yucatán Constitution by Manuel Crescencio Rejón, and then by
Otero in 1847 in the Acta de Reformas.58 While both men are hailed as fathers of the
amparo, it is Otero’s role, in particular, that has been been lauded, for he was
responsible for the introduction of the law at a national level. José Barragán Barragán
pointed out that the 1847 Acta de Reformas was the basis of the 1857 Constitution,
arguing that its provisions were closely followed by the 1856 Constituent Congress,
even though it rejected a certain number of them. His introduction sets out the scope
and the nature of Otero’s ideology as deduced from the Acta de Reformas, prior to
moving on to study the modifications made to the amparo in the 1857 constitution and
in subsequent years, which he did by giving a breakdown of the 1847 proposals and
pursuing each individually, as he assessed the impact of Otero’s work. 59 This led him
to the conclusion that, however distant the current amparo legislation may be from that
expressly set out in the 1847 Acta, Otero is still to be considered as the father of the
amparo. This concentration on the amparo and its judicial repercussions, however,
means that Barragán does not make any attempt to examine Otero’s reasoning behind
the Acta de Reformas as a whole or why Otero so urgently wanted it to be approved and,
without this context, it is impossible to understand the greater importance and impact of
the legislation Otero was advocating.
57 The 25th article of the Acta Constitutiva y de Reformas, as published on the 21st of May 1847 states that;
“Los tribunales de la Federación ampararán a cualquier habitante de la República en el ejercicio y
conservación de los derechos que le concedan esta Constitución y las leyes constituicionales, contra todo
ataque de los Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo, ya de la Federación, ya de los estados; limitándose dichos
tribunales a impartir su protección en el caso particular sobre el que verse el proceso, sin hacer ninguna
declaración general respecto de la ley o del acto que la motivare.”
58 For a brief but thorough overview see the introduction to Barragán Barragán’s books on the Juicio de
Amparo.
59 José Barragán Barragán, “Primera Ley,” p. 11.
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José Luis Soberanes Fernandez agreed with Barragán Barragán that Otero’s
contribution and the Acta de Reformas that stemmed from it was the first and most
important step at a national level towards establishing a judicial safeguard against
constitutional violations. 60 He went so far as to argue that it was at this point that the
Mexican amparo was created, and by Otero, although he too explored other origins,
including Manuel Cresencio Rejon’s amparo in the Yucatán constitution in 1841 and
the precedent found in the 1812 Cadiz constitution. He clearly outlined what the
amparo sought to do in 1847, and highlighted its importance, writing little, however, on
Otero’s motivations or the political and social context in which it was written. Perhaps
the most important study on Otero and his contribution to the Juicio de Amparo debate
was the work of José Francisco Zavala Castillo.61 His intention was to position the Acta
de Reformas within the framework of national events, but also in the context of the
wider scope of Otero’s other works. He analyses the connection between the Voto de la
Minoría in 1842 and the Proyecto de Reformas in 1847, laments the lack of information
on Otero and presents a brief biography. This book is an extremely important step
towards contextualizing Otero. Zavala Castillo referred to a variety of Otero’s ideals at
several points in time permitting him to construct a complete image of the Acta de
Reformas and the motivation behind it, and to tie this in with the amparo concept as
seen by Otero himself. However, due to the limitations of a subject consisting of merely
the Acta de Reformas and the Juicio de Amparo, he really only sheds light on that one
aspect.
While the Jucio de Amparo has been studied by academics in the legal
disciplines, historians have always focused on one particular aspect of Otero’s ideology.
This is why no historiographical analysis can be complete without assessing the impact
60 Soberanes Fernández, Evolución.
61 Zavala Castillo, ¿Formula Otero?
28
of his major, and often it seems his only work, the Ensayo. Hale, González Pedrero and
Brading all analyse the Ensayo. Villegas Revueltas emphasises the methodology
developed in it. All the above mentioned general histories of the period cite the work at
least once, even if they do not go into any depth. It is quoted to support many different
issues; to assist in understanding the actions of the radicals in the 1830s, the social
situation of Mexico in the decades following independence and the development of a
new idea of history. 62 This one piece of work is the reason why Mariano Otero is
hailed as an outstanding political and social writer. As has already been stated, more
often than not, none of his other writings, speeches or letters are analysed so that there
is a limited awareness of Otero’s views on a variety of subjects.
Perhaps because of the confines of the period of his work, 1852-1864, Silvestre
Villegas merely glances over Otero’s contribution to the ideology of the moderate
factions prior to the 1850s. However he, like Reyes Heroles, discerns the novel
methodology displayed in the Ensayo when he makes the following very valid point;
Sin duda alguna fue el estudio con visos de cientificidad más importante que
revelaba el estado del país en ese momento coyuntural. Mostraba las
preocupaciones de un pequeño grupo de personas que se definirían en el futuro
como ‘los moderados’, no en cuanto a su existencia, pues ésta databa de tiempo
atrás, sino en una forma concreta de actuación política y definición de un
programa de trabajo que llevarían a cabo más adelante.63
Enrique González Pedrero is also aware of the importance of Otero’s work, positioning
it in the wider picture of what he refers to as the Mexico of Santa Anna. In País de un
solo hombre: El México de Santa Anna, we find a fairly accurate, if somewhat
simplistic, presentation of some of the main points made by Otero in his Ensayo. The
introduction employs a very basic paraphrasing of some of Otero’s salient points,
although in Chapter XIV, González Pedrero does go into a more detailed analysis of the
Ensayo and uses Otero’s ideas and opinions as a guideline to investigating aspects of
62 González Pedrero, País de un solo hombre, Vol. II.
63 Villegas Revueltas, El Liberalismo Moderado, p. 25.
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the 1833 Gómez Farias government, the reasons why it failed and the lessons that
should be learned from these mistakes. However, as in the introduction, he highlights
the main points, dividing the Ensayo into categories, “La aristocracia territorial,” “El
Clero,” “Los Propietarios, la industria, la minería y el comercio,” “El Ejército,” “Clases
no propietarias, o proletarias,” and “las Clases Intermedias.” He does not provide any
new insight into the Ensayo, nor does he reach any conclusions, for it is no more than a
description of Otero’s words, with no mention of their relevance to the times. His
analysis is simplistic, simplifying the existing political strife into “liberales y
conservadores” or making sweeping statements, “una sociedad que no ha logrado
integrar un Estado.”64 He merely presents Otero’s arguments, copying great sections of
text from the Ensayo without, at any point, developing Otero’s statements or
contextualising them specifically to the subject in hand –Santa Anna’s domination of
politics in the decades following Mexican independence. As such, we are merely left
with a paraphrase which adds nothing new to the analysis of the Ensayo.
Hale, too, focused on Otero’s methodology and on his Ensayo. He argued that
Otero was convinced that society also needed to be seen as a whole and not only in parts.
In addition, Hale discussed Otero’s view of historical inevitability –that one event leads
to the next and that no event can be studied in isolation. Hale described the Ensayo as
being “no solo una obra notable de penetrable análisis social, sino que representa un
cambio muy significativo en el pensamiento social Mexicano.”65 However, he went on
to suggest that Otero was unable to develop these ideas due to his early death and his
active role in politics as of 1842. This statement seems to argue that Otero’s activities in
politics were removed from his ideas, as opposed to seeing his political decisions and
actions as a further expression of his ideals, which can then be used to explain their
64 Gonzalez Pedrero, País de un solo hombre, p. 441.
65 Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano, p. 187.
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significance throughout his life and not merely at one point in time. This may have been
the reason he did not go on to use Otero’s later works and actions to explain how
moderate ideas changed and mutated in the later years of the 1840s decade. Fowler, on
the other hand, paves the way for further study by demonstrating the impossibility of
assessing the Ensayo, or any single work as an isolated piece of ideological and social
discourse, and underlines the need to place it within the events and the writings of the
time, in order to form a complete picture that enables us to assess the impact of this
major work.66 Due to the constraints of the chapter and article, he does not follow this
through, but it does show a slight shift in the historiographical tendencies to
approaching Otero’s works, a move to no longer considering the Ensayo in isolation;
the start of its depiction as a coherent set of opinions and arguments that shaped what
was to became a cohesive movement. At the present time, it remains just that, a slight
shift in perspective, and no further study has emerged to give it momentum.
One of the writers who did endeavour to place Otero’s Ensayo among the great
writers of his time was Jesús Silva Herzog.67 He gave a brief description of the content
of the Ensayo, along the typical lines of highlighting the salient points and quoting
solely the Ensayo but, although Silva Herzog included Otero with Zavala, Alamán and
Mora, he did no more than look at each in turn without actively comparing and
contrasting their ideas. It is inarguable, that the Ensayo is one of the greatest pieces of
social and political analysis produced by the moderados in the 1840s, “se trata de un
examen magistral de la sociedad colonial al consumarse la independencia y de las
modificaciones sufridas por ésta en los primeros años del México independiente.”68
However it is important to move on from the Ensayo, to explore the changing ideas that
66 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of the Proposals and “El Pensamiento Político.”
67 Jesus Silva Herzog, El pensamiento económico, social y político de México, 1810-1964 (Mexico City:
Instituto Mexicano de Investigación Económica, 1967).
68 Eduardo Castellanos Hernández, Formas de gobierno y sistemas electivos en México 1812-1940
(Mexico City: Centro de Investigación Científica, 1996).
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Otero portrayed throughout the decade in order to understand that what are often seen as
contradictions are merely the next stages of his political theory. The Ensayo cannot and
must not be seen as the sole repository/exponent of his ideals. When it was written,
Otero had only been in Mexico City for a short period of time. As his political
involvement grew so his ideas shifted and the Ensayo, although a perfect reflection of
the state of affairs in 1842, cannot be used to define Otero’s views in the late 1840s, nor
should it be held as a yardstick to measure his actions and reactions during the same
period. As it stands at the moment, there is still an unwillingness to construct a cohesive
timeline of events and to place Otero’s work within it; no effort has been made to marry
Otero’s later actions in his political career with the attitudes and ideas that he
proclaimed in his Ensayo. It is too often considered to be an isolated achievement, a
flash of brilliance, and this tends to leave a generally positive image of Mariano Otero
in all existing historiography. At the same time, however, the occasional references to
Otero when not linked to his Ensayo raise a large number of questions. The
contradictions that emerge in his career and personality, of which we have mentioned
but a few, are never explored. As will be seen in the following chapters, further study
does not seek to revile him; the contextualisation of later actions within the events of the
1840s will reshape the image we have of him, basing it on his lifetime achievements. In
addition it will examine actions apparently at odds with his political ideology but which
he felt forced into by the circumstances. The result is fair and balanced; errors or
contradictions, even if impossible to explain fully, are firmly placed in context. He no
longer appears as an insubstantial being, responsible for two or three great works, but as
a significant political figure whose actions and works are examined within the
significance of the times in which he lived.
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Undoubtedly, despite the comparatively little written about him, Mariano Otero
was a leading figure who appears time and time again in the most important books on
the 1840s. The studies written since the 1980s present Otero as central to some of the
key events of that decade; the series of pronunciamientos of 1841, the congresses of
1842 and 1846, the US War, the Acta de Reformas and the rebuilding of the nation after
defeat at the hands of the Americans. As such, in the Central Republic in Mexico 1835 –
1846, Michael Costeloe portrays Mariano Otero as a person of some consequence in
many of the events he details. He is seen as a crucial player in the 1842 congress, with
reference being made to his vital role in the discussion of the new constitution that split
the committee. Otero’s importance in the politics of the time is underlined by his arrest,
together with other prominent figures, Gómez Pedraza, Riva Palacio and Lafragua, in
1843, on the orders of Santa Anna. That Santa Anna was threatened by these men, to the
extent of having them arrested and kept in solitary confinement for over a month, is, for
Costeloe, a sign of the power and influence they wielded, not only in politics but also
through their writings in El Siglo XIX. González Navarro’s Anatomía del poder en
México, also highlights Otero’s importance, this time in the events of the late 1840s. He
draws attention not only to the positive aspects of his political and legislative career but
also points out the negative ones. Mariano Otero, he says, was involved in the
devastating Rebelión de los Polkos, and, in addition, accused Suárez Iriarte of
collaborating with the United States, a mere six weeks after Otero himself had requested
support from the US army to help subdue the rebellions in Yucatán. However,
González Navarro also draws attention to the less dramatic achievements of Mariano
Otero in his role as Ministro de Relaciones, his involvement with the reshaping of the
penal system or the improvement of the communication infrastructure. In Pedro
Santoni’s Mexicans at Arms we are given, yet another side to Otero. He is seen voting
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against the organisation of militias, unimaginable to anyone who was aware of his
staunch support for the militias as a balancing force to the regular army. No context is
given and, without it, Otero’s actions are contradictory; there is no way of knowing that
Otero’s vote was not against the reshaping of the militias, it was against their being
resurrected to be sent to do a job that was rightly the army’s prerogative: the re-
conquest of Texas. At the same time, Santoni succeeds in showing the less attractive
side of Otero. By focusing on the puro government and its actions, Mariano Otero
emerges as a slightly petty, very ‘party’ conscious politician, constantly plotting to
manoeuvre himself and the moderados into power but, at the same time, one who was
willing to push party concerns aside in order to pass legislation. The Otero that emerges
from these texts is full of contradictions; at times, the brilliant legislator and ideologue,
willing to stand up and defend the ideals he held so dear and yet, at other times, he is
also a selfish and self-centred youth, ready to do anything to discredit his opponents,
gain power for the moderados, and achieve his political aims.
Where his participation in certain events is not simply glossed over, such
inconsistencies appear often in the available historiography on Otero. Depending on the
specific event in which he is involved, a different figure is seen to emerge. During the
Mexican War with the United States, Otero played many roles. He was adamant in his
opposition to the war originally, then fervently in favour, and yet eventually, as a
minister, he was tireless in ensuring proper adhesion to the terms of the peace treaty. It
is because he did take different stands at different times that when he is studied in
conjunction within a particular context, it means that different perceptions of him and
his actions can be formed. In Sordo Cedeño’s essay on the role of the 1846 congress
during the war with the United States, we necessarily gain an insight into the part he
played in such an event, although there is little or no contextualisation of his
34
background, motives or his political objectives. As is so often the case, once again in his
need to show what Otero’s actions and decisions were at a specific point in time, the
author’s depiction of Mariano Otero is a fragmentary one. We see a negative portrayal
of Mariano Otero as an instigator of the Polkos rebellion, but we also see him
passionately eager to use any means to pass his Reform Bill before the dissolution of
congress. There is no attempt to explain what his motivation was in either case or even
to shed greater light on either event, nor are these seen as relevant to the author’s
narrative. However, they are important; those individuals, so opposed to armed revolt or
sudden change, were pushed into beginning a bloody civil revolt at a time when they
could expect only to be reviled by their contemporaries, and their motivations and goals
do need to be analysed further in order to bring greater clarity to even the simplest
narrative.
Finally, Otero also appears in a variety of biographies on the great men of the
decade. Although an important player in his own right, he so often appears in the
historiography standing in the shadow of greater men. In Gómez Pedraza’s political
biography, Laura Solares Robles shows an Otero strongly influenced by the older,
politically wiser, former president. Once again though, Otero is mentioned only in a
supporting role, one whose participation in events is never really linked back to Pedraza.
His actions seem to occur in a vacuum, and it is only at the very end that the importance
of their friendship is highlighted; “Sufrió un duro golpe con la muerte de Mariano Otero,
su amigo y compadre […]. El compromiso moral que tenía con Otero le llevó a fungir
como albacea […] le preocupaba, como a muchos que lo habían estimado, la situación
de su viuda.”69 There is a suggestion here that Otero’s role in Pedraza’s life in the eight
years he was in México City was considerable but the true extent of this friendship is
69 Solares Robles, Una revolución pacífica, pp. 239-240.
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not explored. This also applies to Cotner’s biography of Herrera. Again Mariano Otero
figures prominently, particularly as Herrera’s Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores e
Interiores, but never as a protagonist, just one more character to enhance the image of
the protagonist. Exactly the same faults can be found with Quintana’s biography of
Lafragua. Otero is a constant companion and yet receives no real credit. It happens yet
again in the biographical sketch of Ignacio Comonfort by Rosaura Hernandez
Rodríguez.70 Here she argues that Otero was one of the greatest influences on the
would-be president, pointing out that they dreamed of forming a faction, at national
level, that would bring together reformist and traditionalist ideals, a moderate party in
other words. She goes so far as to assert that following Otero’s death, Comonfort lost
the will to carry out this dream. Otero is ever-present in Comonfort’s actions, in
congress, during the war, and yet nothing is said of Otero’s beliefs, or of what exactly
the moderates stood for before the 1854 Revolución de Ayutla. Again, Otero appears
merely as a contemporary of Comonfort. This is, of course, understandable since these
are all biographies that concentrate on a particular individual. However, Pedraza is
hailed as the leader of the moderados and Herrera as one of the only truly moderado
presidents. If it is true that Otero was the greatest moderado theorist and legislator, this
only underscores the need for an equally focused and comprehensive evaluation of his
life and political thought, in order to place him in a more appropriate juxtaposition with
his contemporaries and colleagues.
The image of Mariano Otero formed by all of the above does emphasise many
salient points. Otero was a key figure in the events of the 1840s, yet there has been no
exploratory study, no biography. What references there are to him are scattered, and
none have the scope to cover his entire ideology and actions. An in-depth study is
70 Rosaura Hernandez Rodriguez, Ignacio Comonfort. Trayectoria política. Documentos (Mexico City:
UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1967).
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needed not only to give greater focus to his writings, beliefs and ideologies, but also to
position Otero in the context of his era, his contemporaries and his position in Mexican
history. The moderados have been largely neglected by the historiography of the
nineteenth century, particularly as concerns their actions during for the decade of the
1840s. More needs to be done to define further their goals and ambitions and to enable
us to explain the events and link them to the political happenings. Where better to begin
this definition of the moderates than by exploring the ideology of Mariano Otero? He
was associated with some of the greatest political figures of the nineteenth century, and
as such he stood out as “the young and inspired liberal of the 1840s,” depicted as being
strongly in favour of the new independent Mexican nation and as, “uno de sus políticos
e intelectuales más influyentes.”71 The only moderado to propose a succinct theoretical
policy, to delineate not only the goals they were striving for but also the methodology to
follow. Most of the historiography on Mariano Otero produces a complex figure.
However, it is not a complexity that gives depth, but a complexity that leads to
contradiction and bewilderment. What emerges is a fragmented image from which we
can begin to discern the full story but we are still, at this point, enmeshed in myth and
legends, where the inevitable bias of history and historians has left us with a figure
whose importance is obvious but cannot yet be precisely pinpointed.
The available historiography therefore presents us either with Reyes Heroles’
liberal hero or with a fragmented Otero, without the sense of a whole or in a vacuum. In
contrast, the image of Otero that emerges from the biographical sketch that follows is
well-rounded, showing a man shaped by a wide variety of factors, his family, his friends,
his career ─both as a politician and a lawyer─ and, above all, the great events that 
formed the nation. The second part of the thesis examines his political ideology and in
71 Fowler, “Dreams of Stability,” p. 295 and “El pensamiento politico,” p. 281
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those chapters it becomes clear that while loosely representative of the moderate faction
he belonged to, Otero’s beliefs were not set in stone. As he faced each new challenge in
his political career or his personal life, so his ideology was forced to shift and mutate.
When it came to putting theories into practice, he was often forced to compromise. He
was not the monochrome liberal that he has been made out to be, anymore than any of
his contemporaries were.
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2.
The Man.
Born in Guadalajara, Jalisco, on 4 February 1817, there is scant information on Mariano
Otero’s early years. He was born into a distinguished and well-to-do family which fell
upon hard times when his father Ignacio Otero, a doctor and lecturer in Medicine at the
Real Universidad, died while Otero was very young. 72 His mother María Mestas
followed soon after, as Otero himself mentions in an application he submitted for a
position as a clerk at the Junta Directiva de Estudios de Jalisco;
Sin padres desde [la edad] de ocho años, quedé bajo los auspicios de mi
hermano político [cuñado], el señor Portugal y hoy a los quince de edad, muerto
él, hace un año, he quedado al abrigo de su viuda, cuya situación es tan
lamentable como la mía.73
Otero remained fairly poor and was forced, from an early age, into a number of jobs in
order to survive, which included sketching plans, copying actors’ parts and publishing
theatre critiques.74
Otero attended the Instituto del Estado de Jalisco, where he studied civil,
political and natural law, as well as political economy, mathematics and history,
combining it all with the Greek and Latin classics.75 He graduated in Civil Law on 10
June 1835, beginning his formal training shortly afterwards. On 1 October he formally
asked the governor to waive the obligatory length of this training and, having been
granted an exemption, took his oral exam on 15 October 1835.76 His examiners included
José Luis Verdía, one of his mentors, and he passed with flying colours. Little is known
72 Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (Mexico City: Editoral Patria, 1964), p. 496.
73 Archivo de la Universidad de Guadalajara. Legajo núm. 478. Solicitud de los señores José Mariano
Otero y Juan Antonio De la Fuente para obtener la plaza del escribiente del Instituto del Estado. See also
Juan Real Ledezma, “La Guadalajara de Mariano Otero,” in La Gaceta, 21 February 2005, Universidad
de Guadalajara, p. 16.
74 Guillermo Prieto, Memorias, p. 497.
75 Reyes Heroles, “Estudio Preliminar,” p. 12.
76 Ibid.
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of his life between his graduation and the first tentative steps he took into politics in
1841. Reyes Heroles, noting French, British and American influences, speculated that
Otero used this time to read and further acquaint himself with philosophers and theorists,
naming Sismonde de Sismondi, Alexis de Toqueville, Edmund Burke and Benjamin
Franklin as the most significant. Reyes Heroles also pointed the influence of the great
Mexican thinkers including, among others, Prisciliano Sanchez, who had founded the
Instituto where Otero was educated, and José María Luis Mora, who was Otero’s
contemporary, and with whom he would, later in life, establish a wide ranging and
extensive correspondence until their death, in 1850, within a month of each other.77
What is certain is that in those years Otero formed the alliances in Jalisco that he would
subsequently take with him to the capital. Despite the fact that he never returned to live
in his homeland, Mariano Otero remained jalisciense to the core. The contents of his
correspondence after his arrival in the capital suggest he had spent those years
practicing as lawyer. Just a glance at these personal and business letters shows that, in
the years before departing to seek his fortune on the national political stage, Otero had
built up a vibrant network of clients and colleagues, acquaintances and political allies. It
was also during these years that he met his wife Andrea Arce, “de bellísimo carácter,
bien amorosa y risueña que cifraba su contento en dar gusto y en ver alegre á su marido”
and whom he married in 1840.78 He became a father soon afterwards and, ever the
family man, also welcomed Andrea’s aunt, Luisa, into the household, where she
remained, even moving with the family to the capital in 1841.
The last months that Otero spent in Guadalajara, before moving to Mexico City,
are better documented. Reyes Heroles argued that Otero was “politically irrelevant”
77 For further information see Ibid., p. 9-190.
78 Ignacio Burgoa, “Semblanza de Don Mariano Otero, insigne jurista y político mexicano,” Revista de la
Facultad de Derecho de México, Número 154-155-156, (Año 1987), p. 435. Guillermo Prieto, Memorias,
p. 364.
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prior to the 1841 Revolución de Jalisco and the upheaval that followed it, but it seems
more feasible to assume he was active in all the right circles, as otherwise, in the tightly
knit political circles of the state capital, it is unlikely a stranger could have simply
erupted onto the political stage.79 Given his youth, he was only twenty-four when the
Plan de Jalisco was announced on 8 August 1841, this period should be considered
merely as the very beginning of his career, when he was taking the first few tentative
steps towards a politically active role. The Plan de Jalisco did present Otero with the
perfect opportunity to take a greater part in politics at the state level which would, in
turn, propel him to prominence on the national stage. In addition, the series of
pronunciamientos, launched from his very doorstep, acted as the catalyst for his Ensayo
sobre el verdadero estado de la cuestión social y política que se agita en la República
mexicana, his best known work, published in mid-1842, and written in response to the
events that had led him to Mexico City. In the Ensayo Otero assessed the state of the
country as he saw it in 1842, and in it can be found the first presentation of his ideology;
the importance of social factors in the development of the nation, the need for
separation of Church and state, the serious problems caused by the military involvement
in politics and, his stress on the importance of a democracy underpinned by a strong
constitution and a federal government to ensure progress. The last of such importance as
to deserve a chapter to itself in Part 2. Written as a response to the pronunciamientos
that broke out in his home state, the Ensayo is a prime example of local and national
circumstances shaping Otero’s political thought.
The Revolución de Jalisco originated from the unrest that had been widespread
since the beginning of 1841.80 In the months leading up to it, Otero was in Guadalajara
79 Reyes Heroles, “Estudio Preliminar,” p. 19.
80 Revolución de Jalisco is the term Otero used to encompass Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga’s Plan of
Jalisco (8 August), Gabriel Valencia’s Plan of La Ciudadela (4 September), and Antonio López de Santa
Anna’s Plan of Perote (9 September), all issued in 1841, and redefined by Michael P. Costeloe as the
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where he would have received information on minor disturbances in Chiapas, Orizaba,
Durango, and San Luis Potosí, among others.81 By the summer, rumours had begun to
spread of a potential revolution being plotted in Jalisco and Veracruz.82 Although he
held no official political position at this time, there can be no doubt that he was aware of
the political situation in the country. His mentors in Guadalajara, Crispiniano del
Castillo and José Luis Verdía, were both prominent political figures in the town, and it
was del Castillo who introduced Otero into the political turmoil that followed the
pronunciamientos. Newspapers and hearsay would have indicated that unrest was
bubbling in Veracruz, where Antonio López de Santa Anna, acting on behalf of the
merchants of that town, stated that they were unhappy with the derecho de consumo, a
15 percent import tax introduced in 1839, which had raised the overall taxation on
imported goods to 49.5 percent, and that they intended, from that point on, to cease
paying it.83 Meanwhile, in Jalisco, the state government was also hinting at the rising
unrest, attributing it similarly to the high level of taxation, and using this opportunity to
attack the central government, headed by Anastasio Bustamante who, it argued, was
reluctant or unable to address it.
On 8 August, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga staged a pronunciamiento in
Guadalajara and issued his Manifiesto y Plan de Jalisco. The demands of the Plan
moved beyond insistence on changes in the rates of taxation; it sought the removal of
General Anastasio Bustamante from power, his substitution by an interim president to
be named by the Supremo Poder Conservador, and called for the election of a new
Triangular Revolt. For more detailed information see Michael Costeloe, “The Triangular Revolt in
Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Bustamante, August-October 1841,” Journal of Latin American Studies,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (Nov., 1988).
81 José María Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de México Independiente, 1822 – 1845 (Mexico
City: Imprenta del Gobierno Federal en el Ex.Arzobispado, 1892), II, pp. 804-6.
82 Ibid.
83 Noriega Elío, El Constituyente, p. 26.
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Constituent Congress.84 The Plan itself moved away from a mere representation of the
interests of one group, the merchants and, like most pronunciamientos, proclaimed itself
as representative of the will of the nation.85 The actions of Paredes y Arrillaga in Jalisco
were to spread across the country, topple the existing government and would result in
Otero being elected to take his seat in the new Constituent Congress, called for in the
Bases de Tacubaya.
Many of the grievances expressed in the Plan were subjects which Otero would
refer to in his Ensayo. Texas was no closer to being reconquered than it had been in
1837 when Bustamante came to power with the promise of an immediate focus on this
issue; few of the reforms promised by the ministers prior to taking office had ever
materialized, and those that had showed no visible effects; and revolts in 1840 in
Yucatán and in Tabasco further sullied the government’s reputation. Moreover, the
floundering state of the national economy forced the government to take on even more
loans from national sources and from its allies, and its inability to repay any of them led
to strains in foreign relations with Britain and France. Increased taxation was the only
other source of revenue for the government, implementation of which alienated many of
its supporters, particularly as even these taxes were insufficient to cover its necessities.86
Perhaps it is not too fanciful to suggest that Otero's firsthand knowledge of the
discontent in the states, the arbitrary and crippling taxation levied on them to fund local
84 The Supremo Poder Conservador had been created by the Siete Leyes of 1836, which came to be
known as the first centralist constitution and was designed to maintain those constitutional laws, see,
Alfonzo Jimenez et al. (Eds.), Ensayos históricos-jurídicos: México y Michoacán (México: UNAM,
UAM, Supremo Tribunal de Justicia del Estado de Michoacán), pp. 1-39. “Manifiesto y Plan del General
Paredes (8 August 1841),” in Josefina Z. Vázquez (ed.), Planes en la Nación Mexicana 1831-1854
(Mexico City: Senado de la República/El Colegio de México, 1987), IV, pp. 58-60.
85 For more information on the pronunciamiento as a representation of the will of the nation see Will
Fowler, “Entre la legalidad y la legitimidad: elecciones, pronunciamientos y la voluntad general de la
nación, 1821-1857,” in José Antonio Aguilar Rivera (Ed.), Las elecciones y el gobierno representativo en
México (1810 – 1910) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y
las Artes, Instituto Federal Electoral, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, 2010).
86 Costeloe, “The Triangular Revolt,” and Vázquez (ed.), Planes en la nación, IV.
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battles and foreign wars, coupled with his legal training, was responsible for the ardent
constitutionalism that he defended all his life, as we will see in Part 2 of this thesis.
Local issues were becoming national ones, and Otero was to make his debut in
local Guadalajara politics only to move on rapidly to a leading role in the capital. The
Jalisco-led pronunciamiento spread rapidly, and on 4 September General Valencia
pronounced in the Ciudadela Garrison in Mexico City, calling for an interim president
and the convocation of a new Constituent Congress. This was significant as it meant the
Jalisco pronunciamiento had established itself as a real force, strong enough to succeed
in the goal it had set –the downfall of the incumbent president. More planes emerged,
seconding the revolution that had begun in Jalisco; Zacatecas on 5 September and Jérez
on 7 September. The most important however was the one that thrust Santa Anna back
into the limelight; on 9 September he published his Manifiesto y Plan de Perote,
dropping all pretence of neutrality and mediation between rebels and the government
and demanding that Bustamante step down.87 The pronunciamiento had succeeded. The
three generals, Santa Anna, Valencia, and Paredes, reached an agreement that produced
the Bases de Tacubaya, a thirteen-point plan that included calling for a new congress
and an interim president. Once signed, Bustamante was ousted from power and Santa
Anna was sworn in as the interim president.
Meanwhile, in Guadalajara, the political spectrum was also being shaken up. As
a direct result of the Plan de Jalisco, the Junta Departamental in Guadalajara voted to
dissolve itself, arguing that it could not continue its functions in the current political
87 “Manifiesto y Plan del General Paredes (8 August 1841),” “Plan del General Valencia proclamado en la
Ciudadela (4 September 1841),” and “Manifiesto y Plan de Perote (9 September 1841),” in Vázquez,
Planes en la nación, IV, pp. 58-61, 64-67, Costeloe, “The Triangular Revolt,” Noriega Elío, El
constituyente.
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climate.88 On 12 August 1841, prominent citizens gathered in Guadalajara to decide the
future of the state. Among those present were General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga,
Commander-in-Chief of Jalisco, Don José Luis Verdía, Diocesan Prosecutor,
Crispiniano del Castillo, Circuit Judge, and “el Lic. Don Mariano Otero, asesor de la
agencia del Banco.”89 His relationship with del Castillo and Verdía had ensured that he
was present when the new political order was being decided. First came the election of a
president and secretaries, with Paredes y Arrillaga filling the former and Castillo and
Verdía the latter. 90 Otero stood for the position of secretary, but did not receive
sufficient votes. After the election of Antonio Escobedo as Governor, they proceeded to
elect vocales and suplentes for the Junta Departamental.91 It is this meeting that is the
basis of Reyes Heroles’ statement that Otero is “irrelevant,” for in addition to his
candidature for secretary, he stood for the position of 4th, 5th and 6th vocal and for 1st
and 2nd suplente.92 He was unsuccessful in all. However, his worth must have been
recognized, for the very first communiqué issued by the Junta Departamental, only two
days later on 14 August 1841, was signed by Joaquín Castañeda as president and
Mariano Otero as secretary.93
Otero remained in this position until late November 1841.94 His seat on the Junta
brought him into closer contact with some of the most politically significant men in
Jalisco. In addition, he was being exposed to the political and social issues that affected
88 Josefina Z. Vázquez, Héctor Cuauhtémoc Hernández Silva (Eds.), Carlos María de Bustamante, Diario
histórico de México, 1822-1848 [electronic resource] (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, Centro de
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2001), annexes, August 1841, pp. 85-89.
89 Ibid., p. 86.
90 Though Verdía was elected, he argued he could not fill the position and Vergara took over. Eusebio
Anaya received 9 votes and Otero, 8, in ibid., pp. 85-89.
91 Although Escobedo was elected as Governor, he turned it down and Paredes y Arrillaga was elected in
his place. See ibid., pp. 85-90.
92 Otero only narrowly lost the election for 4th and 5th vocal, by 23 votes to 19 in the first and by 21 to 19
in the second. For the other positions he lost by considerably more, achieving only one vote in some. See
ibid. for full details of the election.
93 Colección de los decretos, circulares y órdenes de los poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo del Estado de
Jalisco (Jalisco: Congreso del Estado de Jalisco, XLIX Legislatura, 1982), VIII, p. 241.
94 The last time he signs as Secretary is on the 26th November 1841. Ibid., VIII, p. 304.
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Guadalajara, concerns that he would spend the rest of his life addressing at a national
level. During his tenure, for example, he and several members of the Junta renounced
their stipends in order to help the government, as lack of available funds was forcing the
state government to close schools.95 In addition, Otero took part in meetings that dealt
with a variety of topics; health and health regulations, toll road maintenance, the repeal
of the 15% tax whose levy had led to the Revolución de Jalisco, and prison regulations,
among others. 96 How active his role in the discussions is inconsequential. More
importantly, Otero was, for the first time, immersed in the decision making process of
the political elite in Guadalajara. In addition he was forging new contacts and
strengthening old ties, which he would maintain after his move to the capital, receiving
important news from his home state regularly until his death.
It was while serving as Secretary to the Junta Departamental that Otero was
chosen to deliver a speech commemorating independence. On 16 September 1841 he
stepped into the limelight when he delivered his address containing the first indications
of his beliefs; the strokes towards defining his ideological position, which would be
clarified further in the Ensayo, less than a year later. 97 He highlighted the importance of
history as a tool in understanding the current state of the nation, the lingering effects of
the colonial legacy, the unalterable nature of Mexican independence, touching upon
such key issues as the social question, as well as criticising the detrimental effect of
factional politics and the constant revolutions that had plagued Mexico. It was an upbeat,
optimistic and patriotic. It was published in Mexico City, in the recently launched El
Siglo XIX newspaper. Reyes Heroles stated that this was the moment that Otero’s
95 Mariano Otero gives up the 300 pesos a year he receives in his position as Secretary on 16 August
1841. Ibid., p 244.
96 20 August 1841, the President of Public Health presents a report to the Junta. Ibid., pp. 247, 251-255,
261-273, 275-276
97 Otero, “Discurso Pronunciado en la solemnidad del 16 de Septiembre de 1841 en la ciudad de
Guadalajara,” in Obras, II, pp. 405-420.
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“vocación, talento y ambición” had been working towards. Ambition, an apt choice of
word, as the reason the speech was published was because Otero personally submitted
several copies to the editors of El Siglo XIX, ensuring its publication in the capital as a
means of paving the way for a move into national politics. The newspaper, published by
Ignacio Cumplido, fellow jalisciense, published the speech and gave it a glowing
review. ;
por la elegancia de su lenguaje, por la solidez de las doctrinas, por la dignidad
con que trata el objeto, las notas que lo ilustran, y sobre todo, por la elección de
un rumbo del todo nuevo, que la hace original en su género, y la separa en cierto
modo de todos los demás discursos, que en iguales solemnidades se han
pronunciado hasta ahora damos las gracias al señor Otero por el placer que nos
ha proporcionado con el suyo, el cual hace honor a la literatura jalisciense.98
This ensured that when he arrived in Mexico City a few months later, his name was
known to many of the leading politicians of the day, thereby enabling him to step
directly on to the national stage.
This would come to pass sooner than expected. In November of that same year
Otero was presented with the opportunity to move to Mexico City. Jalisco had elected
him as suplente to the Junta de Representantes de los Departamentos and as such he was
called on to replace Ignacio Vergara, who had resigned his position.99 This was the
body, formed as a result of the Bases de Tacubaya, which had elected Santa Anna as
president. On 18 November, Otero wrote to the state government to request leave from
his position as State Prosecutor, to take up his appointment in Mexico City.100 It was
granted and he prepared to leave with his family for the capital.
98 El Siglo XIX, 22 October 1841.
99 For the most in-depth information available on the Junta, see Lucinda Moreno Valle, “La Junta de
Representantes o Consejo de los Departamentos, 1841 – 1843,” Estudios de Historia Moderna y
Contemporánea de México, IV, 1972. The discussions that led to Vergara’s official resignation and to
Otero’s replacing him took place mid November and were published in the capital a few weeks later, El
Siglo XIX, 3 and 4 December 1841.
100 “Sobre el nombramiento hecho en el Lic. D. Juan Palafox para Promotor fiscal de Hacienda interino
de Guadalajara durante la ausencia del Sr. Mariano Otero,” Archivo General de la Nación (henceforth
referred to as AGN), GD118 Sección – Justicia, Vol. 286. Expediente 4. Fs. 24-34.
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Reyes Heroles mentioned that Otero arrived there at the end of May 1842.101
This, however, is impossible, as he was present at the Consejo de los Departamentos for
the last week of 1841.102 His departure must have been hurried; his friends complained
that he had not even had time to say goodbye.103 He did, however, ensure that he left his
legal affairs in Guadalajara in order, ensuring none of his clients were left stranded.
Most of his legal responsibilities he entrusted to Jesús López Portillo, a contemporary of
Otero’s, a moderate, who would go on to be Governor of Jalisco in the early 1850s
before siding with the Maximilian administration.104 Even so, he continued to receive
numerous letters in Mexico City with updates on his legal cases, as well as news of
family and friends in Jalisco. Despite the short notice of his move to the capital, and the
relative uncertainty of his arrival, Otero answered these letters promptly and in depth,
constantly requesting further information on this or that case or situation.105
Otero had travelled with his family; his wife, Andrea, her aunt, Luisa and at least
one child, and on arrival was able to rent a small house at la Estampa de Jesus María.106
He immediately began making the rounds. One of his first visits was to Ignacio
Cumplido, editor and printer of El Siglo XIX, with whom he had already established
correspondence from Guadalajara. It was Cumplido who was able to provide him with
101 Reyes Heroles, “Estudio Preliminar,” Otero, Obras, I, p. 22.
102 Otero was presented to the Junta in the session on 24th December 1841, along with José Urrea and
Patricio Bárcena, of Durango. El Siglo XIX, 30 December 1841.
103 Ignacio García lamented that “el tiempo que Usted tuvo para prevenir un viaje tan dilatado y con
familia fue corto, y los [negocios] que Usted debió concluir o arreglar para separarse de aquí fueron
muchos, y por lo mismo no pudo tener tiempo para despedirse y visitar a sus amigos”. Letter from
Ignacio García to Mariano Otero, 13 January 1842, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 69.
104 Roderic A. Camp, “Family Relationships in Mexican Politics: A Preliminary View,” The Journal of
Politics, Volume 44, Issue 03, (1982), p. 849 and Fowler, Santa Anna, p. 293.
105 Otero received numerous letters in the last weeks of 1841 and the first of 1842 with updates on the
situation of his affairs in Guadalajara, as well as replies to letters he had sent requesting more in-depth
information on certain cases. Lopez Portillo, for example, reassured him that he was following up all his
old cases; “tengo despachada la cause de Jacinto Murillo que está para sentenciarse; hice un escrito en el
negocio de los Mesquitán; […] he dispuesto otro alegato semejante por Rafael Hidalgo y he despachado
también el negocio de la señora Celis”. He continues the letter asking for advice on another case, and
concludes that he is keeping all payment until Otero confirms what he should do with it but refuses to
take any part of it for himself, because he feels “bastante recompensado con prestar a la amistad estos
pequeños servicios a la amistad.”. Jesus Lopez Portillo to Mariano Otero, 24 December 1841, in
Guillermo Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 65.
106 Prieto, Memorias, p. 347.
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another more spacious house and in a better location at no. 6 Calle del Hospital Real. In
addition, Cumplido offered Otero a job on the editorial team of El Siglo XIX, placing
him in charge of the political section.107 Another of his contacts was Manuel Gómez
Pedraza, former president and leader of the moderate faction. He had read Otero’s
speech in El Siglo XIX, and had been in touch with him prior to his arrival, offering his
house as a first port of call.108 In addition, Otero took time to visit old friends, such as
Crispiniano del Castillo, who was serving on the Junta de los Departamentos, and to
make new acquaintances like José Espinosa de los Monteros, a future ally in
congress.109
Within a few weeks, Otero had established himself in the capital and was
attending the Consejo de los Departamentos in his role as the representative for Jalisco.
Otero formed part of the Consejo for the months when it was most active.110 One of its
first tasks had been to form committees to deal with various aspects of governance,
including foreign relations, justice, ecclesiastical affairs, war, finance, and industry.
During the very first session that he attended, on Christmas Eve 1841 when Otero was
sworn in as a member, he was called upon to replace Manuel Larraínzar on the main
Justice Commission.111 The issues the Consejo was dealing with were similar to those
he had already worked on in Jalisco, only this time he was more than a mere secretary,
and they were national, not local. The Consejo was to all intents and purposes covering
107 Ibid., pp 337-339, 348.
108 Ibid., pp. 346-348.
109 Again, Otero’s correspondence for the first weeks of January 1842 shows he was in touch with his old
mentor, passing on letters and greetings from people at home. In addition, in a letter dated 21 January
1842, Julio Vallarta exhorts Otero to make the most of his stay in the capital, congratulating him on his
friendship with Espinosa de los Monteros and arguing that to get ahead he must push his excesiva
delicadeza aside, Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 71.
110 Created originally on 9 October 1841 under the name of Junta de los Representantes Suplentes de los
Departamentos, less than a month later, on 26 October, it became the Junta de los Representantes de los
Departamentos, before finally settling on Consejo de los Departamentos on 5 December of that same year,
the name by which it remained known until it ceased operation. See Lucina Moreno Valle, “La Junta de
Representantes.”
111 El Siglo XIX, 30 December 1841.
49
the duties carried out by a congress that was yet to be called. As a member, Otero was
active in its sessions. Some of the issues he was dealing with included ownership of
land by foreigners or pardons for those facing the death penalty. Although he was new
to the political intrigues of the capital, he was ready to take a stand for what he felt was
right. A legal pedant, he voted against certain measures, not because he did not support
them, but because they had not been correctly proposed or legislated, as we can see in
the case of the vote on foreign ownership of property discussed in various sessions in
January.112 Otero voted against the proposal of the Commission for Foreign and Internal
Affairs, as well as against the private motion presented by Espinosa de los Monteros in
favour of foreigners being able to purchase property in Mexico, only to go on to present
his own 6-part motion on the same subject which was admitted for discussion and
passed to the relevant commission.113 Otero behaved in a similar fashion in the 1842
and the 1846-47 congresses, where he put forward minority proposals, not merely as
opposition for opposition’s sake, but to ensure that even the smallest details were
included, that certain aspects were better expressed or simply that a specific word be
added. At the end of April he had acquired sufficient renown to be elected president of
the Consejo, a position he would resign soon after to take up his seat at the 1842
Constituent Congress. Perhaps most importantly for Otero, the Consejo had allowed
him to meet and establish links with important political figures from across Mexico. He
would go on to serve in congress with some of these; others would become contacts in
the states. Above all, it was an introduction into political life on a national level and an
opportunity to familiarise himself with the issues that the nation was facing in the first
years of the 1840s decade.
112 El Siglo XIX, 21 January 1842, which covers the Consejo de los Departamentos session of 13 January
1842.
113 Ibid.
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The period between the Bases de Tacubaya, with Santa Anna’s election as
president a few days later, and the first preparatory sessions of the new congress was
fraught. Though fully occupied with his place on the Consejo and strengthening his
position in the capital, there is no doubt that Otero would have been fully involved in
the political wranglings that preceded an event of such importance as the writing of a
new Constitution.114 All the politically active classes, if not the entire country, waited
expectantly for the results of the elections, in the main to see how much or how little
say they would have in the new constitutional order. This included moderate and puro
liberals, backed by their respective newspapers, as well as the clergy and army and, not
least, the president himself. Before entering into the details of Otero’s participation in
the 1842 congress, and in order to improve our understanding of why many of the
deputies acted in the manner in which they did, it is essential to explore the context
within which they were operating.
During the Revolución de Jalisco, rumours had begun circulating that the end
goal was not simply to overthrow Bustamante, but to establish a dictatorship, rumours
which persisted well after Santa Anna’s election as president and into the pre-election
period. 115 The Bases de Tacubaya stated that the congress was to write the new
constitution “según mejor lo convenga,” however, it soon became apparent that this
would be unlikely. 116 The inter election period –between Santa Anna’s election as
president and the elections for deputies– was tense. It appeared as though Santa Anna
backed no specific party and, as Costeloe pointed out, although he rewarded some of
those who had aided his return to power, he also alienated many of his supporters,
114 For a detailed account of the period between the Bases de Tacubaya and the sittings of the Constituent
Congress, as well as in-depth analysis of the congress itself, see Noriega Elio, El Constituyente.
115 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 238.
116 Plan de Tacubaya, 28 September 1841, reproduced at http://arts.st-
andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/database/?f=y&id=239&m=9&y=1841, also, see Costeloe, The Central
Republic, pp. 238, 273.
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mainly when the property and wealth of the clergy came under attack on the
introduction of new legislation.117 The copper coin grew into a major issue; the solution,
replacing it by a new copper coin, the octavo de real, was not immediately successful.
The changeover from the old to the new coins was tardy and proceeded slowly, and it
caused many to panic and demand their wage in silver. As is so often the case, those
most affected were the poor. However, the crisis, and Santa Anna’s legislation, also
attacked the power of the merchant classes, as well as industrial and agricultural
interests, by introducing tax upon tax, and raising those that already existed. Bearing in
mind that it was the issue of taxation, or at least this was the excuse, that led to the
Revolución de Jalisco, it was not surprising that it caused a great deal of unrest, not only
among the politically influential merchant classes but, as more and more new taxes were
introduced, it began to affect the poor and the hombres de bien who increasingly found
themselves being included in its levies.
The situation grew tense, and it was in this climate that elections for the deputies
for the new congress were to be called. The main task of the Consejo de los
Departamentos, before Otero’s arrival, had been to write the regulations governing the
convocation of the Constituent Congress. Santa Anna had received a first draft from the
Consejo, and modified it thoroughly before publishing it on 10 December 1841. Where
the original had suggested that the representation per state be the same for all, with 4
deputies each, granting the more distant and sparsely populated areas equal standing
with the others, Santa Anna opted for it to be based on population whereby smaller but
more populated states would send double or triple the number of deputies than others.118
In addition, the Consejo called for congress to meet in Querétaro, thus distancing it
117 Although certain points will be highlighted next, in order to better understand this period, and to gain a
broader perspective, see Costeloe, The Central Republic, pp. 238-273 and Noriega Elío, El Constituyente,
pp. 45-76.
118 Noriega Elío, El Constituyente, pp 64-67.
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from executive power. Santa Anna objected to the move, insisting it be held in Mexico
City. He introduced another major change in the voting age, reducing it from 25 years to
21 years for primary elections, and from 30 years to 25 years for secondary elections
and deputies. This opened up the field to younger politicians, being particularly
advantageous for the young Otero who would be 25 the following February.
The interim president had come to power on the back of a pronunciamiento
which had been backed by all but had fulfilled the specific wishes of none. This was, in
fact, a point in its favour. As the Plan was not seen as politically partisan, support could
be widespread. However, the parties had met only momentarily on common ground,
with no more than short-term goals in mind –the fall of Anastasio Bustamante, repeal of
the import tax and the writing of a new constitution. Once these goals had been
achieved, and the election guidelines had been announced, factional disputes arose
again, although these did take place peacefully and within the bounds of election
propriety. Each newspaper struck its favourite stance, arguing for or against what it
considered certain essential reforms and putting forward suggestions on who was the
best candidate for the job, as well as holding forth on the shape the nation’s future
should take. The elections went rather smoothly, although it suddenly became clear that
the more radical federalists had come to the fore.
For Otero, the months preceding the election were busy. As mentioned
previously, he had settled in the capital, begun or renewed friendships with important
individuals, as well as commenced his work as a lawyer and as a political editor for the
Siglo XIX. He had brought his family with him, which would increase over the next few
years, and his financial situation was precarious. He was not receiving any money for
his position on the Consejo. The treasury in Jalisco was unable to pay him and, indeed,
had been forced to request loans to enable it to function, making any payment in the
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near future most unlikely.119 He received constant updates from his friends, family and
former colleagues in Guadalajara, all of whom were campaigning for his election as
deputy. There was no need for him, or any of his contemporaries, to return home to
carry out any electioneering, as it was all done through personal contacts and intimate
meetings. On Sunday 22 May 1842, the elections took place in Guadalajara. Carlos
María de Bustamante complained that Paredes y Arrillaga had interfered with the
election process, arguing firstly that there were insufficient electors present, and finally,
that the president of the meeting was “loco.”120 Santa Anna ordered they should be
repeated from the primary election stage, possibly in the expectation of military
intervention in his favour, or thereby allowing Paredes y Arrillaga’s backers more time
to garner support. 121 Although the results were published in the press, Otero also
received them from his contacts in the city.122 He was seen as one of the rising stars of
the moderado political faction which had been in existence since the late 1830s under
the leadership of Manuel Gómez Pedraza. His constituents praised him, arguing that as
deputy he would be able to continue serving his unfortunate country, some even going
so far as to insist that a place should be reserved for him after death in the “Mausoleum
of the Immortals.”123 It was not only relatives and his supporters in Guadalajara who felt
that way; Carlos María de Bustamante described him as “joven recomendabilísimo y
uno de los más elocuentes oradores de la cámara.”124 His public image was to be further
enhanced in June when his Ensayo sobre el verdadero estado de la cuestión social y
119 Letter from Julio Vallarta to Mariano Otero, 9 January 1842 and again on 21 January 1842, in Tovar
de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, pp. 68-69, 71.
120 Carlos María de Bustamante, Apuntes para la historia del Gobierno del general D. Antonio Lopez de
Santa-Anna, desde principios de Octubre 1841 hasta 6 de Diciembre de 1844 en que fue depuesto del
mando por uniforma voluntad de la nación (México: Imprenta de J. M. Lara, 1845), p. 49.
121 Ibid.
122 El Siglo XIX, for example, publishes a list of those elected for Jalisco on 30th May 1842. Pedro Tamez
wrote to Otero on 24 May 1842 with the same information, Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p.
76 - 77.
123 Pedro Tamez to Mariano Otero, 24 May 1842 and June 3 1842, and Antonio de Portugal to Mariano
Otero, July 14 1842, in ibid., pp. 76-78.
124 Bustamante, Apuntes, p. 49.
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política que se agita en la República Mexicana was published by his friend and editor
Ignacio Cumplido. As with his 1841 speech, Otero once again demonstrated that he was
willing to indulge in a spot of self-promotion, sending copies to his friends and
colleagues, and announcing its publication in El Siglo XIX. Jesús Reyes Heroles argued
that the essay did not receive the success and attention it deserved. However, what
feedback Otero received from his contemporaries appears to have been overwhelmingly
positive. Francisco Jaúregui stated that the work had been well received and highly
esteemed and Antonio de Portugal praised him for throwing light on the moderate party,
which he referred to as “del Justo Medio” and even went so far as to compare him with
Mora when he said; “la moderación y energía que tan felizmente combina usted en su
obra, es propia y singular de Usted, su estilo servirá de un modelo siempre a nuestros
literatos, sus principios serán la primera lección que deban estudiar los mexicanos.”125
Otero was nothing if not a pragmatist, and here is the moderation that was to define his
political stances throughout his career, most notably in his approach to the army and
Church, as he sought to curb their excessive participation in public life. This will be
explored further in part 2, in the chapters dealing with each one. Following on from this
success, his participation in congress would further enhance his political standing
among his peers.
Although Santa Anna had allowed the elections to proceed without too much
interference, congress soon realised that its deliberations would in no way be free.126 On
24 May, only a few weeks before congress met, the oath which the deputies had to
swear was changed from the relatively generic one to one in which they had to swear
125 Francisco Jáuregui to Mariano Otero, 23 July 1842 and Antonio de Portugal to Mariano Otero, 14 July
1842, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, pp. 78-79.
126 Costeloe notes certain deputies being harassed. In the case of Manuel Cresencio Rejón, who had
introduced the idea of amparo into the 1841 Yucatán constitution, so much so that he was persuaded to
leave the country, Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 266.
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loyalty to the Bases de Tacubaya.127 Some deputies feared that this new oath would
curtail the freedom needed by congress to debate the new constitution, others that it was
unnecessary as it merely reiterated what the congress already stood for and yet others
that, at some point in the future, the oath could be given a significance that it did not
have at that particular time.128 After much deliberation, all but one, Francisco Modesto
Olaguibel, agreed to take the oath. When it was debated whether or not a “juramento
con protesta” was admissible, Otero argued that those who voted were doing so on the
understanding that they were in no way sacrificing their independence or the dignity of
congress.129 Otero had been in attendance from the very first preparatory session on 4
June, and was immediately elected to sit on the commission charged with examining the
credentials attesting the deputies’ identity and their nomination as deputy for their
state.130 Once all the deputies had been admitted and substitutes appointed, attention
turned to establishing the principal commissions within the congress on fiscal and
judicial matters, the police and, most importantly, the Constitution Commission which
would be responsible for drafting the new constitution and presenting it to the other
deputies for debate and amendment before publication. José Espinosa de los Monteros,
Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, Antonio Díaz Guzmán, Joaquín Ladrón de Guevara, Pedro
Ramírez, José Fernando Ramírez and Mariano Otero were chosen to form the
Commission. From the outset, congress was under pressure from various fronts. Santa
Anna had demanded that his ministers be allowed to be present at each and every
127 The original oath had been “¿Juráis desempeñar fiel, legal y patrióticamente el poder que se os ha
conferido, mirando en todo por el bien de la nación?” in Cecilia Noriega Elío, El Constituyente, p. 67, and
was changed to “¿Juráis a Dios y a la Nación la debida obediencia a las bases publicadas en Tacubaya y
adoptadas por la República, así como a la ley de convocatoria de 10 de Diciembre de 1841?”in, Juan A.
Mateos, Historia Parlamentaria de los Congresos Mexicanos, Vol. XIV (Mexico City, Imprenta del “El
Partido Liberal”, 1893) p. 14.
128 See the debate that took place on whether or not the oath should be sworn, in Mateos, Historia
Parlamentaria, Vol XIV, 4ª Junta Preparatoria, pp. 13-18.
129 Ibid., p. 17.
130 Ibid., p. 6.
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session they wished to attend, including those to be held in secret.131 Finally, the
constitution had to be discussed, approved and promulgated within the timeframe set
out by law, as any delay could be used as an excuse to disband congress.
Less than two months after it first convened, the Commission was ready to put
forward not just one constitutional proposal, but two, as it had been unable to reach a
unanimous agreement; the first detailing the view of the majority and the second
outlining the views of the other three deputies. On 26 August, Díaz Guzmán, Ladrón de
Guevara and the two Ramírez deputies, signed the Majority Vote. Its counterpart, the
Minority Vote, written almost in its entirety by Otero was signed by him, Espinosa de
los Monteros and Muñoz Ledo.132 The main divergence between the two was reported
as being one single word, the word federal. Where the Majority argued for a
representative system which would be republican and popular, the Minority argued for
the addition of the word federal. Otero was nailing his colours to the mast, firmly
convinced that federalism was the only answer to Mexico’s current malaise, devolving
power from the centre, forming an equitable partnership between the states and among
the states themselves. The chapter on federalism in Part 2 looks at his ideology and his
proposals in-depth and examines their degree of success. Debate began on 3 October,
major figures speaking on each side. Carlos María de Bustamante provides details of the
debates; Ceballos for federalism, Canseco for the Majority, Otero for the Minority,
Tornel against it, Espinosa de los Monteros pro, and so on.133 Otero’s speech was
lauded as one of the very best to be made in that congress. Prieto described the speech
as “el desplegarse, tenues primero; después, ponderosas; al último, sublimes las ráfagas
de una aurora boreal que inunda en oro y púrpura el horizonte,” and said it brought total
131 Noriega Elío, El constituyente, p. 89.
132 Lafragua, Apuntes sobre mi vida política, quoted in Ibid., p. 95.
133 Bustamante, Apuntes, p. 74. For further details see the transcription of Lafragua’s version of events in
Noriega Elio, El Constituyente, pp. 94-96.
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silence to the room; for over three hours, no one moved.134 He went on to say that Otero
seemed unaware of his greatness, unaware that he had just achieved immortal fame.
Carlos María de Bustamante endorsed Prieto’s opinion while disagreeing with Otero’s
argument, describing him as seducing and captivating his audience, despite his youth,
displaying all the traits of a great orator.135
Once the Majority Vote had been sufficiently debated, it was put to the vote on
14 October and rejected by 41 votes to 36, including, interestingly, one of the original
signatories, Ladrón de Guevara, who voted against it.136 With this rejection of the
Majority Vote, wheeling and dealing led to the withdrawal of the Minority Vote by its
signatories. Lafragua admitted his invitation to the minority to withdraw the dissenting
Vote had been agreed beforehand and that the move was mainly motivated by their fears
that they did not hold a clear enough majority to guarantee the Minority Vote would be
passed.137 As a result, both proposals were returned to the Commission, which promised
a second resolution within the fortnight. Suddenly congress received unsettling news.
Santa Anna had requested Bravo, who had been on his way to join congress as a deputy,
to stand in as president while he retired to the country. The deputies were only too
aware that when such a change took place, Santa Anna was removing himself from
events which might sully his image, and they feared the worse.138 Under pressure, the
Commission presented the new constitutional outline on 14 November, and the very
next day, congress was ready to vote on it in general terms, passing it by 36 votes to
30.139 Immediately voting began on each of the individual articles.140
134 Prieto, Memorias, p. 349.
135 Carlos María de Bustamante, Apuntes para la historia, p. 74.
136 Ibid.
137 Cecilia Noriega Elio, El Constituyente, p. 96.
138 Ibid., p. 97.
139 Mateos, Congresos Mexicanos, XIV, 119-120.
140 For an in-depth analysis of the different articles, the debates and the votes, see Noriega Elio, El
Constituyente, pp. 97-111.
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The debates and the voting lasted nearly a month, and were interrupted suddenly
on 13 December, when the Minister for War notified congress of a pronunciamiento
which had taken place in Huejotzingo, Puebla, on the 11th of that same month.141 In
brief, the pronunciamiento called for the dissolution of congress, stating that it would
not admit any constitution it proposed, and calling for a Junta de Notables to be
instituted in its place. Congress returned the acta to the Ministry, and immediately set
up a commission to formulate a response, choosing Luis de la Rosa, Fernando Ramírez
and Otero to do so. At 4:15pm that same afternoon, the response was passed
unanimously, congress stating that it was unable to deal with an act of sedition and was,
therefore, returning it to the Supreme Government to be dealt with accordingly. In
addition, the response stated that as far as the demands in the pronunciamiento were
concerned, congress was fully aware of its responsibilities as the representative of the
nation and it would continue to perform its duties until “se impida por la fuerza el
ejercicio de sus funciones.”142 In the days that followed, news began to arrive of other
places adhering to the Puebla pronunciamiento; San Luis, which predated the
Huejotzingo action by two days, Jalisco, Zacatecas, Michoacán, among others. 143
Congress continued to sit and discuss the particulars of the new Constitution, although it
seems unlikely that its members held any real hope of any significant outcomes to their
discussions; they knew it was just a question of time. They did not have long to wait. At
four a.m. on Saturday 19 December, the city garrison occupied the congress building.
The deputies persevered for a few hours, but eventually succumbed to the inevitable.
The 1842 congress had been disbanded and no constitution had emerged. Otero’s
performance in the Constituent Congress, coupled with the publication of the Ensayo in
June entrenched him as one of the leading ideologues of the moderate faction. His
141 For the full text see Mateos, Congresos Mexicanos, XIV, pp. 174-177.
142 Ibid., p. 177.
143 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 271.
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patriotism had shone throughout those last chaotic weeks, and he had upheld his liberal
principles and ideals. 144 Otero had become a household name among the political
factions; he had gained experience in a Constituent Congress, written for one of the
great newspapers, and published what would become his best known work. 1842 would
be the year of the Constituent Congress that never was, but for Otero it was the
beginning of his career as a politician. Now dubbed the standard bearer of the moderates,
his worth recognized even by those ideologically opposed to him, these were
remarkable achievements for one so young and relatively experienced. His importance
to them and to Mexico could only increase.
The decree that closed congress on 19 November called for a Junta de Notables,
chosen by Santa Anna, to decide the most suitable constitutional structure for the
country.145 In sharp contrast with those elected to the 1842 congress, the Junta was
made up of much older, more politically experienced and upper class individuals;
needless to say, Otero was not included.146 They began their deliberations in January
1843 and while these were taking place, Santa Anna manipulated his ministers and his
substitute in the capital to begin a campaign against those who opposed him. On 14
January a decree was reinstated aimed at muzzling the press, establishing penalties for
journalists who overstepped the line.147 El Siglo XIX closed down for two weeks, and
other newspapers quietened down or, in some cases, even disappeared altogether.148
This was not enough for Santa Anna, eager to silence opposition by removing
influential adversaries from the political arena. After his uncompromising speeches in
144 Letter from Ignacio Aguirre to Mariano Otero, 10 November 1842, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a
Mariano Otero, pp. 85-86.
145 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 276.
146 See Ibid., pp. 275-304 and Noriega Elio, El Constituyente, pp. 115-189.
147 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 278.
148 Ibid.
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congress and, in view of his position as political editor of El Siglo XIX where he
continued to press uncomfortable issues, Otero was one such man.149
On 30 April, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Manuel Gómez Pedraza,
Mariano Riva Palacio, Francisco Olaguibel, José María Lafragua and Mariano Otero.
Pedraza was arrested that very same day, Lafragua and Otero on the night of 2 May.150
Based on the evidence in correspondence between Gómez Pedraza and General Juan
Álvarez, the charges were that they had conspired with the general to stage a revolt.151
Despite a written denial by Álvarez that any such revolt existed, Santa Anna had found
the perfect excuse to allow him to bar the moderate leaders from the political stage. The
day following his arrest, El Siglo XIX rose to Otero’s defence, admitting that his openly
expressed principles were contrary to those of the current administration but sustaining
that differences in opinions should never be considered a crime. 152 In addition, it went
on to point out that Otero was aware of the warrant issued for his arrest and chose not to
escape, as he was convinced of his innocence. Initially Otero was held in the Celaya
battalion barracks, but was later moved to a room in the National Palace.153 In the days
that followed, El Siglo XIX printed lists of other prisoners, as well as reporting on those
being released. By the evening of 5 May, El Siglo XIX had become aware that both
Pedraza and Otero had been questioned by a prosecutor, Colonel Lucas Condelle.154
Otero’s participation in the revolt was discussed further by El Siglo XIX on 14 May,
149 El Siglo XIX, 2 March 1843. Otero writes to the newspaper in reference to his participation in
Congress during the last weeks of 1842 and to clarify his voting record. In doing this, he was drawing
attention to the deliberations that had taken place, as well as returning to a topic Santa Anna would have
wished to see closed.
150 José María Lafragua, “Preso por 43 días,” in Patricia Galeana Valadés, José María Lafragua, Serie los
Senadores (Mexico City: LIII Legislatura, Senado de la República, 1987), pp. 49-50. El Siglo XIX, 3 May
1843.
151 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 285.
152 El Siglo XIX, 3 May 1843.
153 Ibid., 4 May 1843.
154 Ibid., 5 May 1843.
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with a strong defence of his character and of his ideologies, showing just how highly the
young politician was esteemed in the first few months of 1843;
los encantos de su espíritu, tan puro y tan tranquilo, de aquella esencia tan
profunda y tan variada, de aquella inteligencia tan vasta y ocupada
constantemente en la felicidad y en el progreso social de su país; y a la primera
noticia de su prisión, como cómplice de una sedición a mano armada, hemos
recordado nuestras conversaciones con el que no hablaba sino de los medios
legales y parlamentarios de hacer gozar a su patria de la prosperidad que encierra
en las entrañas de su suelo, y hemos exclamado: “¡No! este hombre no es un
conspirador: que se examine su vida política apenas nacida y ya tan brillante y
tan honrosa; su carácter tan dulce e inocente; sus principios tan apuestos a esa
furia revolucionaria que hoy se le atribuye, y sus acusaciones de conspiración,
de complot, de pillaje, de robos y asesinatos, no podrán creerse en sus virtudes,
que nosotros recomendamos con todas nuestras fuerzas a los magistrados
encargados de fallar sobre la vida de este orador joven e ilustre.”155
The Diario Oficial was also strong in its defence of Otero, making an impassioned plea
for his name to be cleared promptly.156 However, the efforts of these defenders were to
no avail. The prisoners were still being held in isolation, allowed no communication
with the outside world, no legal proceedings had been instituted and there was no news
of a release date. Speculation was the only option left to the newspapers. Debate was
feverish but achieved nothing. New theories surfaced weekly on the reasons behind the
arrests and included a conspiracy to murder Santa Anna, his Minister for War, and his
Chief of Staff.157 Twenty days into the arrests the Estandarte Nacional reviewed the
situation, arguing that the accusation against the prisoners had not been substantiated
and that, as things stood, no one was sure if they were merely under arrest or if they had
been accused of something specific.158 Indeed, it was not even possible to ascertain
which judge had jurisdiction over the case. Though cut off from family, colleagues and
each other, when called to declare Gómez Pedraza, Otero, Lafragua and Riva Palacio
155 Ibid., 14 May 1843.
156 Mentioned in the editorial of ibid., 17 May 1843.
157 Ibid., 20 May 1843.
158 Transcribed in ibid., 22 May 1843.
62
submitted a formal protest that they would not submit to military jurisdiction. 159
Nothing ever came of the accusations against them and on 13 June, under an amnesty
granted by Santa Anna on the occasion of his birthday, all political prisoners were
released.160 Otero and the others returned to their families. Their forty three days in
prison had caused a furious debate on the legal system and the rights of prisoners, as
well as on jurisdiction and procedure. It was clear to all that it had been a ploy by Santa
Anna’s government to ensure that the constitutional project being discussed by the Junta
de Notables, which would become the Bases Orgánicas, was passed without the
moderate opposition being allowed to interfere.161
Soon after their release, the four men decided to file a complaint, written by
Otero, against the prosecutor handling their case.162 In a move to clear his name, Otero
ensured that the defence of his and his fellow prisoners’ innocence, the Acusación, was
sent to key colleagues, friends and family.163 However, it never proceeded. As Lafragua
explained, they convinced the government to publish the testimonio de causa, which he
suggested was sufficient to pacify them and to humiliate Santa Anna. Lafragua went on
to say the accusation was maintained against Florentino Conejo, but nothing came of
that either as he was also included in the amnesty decreed by Santa Anna.164
In direct conflict with the established regime and unwilling to compromise his
principles to effect a rapprochement with the Santa Anna government, Otero found
himself banished to the wings of the political stage. His friends assumed that his letters
159 Ibid.25 May 1843.
160 Bustamante, Apuntes para el gobierno, p. 139.
161 Costeloe, The Central Republic, pp. 222-226.
162 Acusación que contra el Sr Auditor Lic. D. Florentino Conejo dirigen a la Suprema Corte Marcial,
Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Mariano Riva Palacio, José María Lafragua y Mariano Otero; por los
dictámenes que contra leyes expresas dio a la Comandancia General de México, en la Causa que por
conspiración se siguió a los acusadores, y exposición de los mismos sobre aquel suceso (Mexico City:
Imp. Ignacio Cumplido, 1843).
163 Many letters refer to the “cuadernito” sent out by Otero detailing their defence. For example, Joaquín
Angulo to Mariano Otero, 25 July 1843, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 96-97.
164 José María Lafragua, “Preso por 43 días,” p. 50.
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would be intercepted, and offered the consolation that the arrest had been unjust.165
They attributed his imprisonment to cowardice and despotism.166 However, despite all
this, Otero’s mood was sombre, and he complained of malestar político, arguing that his
position was precarious at best.167 Joaquín Angulo, from Guadalajara, wrote reassuring
him that his position was stable, that he had the esteem of those that shared his
ideologies, and even the respect and recognition of those who opposed them.168 This
was amply demonstrated only a few months later, when he was elected by the Junta
Patriótica to deliver the speech commemorating independence on 16 September, in
Mexico City.169 Two years earlier he had been given that honour in Jalisco, and echoes
of that speech had reached the capital. Now he was being given centre stage. Once
again, he had the opportunity to present his political ideology, in addition to the
historical analysis that was so important to him.
In the months that followed, he focused on his business affairs in the capital as
well as attending the Ateneo Mexicano, where he was elected Vice-president of the
Junta.170 From here on, Otero entered what Reyes Heroles refers to as a dark phase,
arising from his political inactivity and his somewhat illegal behaviour when elected as
a deputy in 1845.171 The Junta de Notables had finished its deliberations and, on 8 June,
it presented Santa Anna with the Bases Orgánicas calling for elections for a new
congress. The main campaigning was followed by relatively peaceful elections in which
165 Juan B. Cevallos to Mariano Otero, 19 June 1843, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 95.
Cevallos sends the letter by hand, and provides a name to which all correspondence can be addressed that
would not give rise to suspicion.
166 Antonio Brambilla to Mariano Otero, 13 July 1843, in ibid., pp. 95-96.
167 See references to Otero’s letter in Ibid.
168 Letter from Joaquín Angulo to Mariano Otero. Ibid., pp.96-97.
169 El Siglo XIX, 13 July 1843. The Junta Patriótica met on 11 July to elect the orator for the 16 and 27
September celebrations of Independence. Otero beat Manuel Barranda and Francisco Modesto Olaguibel,
with 116 votes in favour.
170 Ibid., 26 January 1844.
171 Jesus Reyes Heroles, “Estudio Preliminar”, Mariano Otero, Obras, I, pp. 35-44.
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the federalists were mostly defeated.172 Once again, Otero found himself excluded from
congress as he did not meet the minimum age requirements.173 The elections had caused
considerable controversy in his home state, and Otero’s correspondence for the second
half of 1843 revealed a wide breadth of opinions. The “liberals” and “clerics” had
reached an agreement but to no avail and, once the elections were lost, doubts were
immediately cast on how long such a partnership could last. 174 In addition some
expressed the opinion that irrespective of their poor showing, it was essential that
congress sit, as “vale más que por un orden jurídico semi-legal, nos aparejen y humillen,
que no por la sola, arbitraria voluntad de un jinete atrabiliario.”175 Congress convened at
the beginning of 1844, working under the terms of the Bases Orgánicas. In the
meantime Otero’s contacts were unhappy with the fact that he had been excluded from
the decision making process, and sought alternative occupation for him. Joaquín Angulo
investigated a position for Otero in Gobernación but, once again, it seemed his age was
a drawback, as the other vocales would not admit someone who did not meet the age
requirements stipulated in the Bases, and, furthermore, he did not have 5 years
experience in public office, yet another basic requirement.176 This break from politics,
or at least from an official political position, meant that he was able to consolidate his
business as a lawyer. Ignacio Vallarta wrote full of concern that money was still not
forthcoming to cover Otero’s time as deputy, and lamented that he was not even able to
secure a promise that it would be paid in the future. After arguing that family and the
work that provided their sustenance must take precedence, he immediately launched
into talk of elections, wondering if Otero would be interested in standing for congress
172 Costeloe, The Central Republic, pp. 290-291.
173 Ignacio Villanueva to Mariano Otero, 16 October 1843, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero,
p. 121.
174 José María Castaños to Mariano Otero, 28 October 1843, in ibid., pp. 124-125. Otero himself seems to
have been of the opinion that the union would be ephemeral, and would not last beyond the election of the
governor; Jose María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 9 February 1844, ibid., p. 155.
175 Ibid., p. 125.
176 Juan Gutiérrez Mallén to Mariano Otero, 1 February 1844, in ibid., pp. 152-153.
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and suggesting that he might care to visit Guadalajara in order to secure the necessary
funds.177
The correspondence we have from this interim period where Otero was
slightly removed from the political scene offers glimpses into Otero’s private persona,
into his day to day life.178 Otero was a tall man, well-built even overweight, which is
further compounded by his friends referring to him as panzón and gordo, but always
with affection.179 Bernardo Flores whom he had met only in December 1843, and who
would remain a loyal friend until Otero’s death, strengthened their friendship by
acquiring a horse for Otero, joking that it would be perfect as, when purchasing it, he
had kept in mind that it was for “un colegial, gordo y Licenciado y en esa triple cualidad
no veo, por cierto, la de jinete.”180 The constant joking and friendly repartee backs
Prieto’s description of Otero as a family man, devoted to his friends and family;
era al extremo olvidadizo de la compostura: su señora le mandaba hacer
vestidos, las más veces injuriosos á la moda, levitones llenos de arrugas,
chalecos amarillos, pantalones del otro jueves. Muy grueso y de alta talla,
andaba desgarbado y babeando con indolencia. Si veía al paso fruta ó dulce que
le gustase, lo compraba y comía en la calle: tardaba á veces tres y cuatro horas
en ir admirando en las calles de Plateros lienzos, gorros, muñecos y juguetes con
gran placer, oyendo las cajas de música, siguiendo los movimientos de un
autómata. Volvía á su casa cargado de golosinas y juguetes á recrearse con el
júbilo y las sorpresas de sus hijos.181
His family and friends in Guadalajara wrote often, with news of his brothers, Juan and
Miguel. In 1844, these included updates on Juan’s health, who was suffering from a
serious eye infection which the family worried would lead to the loss of sight in one
eye.182 Otero's correspondence leaves no doubt that he was a doting husband and an
177 Julio Vallarta to Mariano Otero, 18 February 1844, in ibid., p. 157
178 See the correspondence for the last months of 1843 and for 1844, ibid.
179 Prieto, Memorias, pp. 346-347, and Ricardo Arce to Mariano Otero, 3 October 1842, and Bernardo
Flores to Mariano Otero 21 March 1844, in ibid., pp. 116, 162.
180 Letter from Bernardo Flores to Mariano Otero, 21 March 1844. Ibid., p. 162.
181 Prieto, Memorias, pp. 349-350.
182 At the end of February Juan fell ill with a recurring eye problem, for which a seton stitch was used to
alieviate the pressure. He remained unable to see for months and did not begin to experience any
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affectionate father. His friends were aware that he happily spoiled his wife, to the extent
that when looking for a temporary house for him in Toluca during the war with the United
States, Eulalio Maria Ortega joked that he had gone ahead and chosen a larger, all be it less
central, house because Andrea would prefer it adding that “Conociendo lo que Ud. chiquea
a la suya [señora], como se lo merece...” he was in no doubt what Otero's decision would
be.183 In what little correspondence remains between Otero and Andrea, he was always
openly affectionate, constantly worrying over her health, her comfort and their children. In
the midst of the war with the United States, when he was living in Querétaro with the rest
of the legislature, his letters home contained grumblings about his recurring toothache, his
reticence to see a dentist and the fact that he was getting only a few hours sleep. At the
same time however, he openly discussed politics with her, informing her of his decision to
vote against the peace treaty and his motives in doing so.184 Andrea became accustomed to
her house being taken over by his friends and colleagues for impromptu dinner parties and
informal gatherings since “la casa de Otero era la casa de sus amigos. Se complacía en
servirlos y agasajarlos, y mostraba satisfacción íntima cuando usaban en ella de la mayor
confianza.”185 According to Prieto, Andrea was just as devoted to Otero as he was to her,
adding that she “secundaba admirablemente á su esposo, previniendo sus deseos y
consagrándose á su cuidado.”186 Otero's premature death left Andrea inconsolable.187 His
friends described him as “de un raro mérito para el país y para sus amigos, y lo tenía
aún superior como esposo y como padre de familia” and lamented upon his death that
the loss of a father and husband such as Otero had been left an unfillable gap in his
improvement until the end of April. Ibid.; Letter from Ricardo Arce to Mariano Otero, 5 March 1844, p.
158 and letters from José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 29 March, 30 April 1844, pp. 166, 185.
183 Eulalio Ma. Ortega to Mariano Otero, 12 May 1847 in Eduardo Flores Clair (Ed.) La guerra de 1847 en
el buzón de Mariano Otero (unpublished manuscript), p. 83. I thank Dr Flores Clair for very kindly
allowing me to read this insightful piece of research.
184 For letters from Otero to Andrea see Otero, Obras, II, 605-611.
185 Prieto, Memorias, pp. 349-350
186 Ibid., p. 350.
187 Letter from Bernardo Flores to Mariano Riva Palacio, Junio 5 1850, MRPA, 4252.
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family's life.188 After his family, his greatest weakness appears to have been food.
Friends were constantly sending him cheeses and fishes, sweets and legumes.189 Prieto
joked that he was never to be seen without some sweets in his pocket, even when in
chambers, in congress or when writing for El Siglo XIX; “tenía siempre á mano dulces ó
bizcochos, ó quesadillas ó muérdagos, porque era muy goloso.”190
National events were to thrust him back in the spotlight once more. Indeed there
was suspicion among his contemporaries that he was working behind the scenes to this
end. Santa Anna had been elected president in 1843, and in October handed over power,
temporarily, to Valentín Canalizo, who was sworn in on 4 October 1843. Santa Anna
was to have begun his official term as president on 1 February 1844, but he declared
that he had no intention of returning to the capital and left Canalizo in charge. Costeloe
argues that his likely reason was that it had become obvious that congress, despite
operating under a centralist constitution and the elections having been won by his
supporters, was not willing to be bullied.191 The nonconformity within congress soon
spread to those politicians who had been left on the periphery. Two deputies presented a
motion on army reforms which, in turn, led to discontent in the military echelons. If
Santa Anna could not demonstrate that congress was under his control he would be
ousted. The solution came from the North where the United States announced its
188 Ibid and Draft letter, Mariano Riva Palacio, 6 June 1850, MRPA, 4257.
189 Bernardo Flores sent him “un queso y un ciento de panelas” to hand out among their friends, urging
Otero to make sure he kept “las más grandes y de mejor clase,” in a letter from Bernardo Flores to
Mariano Otero, 21 March 1844, Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 162. His uncle sent Andrea
some frijol, instructing Otero to ensure that she to not give too much away and use it so the family could
remember their homeland; letter from José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 29 March 1844, Ibid., p. 167.
He also sent 9 boxes of calabacete and 14 boxes of vino mezcal for Otero to hand out on his behalf, again
insisting that Otero keep some for his own consumption; letter from José María Mestas to Mariano Otero,
5 April 1844, Ibid., p. 172. It was not only from Jalisco that he received gifts of food. A colleague in
Veracruz, Manuel Ascorve, having received some calabacete from Otero, sent back “una lata con
camarones” which unfortunately had spoiled by the time they arrived in Mexico City. Undeterred by the
earlier failure, Ascorve, sent six huachinangos –red snappers– which he hoped would arrive in better
conditions. Letters from Manuel Ascorve to Mariano Otero, June 19 and June 28 1845, Ibid., pp. 305-307.
190 Prieto, Memorias, pp. 337, 350.
191 Costeloe, The Central Republic, pp. 300 onwards.
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intention in May of annexing Texas into the Union.192 Once more the issue of Texas
was central to government policy, as it had been since its independence in 1836. Santa
Anna returned to the capital and immediately began work on a Texan campaign. From
the very beginning, the 1844 congress had insisted on a separation of powers and Santa
Anna’s requests to raise taxes, divert state funds and his demands for a 4 million pesos
loan to be raised by congress itself overstepped such separation.193 In June a committee
turned down Santa Anna’s request for 30,000 men, offering an alternative that only
contemplated half that amount. This was also defeated. Finally it was approved with the
original number of men, but the 4 million pesos request was refused. Passed to the
Senate, heated debate ensued and eventually the proposal was returned to the deputies.
It soon became clear that a section of congress stood in direct opposition to Santa Anna.
The press worked for both sides, pressuring the deputies, who then responded with
accusations against the executive. On 15 October congress rejected a request for 10
million pesos which Santa Anna was hoping to raise through a loan. As he did prior to
the dissolution of the 1842 Constituent Congress, Santa Anna returned to his estates,
Canalizo was called upon to stand in for the president, and left to deal with a hostile
congress. The deputies demanded that the executive be asked to explain exactly where
the money raised was to be spent and, when it refused, a committee formed specifically
for this purpose suggested the executive be forced to provide the information that
congress was seeking. The back and forth between congress and executive only
worsened over the next few weeks, with congress accusing the ministers of different
actions of varying degrees of seriousness.194
192 Ibid., p. 304.
193 For more details see Ibid., p. 309 onwards, a brief summary of which will be presented next.
194 All details from the preceding paragraph have been taken from Costeloe, The Central Republic, for
further details, see the chapter entitled “La Revolución de Tres Horas,” pp. 335-332. See also Reynaldo
Sordo Cedeño, “Constitution and Congress: a pronunciamiento for Legality, December 1844,” in Will
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This was interrupted by a pronunciamiento in Jalisco, spearheaded by the Junta
Departamental and backed by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, which sought to annul all
the actions of the Santa Anna government from the end of 1841 to date, as well as
demanding that the executive respond to enquiries made by congress. 195 Congress
agreed to consider the Junta’s proposals, thereby causing Santa Anna to dash back to the
capital, arriving in mid-November, only to rush off a few days later at the head of the
army in an attempt to defeat Paredes y Arrillaga.196 By the end of the month, the
situation had reached breaking point. Congress called on the ministers to respond to
questions but they refused. On 1 December the deputies requested their presence again
and were turned down, so they voted to remain in session until they received the
answers they sought. Halfway through the day they found that the halls leading to the
chamber had been occupied by military forces and, one day later, Canalizo published a
decree, predated and signed 29 November, closing congress for the duration of the war
with Texas.197 In addition it stripped congress of all its powers, handing them to Santa
Anna or in his absence to Canalizo, and Santa Anna was awarded the right to legislate
on all matters, thereby combining the executive and legislative branches. This was the
final straw. Various military units within the city pronounced on 6 December and José
Joaquín de Herrera emerged as their leader and order was restored fairly peacefully. The
deputies marched back to congress from the convent of Saint Francis, and were
proclaimed as heroes and carried shoulder high to the doors of congress.198 Prieto
argued that the revolt had been masterminded by the “prohombres” of the moderate
Fowler (Ed.), Forceful Negotiations. The origins of the pronunciamiento in Nineteenth-Century Mexico
(Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).
195 Manifiesto del general Paredes y Arrillaga a la nación, 2 November 1844, as well as other documents
published in November and December of that same year; reproduced in http://arts.st-
andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/database/?f=y
196 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 321-332.
197 Bustamante, Apuntes para el gobierno, pp. 428-429.
198 Prieto, Memorias, pp. 368-370, see also Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, “Constitution and Congress.”
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faction and specifically named Otero as one of those involved, and argued that he,
together with Pedraza, exerted a great deal of influence on Herrera.199
It was in the midst of this chaotic political situation, Reyes Heroles argued, that
Otero, and others plotted to take over the Mexico City Ayuntamiento merely for
personal advancement after remaining so long on the sidelines.200 The elections took
place on 7 December and Otero emerged as president of the mesa directiva, along with
fellow moderates Lafragua and Domingo Pérez Fernandez and, less than twenty four
hours later, when the city council itself was chosen, all three were elected as “alcaldes”,
3rd, 4th and 5th, respectively.201 Reyes Heroles was stating the obvious when he said
that Otero had manoeuvred his way into that position but at that time most, if not all, the
political positions that Otero and his contemporaries held during the decade of the
1840s required some degree of wheeling and dealing.202 The fluidity in the political
factions, unconstrained by party lines, meant that very little political action was ever
spontaneous. Governing was achieved through accords and alliances, bargaining and
negotiation, so there is little worthy of note in Otero’s actions to secure a position as
mayor.
Otero remained as 3rd mayor until the city council voted to dissolve itself in
response to the San Luis pronunciamiento in December 1845.203 During his time as
mayor, Otero distinguished himself not by solving typical urban problems such as
sewage or lighting, but by becoming embroiled in a fight that was to have diplomatic
consequences on an international scale. The French minister Baron Alleye de Cyprey
199 Ibid., pp. 370, 374.
200 Reyes Heroles, Estudio Preliminar, p. 37.
201 El Siglo XIX, 8 December 1844 and 9 December 1844.
202 Reyes Heroles, Estudio Preliminar, p. 37.
203 El Siglo XIX, 31 December 1845.
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was known as a fatuous and rowdy individual. 204 He was constantly involved in
complaints and creating scenes over the most insignificant incident, including where he
could leave his horses or when some official had received him in the street without
removing his hat.205 One such affair took place at the Baño de las Delicias on 25 May.
The minister complained that when his horses were taken there, one of them had been
attacked by a dog. His aide had difficulty separating the animals and complained to the
minister, who himself went down to the Baño to demand compensation, but was rudely
received by the owner.206 The situation deteriorated when the minister was locked up
and then confronted by the crowd; pulling out a gun to escape the situation, he left
behind two of his men. On returning to set them free, shots ensued and he was
apprehended and taken to the Ciudadela where he was promptly freed. This led to the
Baron clamouring for justice to be served on all those involved though the incident was
never investigated any further by the Mexican authorities. An editorial was published on
24 September, in El Siglo XIX, gently mocking the Frenchman’s conduct.207 A few days
later, on the night of 30 October, he happened to bump into Otero outside the Teatro
Nacional. Malo gave specific details in his Diario, as did Carlos María de Bustamante
in his Nuevo Bernal Díaz.208 Believing Otero to be the hand behind the derisive article,
he demanded confirmation, through an interpreter, Julio de la Rosa. Otero refused to
answer, arguing that such information could be requested from his editor. The Baron
proceeded to spit on Otero and attempted to hit him with his cane.209 Malo stated that
having received such insult, Otero decided to morirse o matar, challenging the minister
204 Baron Alley de Cyprey is described as “necio, escandaloso” in José C Valdés, Orígenes de la
República Mexicana: la aurora constitucional (Mexico City: UNAM, 1994), p. 373. In addition, José
María Castaños refers to him as “ese loco tronera”; José María Castaños to Mariano Otero, Octubre 11 de
1845, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, p. 361.
205 Valdés, Orígenes de la República, p. 373.
206 Reyes Heroles, Estudio Preliminar, pp. 41, 179-180.
207 El Siglo XIX, 24 September 1845.
208 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, pp. 285-287 and Bustamante, El Nuevo Bernal, pp. 73 - 74
209 Bustamante, El Nuevo Bernal, p. 73.
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to a duel. He called on General José Gómez de la Cortina requesting he serve as
intermediary. Cortina spent the next few days going back and forth between Otero and
the French representative, stating that Otero, whose right it was, had chosen his
weapon –pistols– only one of which would be charged, the shots taking place at short
range. The Baron was aware of the precariousness of his situation. If he killed Otero he
would most likely be lynched. If Otero were victorious he would be hailed as a hero and
paraded through the streets on the shoulders of his fellow Mexicans.210 Having asked
for time to think, a French merchant by the name of Lestapis was sent to request that a
witness be present in addition to the seconds. This was immediately turned down,
Cortina pointing out that duelling being illegal in Mexico, it would drag an innocent
individual into the fray and that Otero would not permit this. Further stalling came from
the Baron’s argument that a short range shot was the equivalent of murder. Each new
excuse was parried and finally the Baron capitulated –he openly refused the duel– thus
settling the matter in Otero’s favour. The newspapers were full of the scandal, hailing
Otero for standing up for Mexican rights. His friends too expressed their support and
concern. Duelling may well have been illegal, but it was seen as the correct course of
action to restore one’s honour.211 Self-effacing as he may have been in congress, it is
clear that Otero had the arrogance to confront the official representative of France in
Mexico, knowing, as he must have, that it might well have caused an international
incident.
Though finally settled, the incident continued to echo through the following
months, but it is likely that it was far from Otero’s mind. 1845 was a dreadful year for
210 Malo, Diario de sucesos notables, p. 286.
211 One of Otero’s correspondents stated; “Siento con usted semejante insulto y sin embargo que deseo
que no tenga un desenlace funesto; quisiera verlo vengado”. M. J. Olasgarre to Mariano Otero, 7 October
1845, another, his uncle, was concerned that having lost, the Baron might choose to resort to more severe
measures to restore his honour; “que yo conozco, en donde, se hace uso del puñal, del veneno, se compra
el asesino […] debes vivir con más precaución, y cuando salgas de noche, mira si tienes un Verdadero
Amigo, que siempre, siempre, siempre te acompañe.” José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 10 October
1845, both in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, pp. 357-360
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Otero. In March his daughter, Mariana, was taken ill with a fever, and died soon
afterwards.212 This followed closely on the death of his older sister who had died on 18
February. His age had disbarred him from the 1844 congress and his election to the
Ayuntamiento had been tainted by the scandal involving the French Minister. There was
one more dark period before him, involving election fraud and his misrepresenting his
age, before the tide turned and he was elected to the 1846–1847 Constituent Congress,
which was to place his name firmly among the leading politicians of the decade. After
the disbandment of the 1842 congress, Otero had failed to be chosen for the Junta de
Notables and been excluded by the higher age requirements from the 1844 congress.
Herrera’s presidential term officially began on 16 September and the following weeks
were filled, once again, with electioneering by both sides.213 In Jalisco, Otero’s contacts
were doing their best to ensure he was elected as a deputy. Correspondence received in
August from his brother Miguel seemed hopeful, assuring Otero that conversations were
underway with prominent men and that each would give him their vote.214 However, as
the weeks passed, this certainty faded. By the end of September there seemed little hope
of achieving a majority and this was confirmed in the first week of October. Suddenly,
“el idiota de Escobedo” and the “partido borbonista” emerged triumphant. Otero’s
brother went so far as to put forward the theory that Otero being the principal candidate
had been enough to cause their rivals to do everything in their power to ensure that he
was not elected.215 They achieved their goal in Guadalajara but he was on the electoral
lists for the capital too, and there he did win. The regulations governing the elections
212 Pedro Zubieta to Mariano Otero, 28 March 1845, stated that his children too had suffered from
escarlatina, however, in the beginning of a draft to one of their aunts, the family stated that the girl
succumbed to a fiebre tifoidea. See unsigned draft to Doña Celsa Arce, April 3 1845, in Tovar de Teresa,
Cartas a Mariano Otero, pp. 284, 287.
213 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 349.
214 Miguel Otero to Mariano Otero, 12 August 1845, in Tovar de Teresa, Cartas a Mariano Otero, pp.
332-333.
215 Bernardo Flores, Miguel Otero, José María Mestas, José de la Barcena, Jesús Lopez Portillo and
Cosme Torres al wrote letters to Otero detailing the election results, see Ibid., pp. 332-417.
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stated that the candidate must be 30 or over in order to be elected as a deputy, Otero was
28. Reyes Heroles argued that Otero lied. However, it was unlikely that he ever had the
opportunity to do so. Once it became known in Guadalajara that he had been elected for
the city of Mexico, Escobedo and his cronies rushed to procure a copy of his birth
certificate with the intention of sending it to the capital with one of their men.216
Crispiniano del Castillo argued that Otero should keep his seat as he felt that the young
politician’s presence would avoid a repeat of 1842.217 This sentiment was echoed by
Ramón Lusa who argued that the country was in dire need of the wisdom and energy
that Otero could give congress. Otero, always one to abide by rules and regulations, was
torn. He wrote for advice on whether or not he should “hacerse el desenterado” and wait
to be asked.218 The advice returned by José María Castaños was to go ahead and admit
his age. If congress proved sympathetic, it would accept his nomination, as there was so
little time left before his 30th birthday. He went on to add that any other course of
action would provide his enemies with ammunition to be used against him, leading to
accusations of dishonesty or crookedness. Otero chose honesty and rectitude and when
asked his age by congress, he confessed that he did not fulfil the requirements.219
Castaños had been right. Although initially turning down the request that Otero be
allowed to take his seat during the preparatory junta on 23 December, the next day, the
vote was re-counted, and three people who had not been present changed their votes,
thereby accepting him and allowing him to become a deputy for the 1845 congress.220
This demonstrated just how flexible certain rules and regulations could become in the
right circumstances. In addition, Otero’s honesty had paid off, but this mattered little in
the ever-changing world of mid-century Mexican politics. In the early hours of the
216 José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 17 October 1845, in Ibid., p. 365.
217 Crispiniano del Castillo to Mariano Otero, 3 October 1845, in Ibid., pp. 376-377.
218 José María Castaños to Mariano Otero, 29 November 1845, in Ibid., pp. 398-399.
219 Bustamante, El Nuevo Bernal, p. 97.
220 Reyes Heroles, Estudio Preliminar, p. 43.
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morning on 30 December, a pronunciamiento broke out against the Herrera government
and congress was immediately dissolved. Otero’s return to centre stage had been brief,
but it paved his way towards his participation in the 1846–1847 Constituent Congress,
in which he would have a key role, if not the key role.
The fall of Herrera, in December 1845, if not exactly expected, was not really
surprising either. Otero’s distance from any direct role in politics would not have meant
he was unaware of the turmoil surrounding the Herrera presidency, particularly in view
of his ties and influence with the president. Though the grievances were many, they
centred on the army’s unhappiness with what was seen as the government’s plan to
replace the regular army with a National Guard. This view was definitely an
exaggeration, as Herrera and any other president would have been fully aware that any
overt attack on the military meant political suicide. Coupled with these rumours, the
ever present fiscal problems meant that there was little room, or money, for real
solutions. Even natural disasters appeared to be plotting against Herrera when an
earthquake devastated hospitals, shops and houses in Mexico City.221 However, the
most pressing matter for the government was Texas. During the first few days of June
1845, the United States agreed to admit Texas into the Union and a month later, Texas
announced that it was doing so. Suddenly the issue of the reconquest of Texas, ever
present since 1836, became critical. This coincided with a first, unsuccessful
pronunciamiento, launched against the government by a section of the National Guard.
Nothing came of it, but unrest and dissent had found an outlet, and although Herrera
221 The earthquake which began at 3.47pm on 7 April 1845, with a strong aftershock on 10 April, is
considered to have been one of the strongest of the nineteenth century; “popularly known as “the
earthquake of Santa Teresa” it affected churches, convents, schools, government buildings and hospitals.
América Molina de Villar, “19th Century earthquakes in Mexico: three cases, three comparative studies,”
Annals of Geophysics, Vol. 47, N. 2/3 April/Junes 2004, pp. 499-501, 504. James Garza adds that the
earthquake was so strong that it resulted in numerous dead and injured by falling walls and that some of
those left homeless were forced to make camp in the Alameda. See James A. Garza “Conquering the
environment and surviving natural disasters,” in William H. Beezley (Ed.), A companion to Mexican
History and Culture (England: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 326.
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was still strongly supported by the hombres de bien, it was only a matter of time. The
presidential election on 1 August was won by Herrera, who took up his position in mid-
September. In the meantime, elections for congress were held, in which Otero was
elected deputy, and congress readied itself to begin sessions. The apparent success of
the moderates was to be short lived; on 14 December another pronunciamiento
shattered the peace. In San Luis Potosí, a Plan was announced that struck out against
Herrera’s presidency and against congress. Less than twenty four hours later, General
Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga was asked to head the revolt, which he immediately
accepted. Meanwhile General Valencia assumed leadership of the rebels at the
Ciudadela. Herrera did not even attempt to fight the pronunciados; he left town quietly,
taking his family with him. After a very brief tussle for power between Valencia and
Paredes, the latter entered Mexico City on 2 January to be elected provisional president
the very next day.222
Once again, Otero found himself exiled from political circles but this time it
would only be a few months before he resumed his position as a congressional deputy.
Paredes had risen to power at a moment of great national uncertainty. The United States’
annexation of Texas meant that a constant threat now shadowed all political decisions in
the capital. Paredes called for a congress, and aided by Alamán, electoral restrictions
ensured it would be a traditionalist one, with marked monarchist tendencies. This
congress sat in June and one of its first tasks was to grant permission for Paredes to
stand down from the presidency in order to command troops heading north. On 27 July,
Nicolás Bravo, vice-president, assumed the interim presidency. On 1 August Paredes
left Mexico City. It took less than three days for a revolt to break out. In the early hours
of 4 August, Mariano Salas and the ever-side-shifting Ciudadela garrison pronounced in
222 Pedro Santoni, Mexicans at arms, pp. 87-99.
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favour of the election of a new congress and, more importantly, called for Santa Anna,
who was in exile, to take command of the army. A little more than ten days later, Santa
Anna set foot on Mexican soil and immediately began the necessary scheming to
reintroduce the 1824 Constitution and called for a new congress under the electoral
terms of 1823.223 It was to this congress that Mariano Otero was to be elected.
1846 was to be a bittersweet year for the young politician. In April, less than a
year after the death of his daughter, he lost a son, Sisto. This loss left Otero heartbroken,
and furthered his disillusionment with public life.224 He sought to retire from politics
and devote time to his family. Andrea was once again pregnant. In September he
received a letter from his uncle, José María Mestas in Guadalajara, which showed the
extent to which Otero had been decimated by the loss of his child. The letter paints a
poignant picture of Otero’s anguish. The young father continually visited his son’s
grave, in the San Fernando pantheon, sometimes for hours on end, to such an extent that
it began to affect his health. His uncle begged him to stop; “por tu patria, por tus hijos
que viven, por la apreciable compañera que tienes, por el cariño que te merece tu tío,
por lo que más ames y quieras.”225 Furthermore Mestas argued that his son was resting
in peace and, if he could, would call upon his father to “no vaya a morir y ser falta a mis
hermanos, a mi madre, a su patria, que espera tanto de Ud.”226 At the same time, his
friends and family were working to push him back onto the national political stage. The
elections for the new congress were taking place and many believed Otero was essential
to the success of any Constituent Congress. Octaviano Muñoz Ledo writing from
223 Costeloe, The Central Republic , pp. 363-376.
224 Letter from Joaquín Goméz de la Cortina to Mariano Otero, 20 April 1846, and letter from Francisco
Placido Fletes to Mariano Otero, 5 May 1846, in Flores Clair, La guerra de 1847, p. 17.
225 Letter from José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 4 September 1846, in Ibid., p. 27.
226 Ibid.
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Guanajuato, argued that the election was to be “juiciosa y moderada” and that as such, a
seat would be his.227
The last four months of 1846 were a busy time for the young politician. He was
appointed the Minister of Internal and Foreign Affairs in September, but resigned the
very next day, quoting pressures of work.228 In October Valentín Gómez Farías sought
to form a Consejo de Gobierno to comprise politicians of various factions. 229 Luis de la
Rosa, José María Lafragua and Otero were all asked to join and accepted, even agreeing
to intercede with Pedraza so that he too would accept the nomination. The creation of
such a Consejo would have given the impression that the government was widely
supported by all political factions, thus lending it stability and credibility. However,
Gómez Farías stated that the moderates could not countenance the fact that he had been
named President of the Consejo and not only renounced their seats, but called on several
States to oppose the creation of any such body.230 Though there is little doubt that
political intrigue would have been rife, Otero also had other things on his mind. Andrea
had given birth to a daughter in October, named after the mother, and had suffered
complications, but pulled through successfully. 231 In addition, Muñoz Ledo’s
predictions turned out to be accurate. Otero was elected as deputy for his home state of
Jalisco. Perhaps the addition of a baby girl to the family instilled new fire in his political
life too, because despite negative press from Valentín Gómez Farías, and rumours of
interventions against him by Santa Anna, Otero looked forward to the new congress and
the constitution that would emerge from it with optimism.232 In reply to a letter from
227 Letter from Octaviano Muñoz Ledo to Mariano Otero, 18 September 1846, Ibid., p. 29-31.
228 Letter from José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 3 November 1846, Ibid., pp. 33-37.
229 Draft letter, Valentín Gómez Farías, 1st fortnight in October 1846, Valentín Gómez Farías Papers,
4911, the decree itself being published in El Siglo XIX, 20 September 1846.
230 Ibid.
231 Letter from José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 3 November 1846, Flores Clair, El Buzón, p. 35.
232 Negative circulares issued by Valentín Gómez Farías are mentioned in a letter from Crispiniano del
Castillo to Mariano Otero, 6 November 1846, Ibid., 39-41. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna wrote to Otero
to clarify his position, arguing that he had become aware of, untrue, rumours that stated that he had
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Santa Anna in which he said he had not sent instructions to Guadalajara to impede
Otero’s election, Otero said that his wishes were those of the nation, and that the wishes
of the nation were to be reflected in Santa Anna; “consolidar las libertades públicas bajo
el régimen federal, salvar el honor de México resistiendo la más inicua de todas las
agresiones,” and added that it was the duty of every Mexican to support Santa Anna in
this task.233 Otero took on these two goals as his own and, during the next two years,
battled in congress and in the Senate against the Unites States’ invasion and for the
introduction of reforms to the recently re-established 1824 federalist constitution.
The preparatory sessions for congress took place on 3 and 5 of December 1846,
and Otero was in attendance. On the first day, he was elected, along with Pedro Zubieta,
Guadalupe Perdigón Garay, Manuel Buenrostro and Benito Juárez to form the
commission to examine the credentials of the deputies.234 In addition, on the 5th, he was
called upon again, with four others, to form a second commission to establish the oath
to be sworn by the deputies.235 Otero was, once again, centre stage and very active in
congress. His first few positions were mostly administrative, though he was constantly
elected to new ones. On 7 December he was asked to sit on the Comisión de puntos
constitucionales, the Comisión de relaciones exteriores and the Comisión de gran
jurado.236 As a member of these various committees he began to form a clearer idea of
the situation facing Mexico and demonstrated his willingness to protest or dissent in
order to add or amend sections or proposals he did not feel benefited the country. One
such example, which took place in the second week of the sessions, was his argument
written letters to Jalisco to ensure that Otero was not elected deputy, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to
Mariano Otero, 10 November 1846, Ibid., pp. 41-42.
233 Draft of a letter from Mariano Otero to Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, 14 November 1846, Ibid., pp.
42-43.
234 Manuel González Oropeza, (Ed.), La Reforma del Estado Federal, Acta de Reformas de 1847 (Mexico
City: UNAM 1998), pp. 153-156.
235 The oath they produced, “¿Juráis haberos bien y fielmente en el cargo que la nación os ha
encomendado en todo por su bien y prosperidad?” was fairly generic and caused none of the
controversies aroused by the 1842 oaths. Ibid., pp. 156-152.
236 Ibid., pp. 163-168.
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that congress and not the Executive should be the one to choose the interim president
should the president elect be unable to accept or remain in office.237 Though this did not
pass, Otero, with Mariano Riva Palacio and Godoy, was willing to vote against the
established opinion in order to ensure that the “will of the nation,” as deposited in
congress, chose the interim president when required, thus avoiding any arbitrary
decision of the Executive. The most important election was still to come and the
Constitution Committee was formed on 11 December. Espinosa de los Monteros, with
whom Otero had already worked in 1842, Rojas, Cardoso and Zubieta were elected,
along with Otero himself.238
Otero was to use his seat in congress to support his personal views, as well as to
further the interest of his home state. He drew attention to the fact that despite four
months in which to do it, the government had not found a solution to the deficit in the
treasury, and that its constant cries for more and more money to support the war left
congress looking as if it were unwilling to provide the necessary funding.239 In addition,
he took up the cause of the tobacco growers in Veracruz, as well as supporting motions
on the Montepío from Carlos María de Bustamante. However, it was two specific
interventions during the 1847 sessions that would prove to be the most important.
Firstly, he led the opposition in January against a decree which would allow the
government to mortmain property held by the Church and clergy, in order to raise
money for the war against the United States. Otero was accused of being the standard
bearer for the clergy, and described as being willing to use every parliamentary weapon
to advance his cause, including any available moratorium or loophole in the regulations
237 Ibid., p. 182.
238 Otero won a seat on the commission with 60 votes out of 73. Ibid., p. 187.
239 Ibid., pp. 206-207.
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governing congress.240 As can readily be seen in the chapter on the Church in Part 2,
this was not the whole story. He was steadfastly opposed to any increase in Church
influence in Mexico and while he probably did use every weapon in his power to get his
own way, he would never support a measure that would rebound badly on the poorer
echelons of society inhabiting or earning a living from Church properties. Despite his
best efforts, a law was passed on 11 January 1847, fixing the amount to be raised at
fifteen million pesos.241 A second law was passed on 4 February regulating how this
money was to be obtained. Legislative options having been exhausted, the Church
resorted to making inflammatory speeches and threatening anyone that carried out the
laws with excommunication.242 As agitation began to spread, Valentín Gómez Farías
received notifications of unrest among the National Guard. On 22 February the
Independencia Regiment endeavoured to meet at the University but, on arrival, found
themselves detained and their weapons removed. The news spread rapidly, and the
different battalions of the National Guard began to gather in their respective
headquarters and the members of Independencia met at the old Coliseum. A few days
later General Anaya and Gómez Farías made the decision to relocate the regiment to
new headquarters in the Hospital de Terceros, prior to it being posted to Veracruz. The
regiment was composed of more than a thousand guards, and it was made up largely of
well-to-do men, including José María Lafragua, Joaquín Navarro and Mariano Otero,
who were officers.243 According to Guillermo Prieto and José María Lafragua, both the
laws against the property of the clergy and posting sections of the National Guard to
Veracruz were the catalysts that set off the Rebelión de los Polkos, but that these were
240 Ramón Alcaraz et al. Apuntes para la historia de la Guerra entre México y los Estados Unidos
(México: Tipografía de Manuel Payno (hijo), 1848), p. 124.
241 The law of 11 January and the regulation for said law, 15 January, can be found in Manuel Dublán y
José María Lozano, Legislación Mexicana, colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas
desde la independencia de la república, available at; http://biblioweb.dgsca.unam.mx/dublanylozano/
242 Alcaraz, Apuntes, p. 124.
243 Ibid., p. 128, Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 171.
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merely excuses.244 The moderado party had been involved in secret manoeuvres to oust
Gómez Farías from power. Prieto named Otero, Pedraza and Lafragua as the “directores
ocultos” and admitted that he himself took part. Lafragua said he had been told of the
decision only the day before it erupted, and had tried to no avail to stop it by agreeing,
as President of congress, that the laws would be repealed the next day.245 This, Lafragua
argued, had no impact as it had been clear to him all along that the repeal of the laws
was not the real cause of unrest. Those involved merely wanted to bring down the
government, and more specifically Valentín Gómez Farías, in an effort to regain control
of power.
A figurehead was found for the movement, a plan delineated, and the clergy
provided the funds.246 In the early hours of Tuesday 27 February, rumours began that a
pronunciamiento was under way. Such rumours were soon substantiated by a Plan
which began circulating, signed by Matías de la Peña Barragán. The Plan demanded the
repeal of the January and February laws affecting clergy property. It also called for a
new executive. Hostilities broke out between the pronunciados and the troops loyal to
the government and fighting tore the capital apart for just under a month. People were
unable to leave their houses, and those that did were “shot like rabbits.” Many deputies
were unwilling to risk attending congress.247 Civil war had broken out at a time when
the country was under attack from United States forces. Congress agreed to grant the
rebels an amnesty if they surrendered but they refused. It was stalemate. The
government was unwilling to give in to their demands and the rebels had overestimated
their support base. On 8 March, the rebels radically changed their Plan. The thirteen
original points were reduced to a single one, the one that had been the real motive all
244 Prieto, Memorias, p. 395.
245 Lafragua, Miscelanea política, p. 63.
246 Michael Costeloe, “The Mexican Church and the Rebellion of the Polkos,” The Hispanic American
Historical Review, Vol 46, No. 2. (May, 1966), pp. 170-178.
247 Letter from Manuel Terreros to Mariano Otero, 2 March 1847, Flores Clair, El buzón, pp. 62-63.
83
along; the removal of Valentín Gómez Farías from the presidency and from the
executive. Public opinion turned against both the pronunciados and the clergy who had
spurred them on. Where support for the repeal of the January law had been widespread,
here it was replaced by revulsion against those Mexicans willing to sacrifice not only
their fellow citizens but their country for their petty personal goals. The citizens of
Veracruz openly blamed the conquest of the city by US forces on the pronunciados, as
their refusal to come to the city’s defence had left it wide open.248 The pronunciamiento
ended with the return of Santa Anna, who had been recalled by 41 deputies in congress,
unable to see an end in sight. On 21 March, he was met at Guadalupe, outside the
capital, by a commission led by Otero as President of congress.249 Two days later, Otero
was elected Minister of Internal and Foreign Affairs, a post which he promptly refused,
for the second time in less than six months, although his reasons were not clear.250
Congress had remained in session throughout the Polkos revolt and Otero,
despite being named as one of the orchestrators of the revolt as a member of the
Comisión de Constitución, was working towards this end. As the enemy advanced, his
actions became more desperate as he believed that the only way for Mexico to survive
was by becoming united by a strong constitution which would clearly delimitate power
and responsibility. During the session of 5 April 1847, two proposals were presented by
the Committee. The first, a Voto de la Mayoría, was backed by all its members except
one, Otero, who presented his Voto Particular. This was the second time that Otero had
dissented from the majority but, whereas in 1842 he had done so with the backing of
other deputies, here he stood alone. Both were printed and distributed and put to the
248 Letter from José Joaquín Pesado, 12 March 1847, BNE, Ignacio Cumplido to Mariano Otero, 20 April
1847, BNE, José María Esteva to Mariano Otero, 30 May 1847, BNE, Flores Clair, El buzón, pp. 67-68,
76-78 and 94-95.
249 For a more detailed analysis and chronology of the Polkos rebellion see Costeloe, “The Rebellion de
los Polkos”.
250 Letter from José Cayetano Orozco to Mariano Otero, 30 Mach 1847, BNE, Flores Clair, El buzón,, pp.
69-70.
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floor. The majority wanted the 1824 constitution, already in effect, to continue, leaving
it open, should it be necessary, for changes or amendments to be added at a later date.
Otero’s Voto Particular, which would come to be known as the Acta de Reformas,
sought to amend the 1824 constitution, in the interests of a nation, in a very different
position from that in 1824 shortly after independence. In 1847 it was facing an invading
force having been dogged by failed and experimental governments for twenty-three
years. Debating began on 22 April, only four days after the devastating Mexican defeat
at Cerro Gordo. It was not only the constitution that worried the deputies. Cerro Gordo
signalled the possibility of an attack on the Mexican capital by the United States, and
congress spent days discussing the outcome if that were to happen. Once the enemy was
spotted at Perote, congress would disband and regroup outside the capital and wherever
they re-grouped, thirty deputies would be sufficient to establish a quorum. 251 The
debates continued for three weeks, first on the Acta itself in general terms and then each
article, one by one. As the threat posed by the enemy grew, so did Otero’s desperation
for the Acta to be passed. A committed constitutionalist, he believed nothing was more
important than a reformed constitution and, in pursuit of this goal, was willing to work
against his own faction in congress.
Puros and moderados were opposed on whether to accept British mediation in
the conflict with the United States.252 The moderados were pro-British intervention; the
puros were strongly against it. The moderates believed that they would be able to
outsmart the puros and turned to Otero to force a recess but Otero would not. He was
aware that the US threat grew closer as each day passed and was willing to disregard the
wishes of his political faction in favour of furthering his own goals. A recess would
mean a delay in passing the Acta and, as far as Otero was concerned, this was not an
251 José Fernando Ramírez, México durante su guerra con los Estados Unidos (México: UNAM, 2001), p.
127.
252 For more in-depth information see Santoni, Mexicans at Arms, p. 203-205.
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option. He refused to call the recess and instead he sought the support of a section of
congress that was facing difficulties in getting its own motion passed. The Oaxaca
delegation wanted its legitimate authorities reinstated –they had been removed by a
revolt in February– but the government could not afford to send troops to the southern
state when they were needed to hold off the ever advancing enemy. The Oaxacan
delegation’s proposal was rejected and, in protest, they threatened to leave the capital.
Once Otero realised that this departure would signify the loss of quorum, and faced with
an imminent vote on the Acta, he approached them with a mutually beneficial proposal;
if they voted for the Acta de Reformas, he would convince his party to vote in favour of
the Oaxaca proposal. Both parties remained true to their word. On 28 May, the Acta de
Reformas, establishing the amendments to the 1824 constitution became law. Otero had
achieved his aims, and managed to hold on to the allegiance of his party, who followed
his vote on the Oaxaca question, despite his initial manoeuvres against the proposal.253
The country did not enjoy similar success and in May, Puebla fell to the
invading forces. By August the United States were ready to begin their march on the
capital. Mexican resistance was weak, General Valencia was beaten in Padierna,
Churubusco fell and the United States was rapidly bearing down on the city. Santa Anna
signed an armistice, which led to the first peace negotiations taking place at Alfaro.
These were unsuccessful and a week later, when the armistice expired, the United States
defeated the Mexican forces at Molino del Rey. Chapultepec fell on 13 September and,
a day later, Mexico City was occupied and the American flag rose above the capital.
Santa Anna renounced the presidency. Reluctant at first, at the end of September,
Manuel de la Peña y Peña, who had moved to Toluca in order to evade the advancing
US troops, finally agreed to accept the presidency and, a few weeks later, left for
253 For greater information on the workings of Congress during this time see Sordo Cedeño, “El
Congreso”.
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Queretaro. There he sought to establish the provisional government and requested the
deputies make haste to the city so that congress could meet to name his successor. At
the beginning of November the Constituent Congress reconvened, and elections were
held wherever possible for the 1848 congress. On 11 November, the deputies elected
General Pedro María Anaya as the interim president and, less than a month later the
Constituent Congress which had first sat in 1846, having fulfilled its purpose, dissolved
itself. Anaya’s term ran out on 8 January 1848 and once again Peña y Peña found
himself at the head of the executive.254 Whatever else he might have to deal with, he
was faced with only one critical issue from the very beginning –the peace negotiations
with the United States. They began during the first few days of January and concluded a
month later when agreement was reached on 2 February. It was not until 10 March that
the United States ratified the treaty with a few changes and fourteen votes against.
There was more opposition in the US senate than there was in the Mexican one, where
the treaty was passed on 21 May with only four votes against it. The ratification of the
treaty, with the cession of more than half of Mexico’s territory to the United States in
exchange for 15 million dollars, ushered in a period of despair for many Mexicans who
saw the defeat and subsequent loss of territory as proof that Mexico could not even be
called a nation.255 Although congress was supposed to sit as from 1 January, it took 5
months for deputies and senators to get together. On 30 May, as the exchange of the
ratified treaties took place, congress elected General José Joaquín de Herrera as
president. He took office on 3 June 1848. Unrest was widespread, as were the rumours
of revolts and possible pronunciamientos. The government was preoccupied with the
254 All information on dates and general events taken from Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, “México en Armas
1846 – 1848,” in En defensa de la patria, 1847-1997 (Mexico City: Segob, AGN, 1997) which can be
consulted online at http://biblioweb.unam.mx/libros/guerra/guerra.htm and contains essays, documents
and pictures relating to the Mexican war with the United States.
255 An anonymous pamphlet published in 1847 voiced the sentiment that “En México, no hay ni ha
podido haber eso que se llama espírit y nacional, porque no hay nación.” Varios Mexicanos,
"Consideraciones sobre la situación política y social de la República Mexicana en el año de 1847"
(Mexico City: Valdés y Redondas, Impresores, 1848), p. 42.
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war and it was blamed for the state of the country. The clergy and army were similarly
attacked. Crispiniano del Castillo, writing from Guadalajara in June 1847, mentioned a
pronunciamiento which was gestating, and said that the Bishop of Puebla was
welcoming the US troops merely to spite the government, and highlighted the army as
an element of opposition.256
Otero, for his part, had begun to think of leaving the capital with his family by
May 1847. Toluca was the chosen rallying point and Otero was able to secure a house
there at the beginning of the month.257 Though he did not choose to move immediately,
he was aware that sooner rather than later, the United States would reach the capital and
he and his family would need a secure point of retreat. Information was sketchy and
Otero’s correspondence during these months is filled with letters begging for
information on this or that piece of news, or seeking clarification of unsubstantiated
rumours.258 This same correspondence also charted the loss of hope experienced by
many Mexicans as well as the concerns that the war created. Otero’s disappointment
with politics and political manoeuvres was noticeable. Despite his actions in congress,
he was still plagued by the loss of his children and longing for retirement from
politics.259 Congress was having trouble obtaining a quorum and, more often than not,
just as it did, some deputy or another would leave, rendering it invalid.260 Deputies were
leaving the city, in preparation for what was seen as the inevitable arrival of U.S
256 Crispiniano del Castillo to Mariano Otero, 18 June 1847, Flores Clair, El buzón, pp. 101-102.
257 Eulalio María Ortega to Mariano Otero, 6 May 1847, Ibid., pp. 81-82.
258 For example, on 28 May 1847, José María Herrera writes to Otero to refute claims that ten thousand
men were being sent to aid the capital. It was barely 600, and most of those, he states, deserted as soon as
they were asked to march. Ibid. pp. 91-92.
259 Melchor Ocampo to Mariano Otero, 2 June 1847. Ibid., pp. 95-97.
260 Mariano Otero to Mariano Riva Palacio, 19 June 1847, Mariano Riva Palacio Archive, henceforth
MRPA, 2304.
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troops.261 By 21 July the situation had become so unstable that Otero finally took the
decision to move to Toluca, taking his entire family with him.262
In his absence, Otero’s house in the capital was being looked after by Antonio de
Portugal.263 Defending the city had produced little more than broken windows but the
arrival of the US army meant some houses were looted. Portugal announced to Otero,
on 16 September than although his house had been broken into, all that had been taken
was “la cinta de la campana del comedor” as well as “unas sabanas y una funda limpia”
and “unas cuantas cucharas y cuchillos.” 264 Just in case, Portugal decided to hide
everything in storage, as he was worried about Andrea’s enormous wardrobes, which
she had left locked, and possible damage to Otero’s office. Not a week later, Otero
received news from another friend in Mexico City, telling him his house was listed as
being empty and, therefore, likely to be used to house the sick and the wounded, but this
never happened.265 Once in Toluca, and with the U.S army bearing down on and finally
entering Mexico City, Otero began to receive mixed reports from those still living in the
capital. In August he wrote to Antonio de Portugal mentioning he might return to the
city and, in his reply, Portugal told him not to bother. Mexico City had become nothing
more than “el panteón de todos nuestros deudos y amigos,”266 and saying that there was
a complete lack of public antagonism towards against the conquerors. Just over a month
later, when Otero once again considered moving back to the capital with his family, the
news arriving from the city was promising; all was quiet under US occupation.267
261 Letter from Mariano Otero to Mariano Riva Palacio, MRPA, 2304.
262 Eulalio María Ortega to Mariano Otero, 15 July 1847. Flores Clair, El buzón, pp. 107-108.
263 Antonio de Portugal to Mariano Otero, 7 September 1847, Ibid., pp.139-140.
264 Antonio de Portugal to Mariano Otero, 16 September 1847. Ibid., pp. 142-145.
265 Lucas de la Tixera to Mariano Otero, 20 September 1847. Ibid., p. 148-149.
266 Antonio de Portugal to Mariano Otero, 12 August 184. Ibid., pp. 116-118.
267 Ibid., and P Martínez del Rio to Mariano Otero, 22 September 1847. Ibid., 150-153.
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The political classes had dispersed. Gómez Pedraza, who had also fled the
capital, was named plenipotentiary to the peace negotiations, but declined.268 Lafragua
wrote saying he was waiting for a sufficient number of deputies to congregate, wherever
that might happen.269 There seemed little for anyone to do but wait. While they waited
they reflected on the state of the nation, the options available to Mexico and speculated
on the future of the country. There was little or no hope. Pessimism was the
undercurrent in most if not all of the letters Otero received while in Toluca. The
Mexican nation, which had been all but conquered, was a nation of cowards and many
saw only two possible alternatives, either absorption by the north, or unification with a
European power.270 Melchor Ocampo, writing from Morelia, saw a light in all the
despair and argued that the war was showing them the obstacles that prevented them
from becoming a great nation; be they the instability of the governments, or the military
forces, this was the perfect time to remove those impediments that had brought the
nation nothing but harm.271 The war was a lesson, if their experiences were used
correctly, “México puede ser, México será una nación grande.”272
On 9 September 1847, congress finally agreed to disband and regroup in
Querétaro. Only twenty-odd members made it to the final meeting in the capital and a
statement was issued that they would not meet again until the skirmishes in the city
were over, and then it would need to be outside the capital. They would not have the
freedom to make the necessary deliberations were they to meet in the occupied capital.
The waiting was over; once again, the political class had a task to perform, to re-
assemble congress in Querétaro. Otero had not returned to the capital. He had chosen to
268 Manuel Gómez Pedraza to Mariano Otero, 30 August 1847. Ibid., pp. 125-127.
269 José María Lafragua to Mariano Otero, 2 September 1847. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
270 Unsigned letter, to Mariano Otero, 3 September 1847. Ibid., pp. 130-132 and letter from Melchor
Ocampo to Mariano Otero, 6 September 1847. Ibid., pp. 133-137.
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remain with his family in Toluca, but he firmly believed it was essential for congress to
meet so that at the very least a Consejo de Gobierno could be formed in order to
preserve national unity. By the end of September he had made his mind up to make his
way to Querétaro.273 Melchor Ocampo felt that Otero’s presence there would help
convince other deputies to go too, and argued that he was desperately needed there and
should not let anything detain him.274 In the meantime, the government of Peña y Peña
was also being established, but few people had much hope. Mexico had been left “sin la
más remota posibilidad de triunfar… nos conviene hacer un sacrificio a tiempo para
salvar la nacionalidad.”275 This sacrifice was to agree a peace with the United States.
Winning was no longer an option. The arrival of the deputies in Querétaro was a very
slow process, and a circular was sent to all those who had not arrived requesting their
immediate presence as, in view of the dire circumstances in which the country found
itself, it was essential that the legislative power resume its functions, setting the date as
5 October.276 Otero was busy organising his election in Toluca and wrote to Mariano
Riva Palacio to let him know that he would be unable to leave before the 4th. He was
networking with electors and was worried that he might not have a majority although he
did not feel this would be a problem, “con los que haya y la ley de las minorías los
sacaré tales que por la calidad compense el número.”277 It is from this election that
Manuel Gómez Pedraza and Otero himself emerge as Senators for the Estado de
México.278 On 4 October Otero left his family in Toluca and headed for Mexico City.
From there, he made his way to Querétaro, leaving his business behind and paying his
273 Melchor Ocampo to Mariano Otero, 24 September 1847. Ibid. p. 153.
274 Ibid., and Melchor Ocampo to Mariano Otero, 30 September, pp. 154-155.
275 ‘P.M.R.’ to Mariano Otero, 30 September 1847. Ibid., pp. 155-157.
276 Circular from Congress to Mariano Otero, 30 September 1847. Flores Clair, El Buzón, pp. 157-158.
Secretaría del Soberano Congreso Constituyente to Mariano Riva Palacio, 20 Septiembre 1847, MRPA,
2410.
277 Mariano Otero to Mariano Riva Palacio, 21 September 1847, MRPA 2412.
278 A list detailing the results of the election is included in an unsigned letter from Toluca, to Mariano
Riva Palacio, 18 October 1847, MRPA, 2439.
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own way, though he later received notification that he could count on 100 pesos a
month from the State Government in Guadalajara.279 Later, he complained to his uncle
in Guadalajara that he was being paid less than other deputies and asked him to look
into the matter. His uncle insisted he must claim the money owed to him for travel
expenses, “¿por qué tú has de ser el menos, cuando todos se van a pasear, y tu trabajas
como nadie?”280
In Querétaro, the problems between political factions continued and the only real
task congress undertook before its dissolution was to hold elections. The deputies were
fairly safe in Querétaro, the United States had no wish to march upon the temporary seat
of government in case it should dissolve again, rendering any chance of a swift peace
negotiation impossible. They did not appear interested in crushing the country, merely
in having it in such a position whereby it would be forced to sign a peace treaty.281 In
January, Otero returned to Mexico City in order to help his family settle in on their
return to the capital. On the night of 11 January 1848, Otero was arrested for disorderly
conduct. He was accused of publicly delivering subversive speeches against the US
army, and was placed under arrest by the Governor. He was released the next day but it
took the intervention of Francisco Suarez Iriarte, who was able to use his influence in
the capital, to ensure charges were dropped.282 He returned to Querétaro in order to take
up his seat in the Senate. Shortly after his arrival he was notified that he was to be
chosen to act as a consultant at talks on an armistice. In mid-September 1847 Otero had
been present at the initial failed peace negotiation arranged by Santa Anna. At that time
he had written to the Governor of Jalisco, as the State’s deputy, arguing that there would
279 His election as Senator for the State of Mexico did not come into effect until January and, as such, he
was still Deputy for Jalisco. Letter from Joaquín Angulo to Mariano Otero, 4 October 1847, Flores Clair,
El Buzón, pp. 159-163.
280 José María Mestas to Mariano Otero, 22 October 1847. Ibid., pp. 169-172.
281 Eulalio María Ortega to Mariano Otero, 26 December 1847. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
282 José María Roa Barcena, Recuerdos de la invasión Norteamericana (1846 – 1848) (Mexico City:
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be no honourable peace for Mexico if any territory other than Texas were to be included
in the terms, or, indeed discussed. He maintained his position against the war until the
very end but, on more than one occasion, found himself working in support of it. He
separated his personal and political feelings from his duties. The peace treaty had been
concluded at the beginning of February, any objection he might have to the terms would
have to be aired when it was ratified. Otero’s main concern was to bring the country
back from the brink of the abyss and to do whatever could be done to ensure a smooth
transition back to peacetime government. At the end of February, President Peña y Peña
notified the commissioners, Generals Mora y Villamil and Quijano, that they were to
deal with Otero.283 Gómez Pedraza gave him the news, informing him he would be an
advisor.284 The generals had been given the task of signing an armistice, and discussing
other issues with the invader, in the hope of enabling the government to administer the
occupied territories. They were to consult with Otero on any subject that touched upon
civil or administrative matters. These included elections where they had not yet taken
place, reinstatement of the capital’s Ayuntamiento and the naming of a government
there. Despite working towards ensuring a better armistice for Mexico, this did not
change Otero’s views on the terms of the Peace Treaty. Committed to constitutionalism,
he understood however, as with the Acta de Reformas of 1847, that if Mexico emerged
from the war without being a consolidated state, it would be unlikely to survive for long.
It was essential for elections to go ahead to preserve the country and when José Joaquín
de Herrera did emerge as president it was this legitimacy that allowed him to
concentrate all his efforts on rebuilding the nation. The armistice was ratified on 5 May
283 Roa Barcena, Recuerdos de la invasión, III, 312 - 313
284 Manuel Gómez Pedraza to Mariano Otero, 26 February 1848. Flores Clair, El Buzón, p. 240.
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by the United States and by the Mexicans on the 9th, and immediately afterwards,
elections were carried out where they had not yet taken place.285
On 25 May, the Mexican Senate voted on a motion passed by congress on the
ratification of the Peace Treaty, signed in February. Only four people voted against it,
Fernando Ramírez Morales, Bernando Flores, Robredo and Otero. Throughout the war
Otero had made it clear that he was opposed to an unjust peace, which he interpreted as
any treaty in which the terms included Mexican territory other than Texas. He spoke
against the peace on the senate floor in Querétaro. He had written to his wife a few days
earlier stating that he had made up his mind, he would set out his motives for his
negative vote one last time, and then would speak of it no more, no matter what was
said.286 He was looking forward to leaving Querétaro and going home on leave which
he had requested a few days earlier. He already knew he would lose the vote and told
Andrea that part of the reason he was asking for leave in advance, was that he did not
want his colleagues to think he was sulking after suffering a defeat in the Senate.287 The
letters he wrote in those weeks to Andrea were filled with promises of his return to the
capital but his request for permission to be with his wife and children in the city was to
be denied. On 3 June José Joaquín de Herrera was, once again, elected president and he
chose his cabinet, José María Jimenez as his Justice Minister, General Arista in the War
Ministry, Mariano Riva Palacio in Treasury, and Mariano Otero as his Minister of
Internal and Foreign Affairs. He would indeed return to Mexico City a few days later, on
leave from the Senate, not to spend time with his wife and children, but to carry out his
duties as minister. He would be faced with finding a solution to problems in Yucatán,
would establish an enduring correspondence with José María Luis Mora and above all,
he would work towards enforcing the treaty he had been so vehemently against. He
285 Alcaraz, Apuntes, 621
286 Mariano Otero to Andrea Arce de Otero, 21 May 1848. Flores Clair, El Buzón, pp. 274-275.
287 Mariano Otero to Andrea Arce de Otero, 19 May 1848, in Reyes Heroles, Obras, II, p. 608.
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entered into Mexico City with the Herrera government, determined to serve his country
but would remain in the position for less than six months.
Otero was stepping into the Ministry at a time when the country was in a
lamentable state. The peace treaty had been signed and ratified and the US army was
withdrawing, leaving behind a defeated nation. The first task for the Herrera
government was that of ensuring that Mexico made the transition from a country at war
back to normality as quickly as possible. A near-empty treasury and the pessimism of
the political classes meant that there was no simple solution. His duties included
arranging the reoccupation of buildings seized by the North Americans, so that the last
traces of the influence exerted by the United States began to be erased.288 Otero was
also in charge of transferring controls over customs at Veracruz from the United States
back to Mexican officials. This would allow much needed revenue to start to flow into
the treasury as well as symbolically demonstrate that the US forces were really moving
out of Mexico. This turned out to be no easy task and his correspondence with Nathan
Clifford, plenipotentiary minister for the United States deals with the constant setbacks
which meant that Otero was unable to resolve the matter fully, bequeathing it to Luis G.
Cuevas who replaced him.289 In addition, as soon as peace was signed Otero came under
great pressure from British creditors demanding payment due to them for past loans to
the government. Finally, despite the fact that many believed that the army had been
discredited by their utter incompetence during the war, Otero was still faced with unrest
288 “Instrucción del Secretario de Relaciones al Gobernador de Veracruz para que proceda a arreglar la
desocupación de los edificios públicos tomados por los norteamericanos, 1848,” 1-1 80, f.17, Archivo de
la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (henceforth referred to as ASRE), México.
289 “Comunicaciones al Ministro Plenipotenciario del Gobierno de los Estados de los Estados Unidos de
Norteamerica, sobre la entrega de las Aduanas de Veracruz, Mazatlán y Tampico,” H/200 (72:73) / 1,
Exp. I-2-537, ASRE, México.
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and military pronunciamientos erupting across the country, providing a further setback
on the road to stabilising the nation.290
Much of Otero’s time would have been taken up by these problems, unexpected
and requiring immediate attention in most cases. However, he was determined despite
the importance of these issues to work towards fulfilling the Plan de Gobierno. This
document, which had been circulated to all State Governors during the first days of the
Herrera ministry, outlined the goals of the government and outlined those areas Otero
believed, for it was he who wrote it, most required attention.291 In it, he listed the
principal issues faced by Mexico in 1848 and proposed possible solutions to deal with
them. Aware that many of the immediate, urgent, problems he was facing as minister –
pronunciamientos, the empty treasury, high national debt– all had deeper roots, Otero
sought to find deeper solutions. As he had established in his 1842 Ensayo, and despite
his profound pessimism regarding the future after the defeat, he knew that unless these
were rooted out, revolts and debts would continue to plague the nation. The principal
problems he identified were unstable governance, revolutions and the abysmal
conditions within government administration. He struck out against excessive
government spending, and attacked the chaotic state of book-keeping and accountancy
even mentioning corruption by individuals. Once again, he stressed the importance of
the constitution as the cornerstone of a strong nation, and emphasised the need for
reform to the judiciary. In addition he stated that it was the government’s responsibility
290 A few days after taking up the position of Minister, Otero had to confront a revolt in Guanajuato, led
by General Paredes y Arrillaga, who had pronounced against the government and against the peace treaty,
“Proclama del general Paredes y Arrillaga, al levantarse en armas contra el gobierno de la república,
protestando contra la aprobación de los tratados de paz con los Estados Unidos,” 15 June 1848,
reproduced in
http://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/database/index.php?f=y&id=642&m=06&y=1848. During
his ministry Otero was also faced with a pronunciamiento to bring back Santa Anna, “Plan de
Guanajuato, resultado de la fracasada conspiración del teniente D. Eligio Ortiz, desconociendo al
gobierno del general Herrera llamando al general Santa Anna,” 9 July 1848, reproduced in http://arts.st-
andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/database/index.php?f=y&id=642&m=06&y=1848.
291 “Circular del Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores y Exteriores a los Gobernadores de los Estados,”
published in El Siglo XIX, 8 June 1848.
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to guarantee the rights of the individual, an issue which he believed to be intrinsically
linked to the betterment of man, and through man the nation as a whole.292
In order to begin to target these problems the Herrera government passed a series
of laws and sent out circulars that encouraged the states to work towards the goals they
had set. These included the Ley de Garantías Individuales, the Ley de la Guardia
Nacional and the Ley de Imprenta.293 In addition he tackled problems of infrastructure
within the capital, as well as the road system connecting the capital with the states. He
produced a plan for the Ciudadela to become a civic centre, thus becoming a place of
public service.294 The Ciudadela housed a garrison, well known for having the power to
topple or maintain the executive seat of power in the capital, often deciding, seemingly
on a whim, which side they would support. If Otero had been able to implement this
change, it would have removed a very latent military threat to the legitimate political
powers. His position as minister meant that he also oversaw work, less glamorous but
equally important, in the day to day running of a country. He worked on projects for
clearing and draining waterways and canals as well as issuing decrees and proposals in
October which sought to address the problems of city hospitals and asylums.295 These
he combined with issues of great national import, including education, road reform,
colonization and economics.
He worked tirelessly as a Minister, though it appears that his heart was not in it.
He had accepted the ministry to oblige his close friend and political ally Mariano Riva
Palacio, who had been appointed to the Treasury. When Riva Palacio resigned his
292 Ibid.
293 The Proyecto de Ley and the dictamen are available in Barragán Barragán, Jose (compilator), Mariano
Otero, Serie los Senadores (Mexico City: LIII Legistaltura, Senado de la República, 1987).“Ley orgánica
de la Guardia Nacional” (Mexico City: Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplido, 1848). Colección de Leyes y
Decretos publicados en 1848, No. 65, Colección del Constitucional (Mexico City, Imprenta en Palacio,
1852).
294 El Siglo XIX, 13 June 1848.
295 Ibid, 14 October 1848 and Colección, No. 34 and El Siglo XIX, 27 October 1848.
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position Otero wrote to him, indicating his displeasure.296 Otero pointed out that without
him, he had lost the opportunity of carrying out essential reforms, making it clear that as
far as he was concerned, nothing could be done without the support of close political
allies, even at such heights of power. Indeed he went so far as to say that all he had done
was to waste his time and acquire unsavoury commitments and hatred. In fact, he said,
they had done nothing more than pass fleetingly across the stage with time only to
demonstrate that they were unequal to the circumstances with which they had been
presented. As far as Otero was concerned, all that was left for him to do was to follow
his colleague’s example and resign as a minister. He did this on 14 November, citing the
need to return to his business as a lawyer.
Immediately Otero returned to take up his position in the Senate, from which he
had received permission to take a leave of absence to take up his position in the ministry
and was back there by the time the new session began in December 1848, issuing a call
for those senators who had not yet appeared to present themselves with haste and do
their duty.297 As had been the case in congress in both 1842 and 1846, his reputation
preceded him. He was nominated to sit on the Segunda Junta Directiva de Cárceles,
which would lead to a greater interest in prison reform.298 In addition he was voted onto
a number of committees, including the Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales and the
Comisión Segunda de Justicia del Senado, neither of which were new to him; as a
deputy he had gained a great deal of experience in both areas. A joint report was issued
by these committees on reforms to the judiciary, including how the ministros of the
Supreme Court should be elected, as well as how many should sit at any one time.299 In
December 1848, he presented a report co-signed by Manuel Gómez Pedraza from the
296 Letter from Mariano Otero to Mariano Riva Palacio, 24 August 1848, 2905, MRPA.
297 1ª Junta Preparatoria del Senado, 26 December 1848, Actas del Senado, 1848 – 1852. Archivo
Histórico del Senado de la República.
298 El Siglo XIX, 18 November 1848.
299 Available in Reyes Heroles, Mariano Otero, Obras, II, p 813 - 851
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Treasury Committee of the Consejo de Gobierno, on the settlement of five hundred
thousand pounds sterling from the compensations due to Mexico under the terms of the
peace treaty and claimed by G. Musson and Co, New Orleans.300 Once again, Otero was
faced with working within the constraints placed by the peace treaty which he had been
so strongly against. And, although no longer in the ministry, Otero was still involved
with the issues he had faced there and could continue to work towards the goals he had
outlined when taking up his ministerial position. Although there was no important vote
or motion as there had been in 1842 or 1847, Otero worked tirelessly on reshaping the
nation by tackling the essential legislative and administrative issues. It would be easy to
argue, as Reyes Heroles did, that he had retired from politics but he was only too aware
that if he wanted to further his political career the country needed the necessary reforms
that would enable it to function properly and efficiently. He was only thirty-three years
old. He had his whole life before him in which to forge a great political position. But it
was not to be.
On the afternoon of 31 May 1850, Otero left a senate committee meeting, where
they had been discussing public debt. He greeted his children cheerfully when they ran
out, as they always did, to meet their father but was attacked by some form of
discomfort. He made his way inside and Prieto recalled that he exclaimed, “tengo el
cólera y me muero” and called for a priest.301 He had become a victim of the 1850
cholera epidemic. The first documented cases of cholera victims within Mexico City
dated from the first days of May though the disease had been advancing on the city for
some weeks and it was thought to have originated in the north.302 It was not until 19
300 El Siglo XIX, 4 January 1849.
301 Prieto, Memorias, p. 499.
302 All the information given on the 1850 cholera epidemic has been taken from, Ana Cecilia Rodríguez
de Romo, “Epidemia de cólera en 1850. Análisis histórico-médico de un curioso manuscrito,” Archivalia
Médica, Nueva Epoca, No. 4, Departamento de Historia y Filosofía de la Medicina, Facultad de
Medicina, UNAM: México, 1994.
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May that cholera was officially declared present in the capital by which time
containment measures were basically useless. Described by a doctor in Mexico City in
1850, the illness developed with astounding speed, and the initial symptoms were
headaches, nausea, fainting, diarrhoea, stomach pains and cramps. The patient would
then begin to vomit, their body temperature would drop, skin would become clammy,
sweat viscous and they would present a sepulchral voice. In some cases, there would be
no detectable pulse, and yet the patient would sweat profusely. In addition, the illness
appeared to last between four and 48 hours, the patient either recovering or dying in that
time.303
Otero had been correct in his self-diagnosis. Little information is available on
how he was treated, thought it seems that teas and infusions were used to no avail.304 He
was in pain for eight hours, and lay in bed, surrounded by his wife, children and friends.
Through it all, he was awake and aware of his surroundings; lucid enough to confess to
a priest and to draw up his will, naming its executors to ensure his family’s future was
secured. He watched as his family wept and was able to say his farewells. Though his
physical situation worsened, he remained mentally alert, telling doctors it was useless of
them to look for a pulse as none was to be found. In the early hours of the morning of 1
June he asked Bernardo, who remained with him to the end, what the time was, and on
hearing that it was 1 o’clock exclaimed that time passed too fast. A little over half an
hour later, he died.305
He was only 33, and left little in the way of inheritance or security for his family.
Testament of his nature, his friends rallied round the widow and orphans and, in the
303 Ibid., p. 1-22.
304 In a letter to Mariano Riva Palacio, Antonio Haro y Tamariz stated that he was unsurprised by Otero’s
death given his lifestyle, which consisted of food in quantity and not quality, and given the uselessness of
the treatment he received, teas and waters being insufficient. Antonio Haro y Tamariz to Mariano Riva
Palacio, June 1850, 4250, MRPA.
305 Letter from Bernardo Flores to Mariano Riva Palacio, 5 June 1850, 4252, MRPA.
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same way that Otero had on more than one occasion, worked tirelessly towards ensuring
a future, albeit a modest one, for Andrea and the children.306 They moved to a smaller
house, Otero’s library was sold, and the family retained only a small number of
manuscripts and copies of his work.307 His literary, judicial, journalistic and ideological
legacy was more substantial, and Otero’s legacy to his family and his country was his
ideas and works. Ignacio Otero, his eldest son would publish his father’s works in 1859,
paving the way for Reyes Heroles’ compendium just over one hundred years later. It is
these works, the speeches, the letters, the articles, the votes which will enable us, in the
second part of this thesis, to outline some of the key areas of his political thought and
ideological standpoint.
306 See, for example, correspondence between Mariano Otero and Mariano Riva Palacio regarding the
execution of a testament. Only a few weeks before his death, Otero had argued and haggled over the
prices of books in order to ensure that a fair price would be achieved to pass to the widow. Mariano Otero
to Mariano Riva Palacio, 29 April 1850, 4112, MRPA.
307 Letter from Pedro Escudero to Mariano Riva Palacio, 10 June 1850, 4285, MRPA and D. Revilla to
Mariano Riva Palacio, 24 July 1850, 4491, MRPA.
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Part II.
Mariano Otero’s Political Ideology.
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3.
Ideology
The Mariano Otero that emerges from the biographical sketch is a man shaped by the
events of the early national period. His earliest political stances were influenced by local
and national politics and during the decade of the 1840s his position in parliament, his
journalistic career and even his personal freedom were dependent on the state of affairs.
The statesmen of the early national period were forced to mould their actions and goals
in accordance with who was in power, the state of the economy, or the constitution in
force. The ideology of these men was equally reactive, and as Mexico’s situation altered,
the way they thought and their political priorities also shifted; the opinions of these men
“were likely to be fluid, changing to some extent in accordance with experience and the
prevailing circumstances.”308
This second part of the thesis will therefore explore Mariano Otero’s political
ideology, compromising a general introduction to his political thought in this chapter,
and three further chapters, 4, 5, and 6, which will explore his views in detail on three
key issues of the decade; the army, the Church and constitutionalism/federalism. Before
approaching his political thought and an in-depth analysis of his political stance on
these, it is essential to ascertain just who the moderates were, what their beliefs were
and how they were seen by the other political factions in the ongoing struggle for power.
The monochrome liberal tradition that pitched conservatives against liberals during the
early national period has been discredited, and it is now widely accepted that the
struggle was between “monarquistas y republicanos, centralistas y federalistas,
yorquinos y escoceses, imparciales, hombres de bien y progresistas” among others and,
308 Costeloe, The Central Republic, p. 21.
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furthermore, that “antes de 1846 no existían partidos políticos, es decir, grupos
coherentes que conjugaban intereses concretos, en base a una serie definida de
principios.”309 Fowler narrows this down to four prominent political currents; “a variety
of heterogeneous traditionalist, moderate, radical and santanista factions all of which
changed and evolved as the hopes of the 1820s degenerated into the despair of the
1840s.”310 The term “moderate” was not used of a specific political faction until 1838,
when it emerged to define the group led by Manuel Gómez Pedraza.311 Many of the men
who made up this group can be recognised from Otero’s earlier biographical sketch and
yet others can be found in his correspondents: among the most prominent were José
María Lafragua, Mariano Riva Palacio, Guillermo Prieto, José Joaquín de Herrera,
Ignacio Comonfort, Octaviano Muñoz Ledo and José Espinosa de los Monteros.312
Shortly after his arrival in Mexico City, Otero was already considered as “el líder
ideológico de los nuevos moderados.”313 Accused by many of their contemporaries as
being opportunist turncoats with no original ideas of their own, the moderados were
often identified as sharing the political goals of the puros, but of holding a different
view on how these should be achieved.314 According to Fowler they wanted to exercise
moderate reform, which, without riding roughshod over the country’s customs and
traditions, would bring about a slow and gradual modernization of Mexico’s political
life, avoiding any major or abrupt changes at any cost. Thus, it was not the ideas they
held but the speed of implementation that distinguished the moderates from radicals and
traditionalists.
309 Vázquez, “Los años olvidados,” p. 314.
310 Fowler also dedicates a specific chapter to the proposals of Carlos María de Bustamante, but I have
chosen to use the four main factions he identifies. See, Fowler, Mexico in the Age of the Proposals, p.
267.
311 For further information on Manuel Gómez Pedraza and the moderate faction see Solares Robles, Una
revolución pacífica.
312 Ibid., p. 135.
313 Luis Medina Peña, Invención del sistema político mexicano. Forma de gobierno y gobernabilidad en
el siglo XIX (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004), p. 259.
314 Fowler, “El pensamiento político,” p. 275.
104
This second part of the thesis examines Otero as the “líder ideológico” of the
moderate factions in the following decade. Chapter 3 will cover what it meant to be a
moderate and the key points of Otero’s political thought in order to establish the central
tenets of greatest relevance to it. These were; the colonial legacy and the importance of
the struggle for independence, the social question, the issue of class divisions, the need
for reform in all branches of government, the prominence of the Church and the army as
political institutions, the problems caused by factional disputes, the debate on the
correct system of government and, the need for constitutionalism, the rule of law and
the importance of the rights of man.315 In exploring Otero’s approach to each of these
grandes temas we will begin to form a picture of his political standpoint, as well as an
introduction to his ideology. François-Xavier Guerra took these grandes temas and
narrowed them down to “a series of permanent problems,” created by “the precocious
adoption of modern political principles and an imagined liberal nation by a society in
which war had forced the strengthening of the corporate political structures.”316 Guerra
argued that “there were multiple conflicts between the builders of the modern state and
the corporations of the old society; the army, the pueblos, and ecclesiastical bodies” and
and Otero's views on the army and the church will be examined in greater depth in
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively before addressing his version of federalism in Chapter
6.317
315 Fowler identifies the “grandes temas” as; “la política económica a seguir, el sistema político más
apropiado, la posición de la Iglesia, el papel del Estado, la libertad de imprenta, la tolerancia religiosa, la
reforma del ejército y la situación de Texas con relación al expansionismo estadounidense.” I have
modified the list to show the specific issues that can be identified in Otero’s work and that will be the
basis of this chapter. Ibid., p. 282.
316 François-Xavier Guerra, “Mexico from Independence to Revolution: The mutations of Liberalism,” in
Elisa Servin, Leticia Reina, John Tutino, Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of change. Crisis, reform, and
revolution in Mexico (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 134.
317 Guerra uses the word pueblo to incorporate the idea of “provinces/states, municipalities, or
villages/communities”, for Otero, the problem of the pueblo can be identified in his call for federalism,
and the need for adequate representation of the provinces/states on a national stage. Ibid., pp. 134, 137.
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Beginning in the decade immediately following independence, analysing the
state of the nation “el estado de la nación or la situación actual” at particular points in
time, as well as the historical events which shaped it, developed into a constant concern
of the Mexican intelligentsia. Indeed, Luis G. Cuevas went so far as to state that “casi
no hay discusión, conferencia privada ni escrito periódico en que no se hable de las
causas de nuestros males, del remedio que debe aplicárseles y del peligro que amenaza
nuestra nacionalidad.” 318 The country stood in disarray and the years following
independence had been marked by constitutional failures, economic chaos, constant
pronunciamientos, and external threats to its very independence. The situation of the
nation, and the search for a better understanding of why the nation stood as it did at
various points in time was, therefore, one of the most recurrent themes in all the
writings of the early national period.319 Mariano Otero was no exception. Through the
drafting of two constitutions, one that remained theoretical, one eventually implemented,
in his speeches in congress, his votes in the senate, during his term as Minister of
Internal and Foreign Affairs, and even in the tender letters he wrote to his wife, the
analysis of the state of the nation was always central to his work. Fortuitously this
enables us to follow the changes in his visions and beliefs as these were shaped by the
events of the 1840s, as well as clearly identify the themes running through his work.
318 Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (Mexico City: Colección CIEN de México, Consejo Nacional
para la Cultura y las Artes, 1992), I, p. 43.
319 For examples of this phenomenon see Cuevas, Porvenir. 2vols., Lilian Briceño Senosiáin, Laura
Solares Robles, and Laura Suárez de la Torre, José María Luis Mora. Obras Completas. 8 vols., (Mexico
City: Instituto Mora, Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1986) and by the same authors
Valentín Gómez Farías y su lucha por el federalismo, 1822 – 1858 (Mexico City: Instituto Mora,
Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, 1991). Also, Lorenzo de Zavala. Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de
México; desde 1808 hasta 1830 (Mexico City: SRA/CEHAM, 1981), Manuel Crescencio Rejón,
Pensamiento Político (Mexico City: UNAM, 1996), Melchor Ocampo, Textos Políticos (Mexico City:
Colección SepSentas, Sep, 1975), Laura Solares Robles, La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza
1813- 1851 (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr José María Luis Mora, Instituto Matías
Romero, Acervo Histórico Diplomático de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1999), Galeana de
Valdés, José María Lafragua, José María Gutiérrez de Estrada, “La monarquía como posibilidad,” in
Álvaro Matute, México en el siglo XIX. Fuentes e interpretaciones históricas (Mexico City: UNAM,
1992). This is merely a sample of the vast information available, detailing the main works and individuals
to be quoted in this chapter.
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Before continuing with Otero’s analysis of “la situación actual” it is important to
note the peculiarities of Otero’s methodology, particularly visible in the Ensayo but also
apparent in many of his other contributions. As already touched upon in the
historiographical analysis, Jesús Reyes Heroles noted a “concepción y método” in the
way Otero wrote. 320 Reyes Heroles’ defined Otero’s method as a move from a
subjective analysis of events to an objective analysis of Mexico’s past. This método,
according to Reyes Heroles, is what distinguishes the Ensayo from many of its
contemporary works. Lucas Alamán and his Historia de México or Lorenzo de Zavala
in Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México, for example, are just that, histories.
Whatever the reason for writing them –a justification of the author’s actions or the
construction of a timeline to support an ideological stance– they are a chronological
retelling, covering the actions of individuals and the causes and outcomes of certain
events. In Otero’s Ensayo, on the other hand, we find less specificity. His aim, in his
own words, was to
prescindir de los actores para examinar el drama […] descendiendo al examen
del origen de esta sociedad, y analizando sus partes constitutivas y las
revoluciones que ha sufrido, nos es dado conocer su verdadera situación actual.
Dejemos por un momento las pasiones fugaces del día, para examinar la larga
obra de los siglos; y entrando en ese análisis indaguemos cuales son los males de
esta sociedad, las causas por que esos males subsisten, y el modo de disminuirlos
o aniquilarlos321
The Ensayo was written in support of the Revolución de Jalisco, and many of the
justifications he gave refer to revolts and revolutions as one of the causes of the males
that Mexico suffered. However, he went beyond this to apply his system of analysis to
all the issues he identified. There is little or no mention of individual actions, specific
men or particular events. He sought to ascertain and analyse the general, underlying
causes that had brought the nation to such a sorry state by 1842, standing a step away
320 The section by Reyes Heroles on Otero’s methodology in the Ensayo can be found in Jesús Reyes
Heroles, “Estudio Preliminar,” I, p. 46-66.
321 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 23-24.
107
from a historical perspective and taking on a more sociological one –that is, the study of
social problems. His Ensayo emphasised that the origins of Mexico’s problems had to
be established and comprehensively understood before there could be any realistic hope
of improving the state of the nation. He placed little or no emphasis on the actors or on
specific events, preferring to focus on the general issues that permeated all levels of
society. Only after pinpointing these problems, which coincided with the great themes
of the decade as outlined above, and unravelling them could an adequate solution be
proposed and instigated. For example, turning his attention to write about the revolt
initiated by Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga in Jalisco in 1841, Otero argued that although
the successful pronunciamiento had covered the immediate grievances it was nothing
more than “las luchas de las ambiciones personales que se excitan en ellas, y que no
forman sino la parte más secundaria y menos importante de esas revoluciones.”322 Otero
firmly believed that though an initial victory had been accomplished, it was essential
that the “grandes cuestiones sociales” be identified and addressed, in order for the
revolts and revolutions to cease completely. In the Ensayo, therefore Otero set out to
discover and examine these causes, it can be seen how he developed and sought to
construct solutions to these great social questions in the years that followed. It is these
cuestiones sociales that provide us with the main themes of Otero’s political thought.
The first of these themes to emerge from Otero’s writing is that of the problems
that arose from “la diversa situación de las clases,” class divisions and the unequal
distribution of property.323 The importance of class divisions, particularly during the
colonial period, was also highlighted by men such as Mora, Zavala and Alamán.324
322 Ibid., p. 9.
323 Ibid., p. 39.
324 Zavala and Mora focus on the segregation of the Indian. Alamán, like Otero, on the hand focused on
the division between criollos and the Spanish colonists. Zavala, Ensayo histórico, pp. 11-12. Jose María
Luis Mora, México y sus revoluciones, I, in Briseño Senosiáin, Lilian, Solares Robles, Laura and Suárez
de la Torre, Laura, José María Luis Mora. Obras Completas (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, Consejo
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Otero argued that in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the position of the
nation in the 1840s, it was essential for him to examine the composition of the social
classes within the colonies before Independence because he believed the problems the
country faced in the early national period had its roots as far back as the conquest. He
compared the North American settlers with the Spanish conquistadors, and concluded
that the latter had come looking only for “el oro y los peligros,” and once in the New
World were interested only in acquiring great swathes of land and, like Zavala and
Mora, he argued that the result of this had been to force the native population into slave-
like conditions.325 This view of the former Spanish America was by no means unique.
Bolívar, writing in 1824, also highlighted this unfavourable aspect of their colonial past
when he said
our being has the most impure of origins: everything that preceded us is covered
with the black mantle of crime. We are the abominable product of these
predatory tigers who came to America to shed its blood and to interbreed with
their victims before sacrificing them ─afterward mixing the dubious fruit of such 
unions with the offspring of slaves uprooted from Africa…326
Otero shared this view that the rapidly diminishing Indian population interbred with the
conquerors, then with their slaves and, finally, with the Spanish settlers, saying
esa población abyecta y miserable que forma los cuatros quintos del total de la
República, y que representa aquella parte que en todas las sociedades humanas
está destinada a la miseria, por la escasez de los medios de llenar sus
necesidades físicas y morales.327
Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1986), IV: pp. 60-63. Lucas Alamán, Historia de México desde los
primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la época presente
(Mexico City: Libros de bachiller Sansón Carrasco, 1986), I, p. 9, 13-16.
325 Otero, “Discurso, 1841”, II, p. 407 and Ensayo, I: p. 36. In his Ensayo Histórico, Zavala talked of the
indio and described their situation after the conquest as one of slavery. Mora, in Mexico y sus
revoluciones maintained that the Spanish regime had reduced the indio to a state of abject misery, but
argued that as soon as independence was achieved, their situation had changed drastically as
independence had brought with it “la igualdad de derechos para todas las casta y razas”, though he did
admit that this was a change that could not take effect immediately. Zavala, Ensayo historic, pp. 11-12,
Mora, México y sus revoluciones, IV, pp. 60-63
326 Bolivar in a letter to Francisco de Santa Paula, 24 Feb. 1824, quoted in Simon Collier, “Nationality,
Nationalism, and Supranationalism in the Writings of Simón Bolívar,” The Hispanic American Historical
Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Feb. 1993), pp. 37-64. Quote reproduced on p. 44.
327 Otero, Ensayo, I, p. 36.
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He argued that whereas the settlers of the greater part of what was to become the United
States had founded their nation on equality, the Spaniards had from the very beginning
founded theirs on inequality and the subjugation of one group of individuals by another,
leading to many repercussions. He referred to these classes as the “proletario,” which he
divided up between country and city, and mining and commerce. According to Otero,
agriculture in Mexico was underdeveloped following independence, and those who
worked in the sector, although they formed the most numerous segment of society,
received derisory wages, and were hindered by their limited skills.328 In Otero’s eyes,
these men were characteristically indolent, and cared only for satisfying their basic
needs, without looking for betterment or participation in civil society. 329 Those
members of the proletarian classes who lived in cities, worked in the mines or engaged
in commercial activities were, in addition, plagued by the backwardness of their
respective industries although, Otero added, the latter were more fortunate than those
not involved in industry and commerce because they, at least, received higher wages,
though this did nothing to lessen their moral and intellectual degradation.330 Otero
argued that it was not simply the living and working conditions of this class that was
important. In his opinion even the geographical distribution of these people across
Mexico was a reflection of their position within society, and this was an area of concern
it was essential to address if there were to be any hope of prosperity for the nation.
Where minerals or other resources could be found and towns emerged, the situation
worsened across the republic. The most important cities contained on the one hand, the
upper and middle classes, including the high clergy, men who worked in civil
administration and those of a higher social position, which formed a group in which
328 Ibid., p. 36.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid., p. 36-37.
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could be seen “lo más adelantado de todos los elementos sociales.”331 On the other hand,
those members of the lower classes that lived and laboured there did so under the most
terrible conditions. This, Otero argued, created a patent disparity of wealth. This
situation, he believed, produced a nation where, under colonial rule, the state of social
inequality was sustained only by the general backwardness of society.332
The origins of these class divisions, Otero added, had their roots in the colonial
period. The organisation of the colonies had been such that those who lived under
Spanish rule were simple people, submissive and blindly obedient, in awe of those who
wielded any power, and who held the same intolerant fanaticism and stupid credulity
that plagued the lower and middle classes in Spain.333 In addition, it was Otero’s belief
that it was the firm intention of the Spanish monarchy to keep the colony in such a state,
ensuring that none but the Spanish born had access to the colonial administration. The
colonial administrators in turn set up a system of prohibitions and enforced a monopoly
which led to branches of industry, agriculture and commerce, as well as more
intellectual areas such as the arts, remaining underdeveloped. Otero believed that under
Spanish rule, but particularly during the reign of Philip II, colonial administration was
designed in such a way as to ensure that the Spanish colonies produced nothing more
than gold, importing all essentials from Spain.334 Slowly, under Philip V and later
Charles III, a move was made, in Otero’s opinion, towards the stimulation of the
colonies; ports were opened and the manufacture and export of other articles, other than
gold, was encouraged.335 Slowly, as the colonies grew, so did “la inteligencia” and,
331 Ibid., p. 37.
332 The idea that colonial society was generally “backward” was supporterd by Zavala, who argued that
one of the main aspects of the colonial legacy was ignorance and superstition, caused mostly by the
prevalence of religious education. Zavala, Ensayo Histórico, p. 21.
333 Otero, “Discurso, 1841,” II: p. 408. Otero, using similar language, was echoing Zavala who had
argued that the Spanish colonial system was based upon “sobre la más ciega obediencia pasiva,” Zavala,
Ensayo Historico, p. 21.
334 Ibid., II, p. 409.
335 Ibid.
111
Otero argued, it was this element that was to contribute greatly to the revolutionary
movement. 336 This happened despite the fact that the norm was ignorance and
superstition, and despite the close hold of Inquisition on the information to be allowed
unhindered access into the colonies.337
Mexico was not, however, made up only of simply one class. Otero argued that
there was no “aristocracia de nacimiento, de propiedad, de juicio,” nor did there exist
any other kind of aristocracy, the landed aristocracy being bankrupt and a merchant
aristocracy non-existent. 338 Otero favoured the middle class, describing them as
distinguished by “el talento, la virtud o las luces”. This he believed had been the class
that had chosen to embrace “la causa de la emancipación y de la mejora de la
nación.”339 He did concede that this middle class was divided in its opinion of the best
way to approach this national improvement and did not form a homogeneous group. In
addition, Otero added, although the political power of the nation rested, for the most
part, in the hands of these middle class men, they did not have the education or the
political experience to deal with the changes that Independence had bought.
Independence had completely altered the status quo in Mexico, and as such, the men
responsible for the establishment of the new political system confronted a situation
where “todo era nuevo y difícil.”340
The profound class divisions were, as far as Otero was concerned, only one
aspect of the colonial legacy, a legacy which he tended to view unfavourably. Otero
identified other sources of dissension in the years leading up to independence such as
the hindrance of intellectual development caused by the Inquisition or the inequality
336 Ibid.
337 Otero, “Discurso, 1841”, Obras, I, p. 409.
338 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 46. Mora also shared this view. He divided colonial society into three
classes, military, ecclesiastical and “los paisanos” which he described as being “numerosa, rica,
influyente e ilustrada”. He does not, however, see them as nobleza and, like Otero, argued that no such
class could be found in Mexico, Mora, Mexico y sus revoluciones, p. 76, 77.
339 Ibid.
340 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 47.
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between the New Spain born criollos and the Spanish citizens, both of which would
hasten the call, first for autonomy, and then independence from Spain.341 For Otero the
colonial legacy threw up great contradictions. The Spanish liberals, for example,
maintained a duplicitous argument; they sought freedom for Spain from the invading
French forces, but insisted on keeping the Americas in a state of slavery.342 Despite the
submission of the people and the control exerted by the Spanish crown, it was his
opinion that parts of society were undermined by powerful causes constantly disrupting
the established order, and it was these that would eventually lead to the initial outburst
that began the struggle for Independence.343 For Otero, therefore, the legacy of the
colonial period was mostly negative – the mainland had done nothing more than stand
in the way of progress, creating class divisions and forcing the hand of the criollo
Mexicans who, unable to effect change and progress had seen no alternative to
revolution. Mariano Otero grew up in a nation whose very independence was under
constant threat from Spain, a threat that became a reality in 1829.344 The generation
before him had had a very different experience and as such, many of the intellectuals
with whom he shared the national political stage saw things differently. For Alamán, the
conquest led by Hernan Cortés was the real birth of the Mexican nation, and he spent
decades highlighting the importance of the colonial legacy in his writings.345 Mora too
accepted the importance of the colonial legacy, especially as pertaining to the Hispanic
341 As noted above, Otero shared this opinion on education with Mora and Zavala, both of whom saw the
Inquisition and the Church’s hold over education as a hindrance to the enlightenment of the Mexican
people. Even Alamán, who supported the colonial legacy as a positive influence, argued that “ella [la
clase española] poseía casi toda la riqueza del país; en ella se hallaba la ilustración que se conocía; ella
sola obtenía todos los empleos y podría tener armas, y ella sola disfrutaba de los derechos políticos y
civiles”, Alamán, Historia, I, p. 20.
342 Ibid., p. 412.
343 Ibid., p. 408.
344 Despite the fact that Mexico achieved independence from Spain in 1821, Spain did not formally
acknowledge this until December 1836 and in 1829 an expedition was launched against their former
colony.
345 Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano, p.124. For the writings by Lucas Alamán on the colonial period see
his Disertaciones.
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bond although, like Otero, he admitted it was a burden in the early years after the
achievement of Mexican independence, often standing in the way of reform and
progress.346 As Otero pointed out, in view of the state of the nation during colonial
times, it was only natural that the heterogeneous elements to be seen in colonies and so
precariously bound together, would undergo great upheavals and, it was only to be
expected that the first of these arose from independence from the Spanish monarchy.347
As the sons of the colony, as Otero named them, absorbed the liberal ideas that were
filtering through, they compared themselves with “los impuros y atrasados mandarines”
that reigned over them, and became aware of their superiority of numbers, and it was
from this that the possibility of independence emerged.348 In addition, Otero argued that
insight also came via the United States. He believed that simply the “hecho capital y
decisivo de la independencia” of the United States from the British crown, was enough
to embolden and encourage those who sought independence from Spanish colonial
rule.349 Otero did not believe that the leadership of the movement for independence was
initially embodied in any one man; it had been “the people” that took up the standard of
freedom and emancipation, combining it with a call for the rights of man and a
representative system.350 The lower classes, those that had been crushed and kept in
misery, slavery and ignorance by their Spanish overlords, were driven to “lanzarse en
una lucha que su valor salvaje y la miseria de su vida no le hacían temer” driven by a
need for emancipation. 351 These were soon joined by the middle classes, “donde
residían las luces, la moralidad, el deseo del progreso y los sentimientos de
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid., I, p. 38.
348 Otero, “Discurso, 1842,” II, p. 410.
349 Ibid., p. 411.
350 Ibid., p. 412.
351 Otero, Ensayo, I, p. 38.
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humanidad.”352 For Otero these two classes held the key –the lower for its great social
importance, and the middle as a political class.353 In addition, he noted the participation
of certain elements of the army and the clergy, usually from the lower ranks, embittered
by the treatment of their Spanish overlords, and the inescapable awareness that they had
no hope of advancement. On the other side, those struggling to keep control of the
colonial territories, Otero found, were the members of the colonial administration, the
higher clergy and the merchants, describing the subsequent struggle as “una lucha de los
privilegios contra la libertad.”354 Otero conceded that the movement for independence
was not a combined force, and that there had not always been a fixed plan or a
calculated set of moves. He accepted that it was messy and improvised, which often
meant that opportunities had been lost, and thus the struggle was lengthened. Otero also
believed that many of the actors and actions of those eleven years helped to discredit the
cause, but that it was pointless wishing it had been any other way.355
Though the situation in colonial Mexico was abhorrent to Otero, he was
convinced that the causes of the War of Independence were long standing, and that there
had been no specific trigger. On the contrary, he argued, the colony had been
experiencing a particularly good interval, with improvements taking place in the arts, in
material prosperity and in other areas. However, he believed that the mere fact of being
a colony combined with centuries of oppression were the only necessary factors for
independence to be craved by the colonies. This meant that it was inevitable that
Mexico and the other colonies would seek their independence.356 The men that would
go on to form the political classes in independent Mexico did so not in response to any
one attack on their liberties, but, according to Otero, because they believed it was their
352 Otero, “Discurso, 1841,”Obras, II, p. 413.
353 Ibid.
354 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 39.
355 Otero, “Discurso, 1841,” Obras, II, p. 412.
356 Ibid., pp. 469-70.
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right to a political organisation that suited their needs, and because they sought to
establish the rights of every man across the nation. Furthermore, he argued, in doing so,
they sought to erase the great division that had caused colonial Mexico to be divided
into two races; “la una de señores y la otra de esclavos.”357 The freedom they claimed
was not simply freedom from Spanish rule; Otero believed they sought civil, political
and religious freedom, what he called “la libertad radical.”358
For Otero, the independence movement that ensued had been more than a simple
struggle for freedom; “era un espectáculo único por su grandeza y su magnificencia, por
lo inesperado de los sucesos, por la simplicidad de sus causas, y por la prodigiosa
fecundidad de sus resultados.”359 As he also pointed out, those who had hoped that once
independence had been achieved, the momentum gained by new social theories would
be lost, were wrong. It was Otero’s opinion that those who believed that a monarchy
could be installed in Mexico were also wrong; a stance he maintained throughout his
lifetime. Otero argued that there were no foundations in Mexico on which to set a
throne and therefore the fall of Iturbide should have been seen as the natural outcome of
the conflagration of circumstances that had led to Independence and which could not be
swept aside once it had been achieved.360 Moreover, Otero reasoned that the state of
Mexico was such that “el despotismo verdadero” could never be established, as the
circumstances that were needed for it to work, could not be found in the newly
independent nation.
Otero was of the opinion that the existing issues of class divisions, with roots in
Mexico’s colonial past, still existed after independence. However, the state of slavery
under a colonial overlord was no longer an issue, and Otero argued that in the newly
357 Ibid., p. 470.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid., p. 405
360 Ibid., pp. 415-16.
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independent nations, the remaining class divisions were further exacerbated by the issue
of the unequal distribution of property. Indeed, Otero maintained that
Son sin duda muchos y numerosos los elementos que constituyen las sociedades;
pero si entre ellos se buscara un principio generador, un hecho que modifique y
comprenda a todos los otros y del que salgan como de un origen común todos los
fenómenos sociales que parecen aislados, éste no puede ser otro que la
organización de la propiedad361
The issue of property had also been touched upon by Zavala who noted the Spanish land
distribution, and who also believed its effects had lasted until the present day. The
conquerors had chosen the best and most fertile lands, the Church and prominent
families followed closely, leaving very little to small property-owners.362
As far as Otero was concerned property division was directly linked to the
backward conditions in most agricultural, commercial and industrial sectors. The war of
independence had all but paralysed the mining sector; mostly British, what few
investors there were had withdrawn their support.363 Similarly agriculture had also
ground to a halt, with no progress possible until the backward methods in use could be
modernised, agriculturally viable areas colonised and transport between sectors
improved.364 His liberal stance led him to conclude that once there was progress, the
propertied classes, who left the large swathes of property they owned abandoned and
unattended, would be willing to remedy the situation. Once agriculture and commerce
became more advanced, he believed it would be these property owners who would see
that it was in their own interest to transfer these properties to others.365 As a result, these
new owners would be taking the first steps towards personal advancement and move
into the middle class which, as already mentioned, Otero saw as the only class that
embodied the necessary attributes to govern the country successfully. Although Otero
361 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 27.
362 Zavala, Ensayo histórico, p. 17.
363 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 26-27.
364 Ibid., p. 26.
365 Ibid., p. 57.
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made an in depth examination of property ownership and stressed its importance,
particularly in the Ensayo, he never suggested a specific solution to the problems he
found. Therefore, though clearly a subject of great importance to him, he appears to
have believed that only once other, more pressing, issues had been addressed would this
issue come to the forefront and indeed, that once this did happen, the selflessness of the
property owners would lead the problem resolving itself. This, in turn, would ensure
that the class divisions which he saw as being so detrimental to the state of the nation
would slowly recede, thus solving one of the great problems that the nation faced.
Factional politics were another of Otero’s grandes temas. Having destroyed the
old order, the “elementos sociales” which made up the nation, it was essential to band
together and agree upon the shape of the new order. To do so, the disparate political
elements which had emerged after independence needed to unite but, as he saw it,
having defeated a common enemy during the struggle for independence, there was no
longer anything to unite them and this was the root cause of the problems that arose in
Mexico in the following decades; those who had united for independence became
divided on the best form of government, the appropriate institutions, grouping and
regrouping into factions to support one cause or another. These opposing factions, Otero
maintained, had kept the nation in a state of unrest, one which still unchanged in
1842.366 He described Mexico as
una nación donde por tantos años los bandos políticos que la dividieran habían
lidiado clara y decididamente ya por principios determinados, ora
constitucionales ora administrativos, o bien por ciertas personas consideradas
como jefes o candidatos de los bandos que profesaban esos principios, después
de las desastrosas luchas que se habían empeñado alternativamente para obtener
la dominación de los unos y la ruina de los otros…367
He depicted these factions as siding with the army, the clergy or even the masses, as
necessary to achieve their individual goals, more often than not with no regard for the
366 Ibid., p. 39.
367 Ibid., p. 11.
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rule of law. This is why division and anarchy were such a constant in Otero’s writing.
As he saw it, this problem of factional politics, flaring up immediately after
independence, was one that would plague the nation for decades to follow. He
associated this closely with the influence of the military and the Church in politics, as
will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, when political factions, struggling for power, turned
to these bodies for military or monetary aid to underwrite the revolts and rebellions that
were to cause so much division and strife.368 During initial peace negotiations with the
United States in 1847 he accused the political factions of using the Texas issue only as a
means of garnering support with no real plan or any intention of solving it.369 However,
it must also be said that Otero himself was not above engaging in party politics when it
suited him; during the war with the United States for example, when he betrayed his
own party to side with Oaxaca delegation in order to enlist their support for his Acta de
Reformas.
Closely tied to factional friction was the role played by the army and the Church
in affairs of the state, often dragged into disputes to give weight to one faction against
another. Pronunciamientos were often initiated by the army and sometimes funded by
the Church. However, in order to understand Otero’s viewpoint fully and explore the
solutions he proposed to these problems, the Church and the army will be examined
separately in chapters 4 and 5.
Central to the dissent between political elements was that of governance. When
Otero stepped onto the national stage in the early 1840s this issue was still engaging the
political classes. The struggles of previous decades had only underlined the fact that no
one system had been successful. Discussion on which system of government best suited
368 Otero, “Discurso de 11 de Octubre de 1842,” Obras, I, p. 304.
369 Otero, “Comunicación que sobre las negociaciones diplomáticas habidas en la Casa de Alfaro, entre
los plenipotenciarios de los Estados Unidos y México, dirigió al Excmo. Sr. Gobernador de Jalisco el
ciudadano Lic. M. Otero, diputado por aquel estado,” Obras, II, p. 540.
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Mexico was widespread. It was not merely the intelligentsia that considered the issue,
nor was it a debate that only held sway in the 1840s. In 1835, following the repudiation
of federalism by an important section of society, there was a flurry of pronunciamientos,
actas and initiatives, no less than 47 in June alone, discussing the pros and cons of the
system each supported or rejected.370 In the months between the 1841 Revolución de
Jalisco and dissolution of the 1842 congress, every newspaper editorial defended its
chosen position while launching vitriolic attacks on any with whom they disagreed.
Otero himself was particularly partial to the 1824 constitution, and hailed it as an
example of a successful point in the history of Mexico. He had no doubt that federalism
was the only system that would suit Mexico and his proposals and arguments and
lifelong defence of federalism will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 6.
One other major theme visible in Otero’s political thought throughout the decade
was that of constitutionalism. As far as Otero was concerned this was tied in with the
disruption caused by party politics, and the involvement of the army and the Church in
political processes. As a lawyer, Otero believed constitutionalism was synonymous with
the rule of law. Otero opined that a federalist constitution was the only system which
would allow Mexico to enjoy stability and provide an environment in which it would be
possible to guarantee the rule of law, creating in this way an atmosphere in which the
nation’s great problems could be solved. This constitution should be inviolable and it
would be set out the essential laws to govern the nation. Such laws would not only
guarantee federalism, they would also delineate the responsibilities of individuals and
outline their rights. In the Ensayo and in congress in the months that followed its
publication, we see an Otero preoccupied, not merely with the reintroduction of
federalism but with writing and enacting a constitution to reassert the rule of law across
370 See the Pronunciamiento in the Independent Mexico Database for a full transcriptions of the plans and
actas that followed the initial dismissal of Federalism, available online at http://arts.st-
andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/
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the country. The involvement of political factions, the Church and the army in political
affairs needed to be curbed but this would serve no purpose unless a constitution was in
place whose legitimacy was not to be doubted, and it was this that Otero was aiming for
in 1842. Otero’s optimistic appraisal of the Revolución de Jalisco as the
pronunciamiento to end all pronunciamientos was quickly proved groundless. The 1842
congress was disbanded by force, and replaced by a new junta nominated by Santa
Anna.
In the year that followed the dissolution of congress, Otero lost much of the
youthful idealism he displayed in the Ensayo and which had translated into great hopes
for a better future. He had experienced the failure of his proposed constitution with the
forced closure of congress, and had spent weeks in prison on a trumped up charge.
These experiences reaffirmed his belief that the rule of law was non-existent in Mexico
and that without it there could be no hope for a better future. Less than three years later,
the national situation had altered radically. Otero, despaired, describing Mexico as a
country in which the social edifice had collapsed and in which the most pressing
concern was the restoration of the rule of law, so essential to the construction of a true
democracy.371 The threat, however, of disintegration no longer came only from internal
problems and historical issues; the nation now faced an invading force and could not
afford any delay in finding a solution. This was why Otero saw it as his duty to Mexico
to provide the country with the only means he believed would enable it to survive an
attack on its independence –a strengthened constitution– arguing that “la república
demanda con urgencia el establecimiento definitivo del orden constitucional.”372 The
war had progressed in such a way that it was obvious to Otero that Mexico was
embroiled in another struggle for its independence, and the only way it could survive
371 Otero et al, “Manifestación de los Electores Primarios del Distrito Federal”, Obras, I, p. 343.
372 Ibid., p. 356.
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was buttressed by a solid constitution that would regulate, and direct a combined
national strategy.373 Despite his steadfast defence of the 1824 constitution he agreed that
it was flawed which is why he fought hard to pass the Acta de Reformas, reforming the
1824 constitution. Passed in 1847, it served its purpose; the Acta ensured that despite
the capital having been seized by the Americans, there were still provisions in place for
elections to be carried out, providing the nation with the tools to elect a new
president.374 As Minister of Home and Foreign Affairs for the Herrera Government in
1848 it was in Otero’s power to address the shortcomings of the nation and he
constantly underlined the importance of the inviolability of the constitution and of the
laws of the country, calling for strict compliance with both. 375 Constitutionalism
preoccupied him throughout the decade and is closely intertwined with the aspects to be
explored in the following chapters. Without addressing the position of the army, the
Church and the states, it would be impossible to write a constitution that could
withstand the attacks faced by the constitutions of the early national period.
It was the political and intellectual classes, of which Otero was a member,
which decided the principal topics of their era. For Otero these grandes cuestiones,
those that rose to the forefront, those that demanded an immediate attention and those
that he felt it essential to address to enable the nation to progress were class divisions,
property distribution, the separation of Church and state, counteracting military
intervention in politics, political factions. Underlying these, and without which they
would not prosper, was the necessity for federalism, the reestablishment of the rule of
law, and the importance of a strong unchallengeable constitution.
373 Ibid.
374 Otero, “Programa de Gobierno, circular del Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores y Exteriores a los
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The three chapters that follow will expand on Otero's views on the army and the
church and the federalism he espoused so fervently. Chapter 4 will look at the military,
which Otero abhorred as being the principal cause of the dire situation the nation faced
in the 1840s. It is in this that particularly defines him as a moderate; he was willing to
compromise on fueros in order to avoid a backlash, delay reforms for better times and
seek a balance between a standing army and the militias. Chapter 5 will look at the
separation of Church and state –again central to Otero’s ideology but despite strong and
clear feelings on the subject –the Church needed to be removed from the political sphere
of influence– Otero was unwilling to fight openly, perhaps fearing a backlash, perhaps
feeling that laicisation of politics had, by the 1840s, become inevitable and as such
could be allowed to run its course. The final issue, discussed in chapter 6, is the debate
surrounding the best system of government. Here Otero emerges as being radical insofar
as he maintained that federalism was the only viable system for Mexico, and was
willing to fight for the re-institution of federalism regardless of the consequences.
However, his radicalism was tempered by his insistence that Mexico learn from the
mistakes of the 1824 constitution, and from those of the centralist projects that followed,
calling for reforms to produce a federalist charter that best suited the nation.
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4.
The Army
The role of the army is central to any discussion or study of the Americas of the
nineteenth century. Despite the fact that military presence in the Spanish colonies was
scarce up until the second half of the eighteenth century, once it did become established,
it developed into one of the key institutions across what came to be known as Latin
America.376 With the introduction of the Bourbon reforms of Kings Charles III and
Charles IV in the last decades of the eighteenth century, service in the military in the
colonies ceased to be the prerogative of the Spaniards, and the previously excluded
criollos were admitted into the officer ranks. 377 As the struggle for independence
erupted across Spanish America, the army splintered and royalists faced insurgents.
With independence, insurgent armies triumphed across the continent, rising to
prominence as nations gradually emerged from former colonies. The military came to
be seen as the heroes of independence and they became a power to be reckoned with,
subject to its own law, protected by the fueros, and eager to take up its role in the new
nations. As Alain Rouquié remarked; “the new republics had an army even when they
did not have a state.”378 No two nations had the same experience; Bolivia was ruled by a
“sinister series of ‘barbarian caudillos,’” in Peru the army maintained power from 1821
without interruption, well into the second half of the century, whereas in Chile, the
376 For an introduction to the role and actions of the military in Latin America see; Edwin Lieuwen, Arms
and Politics in Latin America (New York/London; Praeger Paperbacks, 1963), Alain Rouquié, The
Military and the State in Latin America (US: University of California Press, 1987), as well as Christon I.
Archer, “The Role of the Military in Colonial Latin America,” The History Teacher, Vol. 14, No. 3,
(May, 1981), pp. 413-421, which includes an extensive bibliography directing further study. Also, James
Mahoney, The legacies of Liberalism; Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America (US,
UK: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), Brian Loveman, Por la Patria; Politics and the armed
forces in Latin America (US: SR Books, 1999).
377 Rouquié. The Military, p. 44. For a study that espouses this view see Robert H. Holden, Armies
without Nations. Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821-1960 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
378 Ibid., p. 47.
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military were placed firmly under the control of a civilian, centralist government from
the late 1830s.379 In Spanish America, emerging from years of strife and turmoil where
a military presence had been essential in waging the fight for independence, the key role
adopted by the armed forces in the nascent nations was hardly surprising. In the United
States, the role the military should take in the young republic was also under discussion.
From the outset, the Framers of the Constitution held it to be central to constituting the
nation but they firmly believed “the military should be subordinated to the civil
power.” 380 Failure to do so meant the military could become a threat to liberty,
democracy, economic prosperity and peace.381
Like the other Spanish colonies, New Spain had no standing army, and relied
mainly on temporary militias scattered far and wide.382 With the seizure of Havana by
the British in 1762, and the Bourbon reforms, this changed somewhat but it was only
during the struggle for independence from Spain that the army really established itself
and, with the entry of the Ejército Trigarante into Mexico City in September 1821, it
cemented its reputation as liberator and defender of the nation’s sovereignty. In fact, it
was commonly posited that the army was “the group most favoured by the War of
Independence.” 383 However, once the unifying cause of independence was made
obsolete by victory, it soon became apparent that “the Mexican army was split, both by
its origins into royalists or insurgents and by its organisation into a permanent army and
militias. It was also affected by ideological tendencies, since it was far from being
379 Ibid., pp. 49-53.
380 For information on the military/state debate in the United States see, Samuel P. Huntington. The
Soldier and the State. The theory and politics of Civil-Military Relations (US/UK: Harvard University
Press, 2002, 19th Ed). The quote is from p. 164.
381 Ibid. p. 156.
382 For a more region-specific and detailed study on the role of the Army in pre-independent Mexico, see
Christon Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760 - 1810 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New
Mexico Press, 1977), Josefina Z. Vázquez “Iglesia, ejército y centralismo,” Historia Mexicana, Vol. 39,
No. 1, Homenaje a Silvio Zavala II (Jul. - Sep. 1989), and William A. DePalo, The Mexican National
Army, 1822 – 1852 (US: Texas A&M University Press, 1997).
383 Josefina Z. Vázquez, “Political Plans and Collaboration Between Civilians and the Military, 1821 –
1846,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, p. 19.
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monolithic.”384 The army rarely backed one man, faction or cause with any regularity,
making it an essential factor to be taken into account by all members of the political
classes. It participated at all levels in the new nation; from the presidential chair to state
governorships, from congress to the logias. It was equally hated and venerated, courted
and rejected. Consequently, it was at the centre of any discussion on improving the state
of the nation.
The aim of this chapter is to present the reader with Otero’s historical analysis of
the armed forces; focusing on their position in the final years of the colony and during
the struggle for independence up until the army surfaced as the heroes of independence.
This will serve to highlight his assessment of the importance of the historical events of
the early national period in understanding why the army enjoyed the influential position
it did in the 1840s. This will be followed by an examination of the 1840s, paying close
attention to Otero’s views on the failure of the military during the United States War
1846 – 1848. The chapter will then analyse his proposals to redress the situation. He
bemoaned the fact that no way had been found of ensuring that the military returned to a
purely defensive position following independence. A further opportunity was lost with
the 1824 Constitution. This could have curtailed the increasing military involvement in
political realms that should have remained the exclusive prerogative of the state but it
failed to do so and no subsequent constitution had attempted it either. He highlighted
the fragmentation caused by the army’s participation in party politics and believed the
disruption and distress caused by the pronunciamientos and revolts, so common in the
decades following independence, could all be blamed on the military. The final section
of this chapter will look at the actual legislation he wrote and how his ideological
beliefs were tempered by different circumstances and issues, such as the fueros, and
384 Ibid., p. 21.
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were finally crushed by the apathy of the very middle class he called upon for help in
reforming the nation. It will also look at his proposals for the profesionalisation of the
military into three sections, each with a different composition and competencies; a
police force, national militias and a professional army. As a result, it traces Mariano
Otero’s political ideology as it shifts from the eagerness of 1842, when as a new
legislator he was commissioned to write a constitution, and thereby put his ideology
into practice, through the travails of a nation at war, and concludes with his despair and
hopelessness near his death in 1850, faced with the reality that the military would not be
so easily reformed.
When Otero first wrote on the subject of the armed forces in 1842, Mexico had
just experienced a wave of pronunciamientos that began in Jalisco, his home state,
spread rapidly to the capital, and toppled the government.385 For Otero, 25 years old and
optimistic, engaged in national politics for the very first time, the meeting of the
deputies in 1842 signalled the start of a new era. He interpreted the Revolución de
Jalisco, and associated military-backed plans and actas, as a sign that the nation was
ready for political change, and that “nada cierto hay en nuestro próximo porvenir: [...]
que el destino futuro de su patria depende casi absolutamente de lo que hoy se haga.”386
However, at the same time as he was openly declaring his support for the Revolución,
Otero, and those around him, were well aware that a little less than a year after its
proclamation, this Plan had turned out to be just another plan that declared itself to
represent the “will of the nation” but was no other than a stepping stone to power for
those proclaiming it.
385 For more information on the Revolución de Jalisco, named the Triangular Revolt by Michael Costeloe,
see, Costeloe Michael, “The Triangular Revolt,” and Melissa Boyd, “A Reluctant Advocate: Mariano
Otero and the Revolución de Jalisco,” in Will Fowler (Ed.), Forceful Negotiations, The Origins of the
Pronunciamiento in Nineteenth-Century Mexico (US: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).
386 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 8.
127
It was in the midst of this charged climate that Otero’s Ensayo appeared,
containing the first of Otero’s references to the army and his analysis of its function.
The ideological base which can be extracted from the Ensayo did not change greatly
over the following decade but, at times, prevailing circumstances made it appear so.
Otero knew future prosperity depended on addressing the army’s role in Mexican
politics and everyday life. It must be noted, however, that his views in 1842, shaped by
a recent military success, would be altered profoundly by the events of the years that
followed. Otero’s hopes, which rested on the constitution taking shape in the 1842
congress, were dashed when a series of pronunciamientos, once again with military
backing, led to congress being dissolved in December 1842. Less than a year later he
would find himself a prisoner and in solitary confinement, held illegally under military
authority, and accused of conspiracy. The failure of the army in the war with the United
States was also a further disillusionment, though perhaps no surprise to him. This defeat
of the Mexican troops and subsequent humiliating loss of territory, so often blamed on
the military’s poor showing, suggested that the time was ripe for army reform. Much of
its support had ebbed away following such a lacklustre performance and Otero seized
this change in perception to revive his proposals for a strong National Guard and a
smaller standing army, in addition to pushing for the introduction of a specialised police
force at state level. Though he was instrumental in passing a law making the National
Guard a reality, the pessimism, apathy and political inaction of the middle classes meant
that it never flourished. In Otero’s eyes, he had failed and there was little room for
optimism.
Otero was not alone in stressing the importance of the military.387 Everyone,
from politicians to generals, from presidents to clergymen, at some time or another,
387 As with the state of the nation, commentary was widespread on the army in the writings, speeches and
correspondence of Otero’s contemporaries. In the decade following independence and the fall of Iturbide,
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either privately or publicly, proffered a plan or proposal to deal with the armed forces,
or to its reform. Whereas the army was unanimously accepted as the author of
independence, consensus ended there. The conservative liberals, or traditionalists,
believed that for Mexico to prosper it was essential that the institutions upholding
traditional values, such as the Church or the army, must be supported at all costs. They,
therefore, advocated a large and well maintained defensive army that maintained the
rule of law.388 In addition, the conservatives feared the threat of social dissolution and
often equated the militias with “arming the ‘rabble’.” 389 Alamán, writing in 1853,
suggested a large standing army, “albeit proportionate in times of peace” and, contrary
to the traditional conservative view, accepted the benefit of militias, but only if these
were “made up of property-owning citizens like those formed under the colony.”390 The
radicals, or puros, for their part, saw the army as a source of instability and favoured
militias in the hope of strengthening these until eventually strong enough to replace a
standing army.391 The santanistas were opposed to this. They were openly militaristic
and sought to strengthen and increase the army while slowly reducing the militia, with a
view to the latter’s eventual elimination. At the same time, santanistas like Tornel
highlighted the need to discipline the military, introduce medical and engineer corps and
educate all ranks.392 And then there were the moderates, who agreed that the military
was an essential tool at a national level, to be used exclusively as a defence tool against
foreign invaders, leaving the regional militias to resolve internal issues. Otero was a
José Maria Luis Mora and Lorenzo de Zavala devoted page after page to describing, analysing and
criticising the armed forces. They were not alone; references to the military and discussions of the role of
the army can also be found in the works of José María Bocanegra and Carlos María de Bustamante. At
different points in their political careers, Valentín Gómez Farías, as one of the political leaders of the
radicals, Gómez Pedraza as the head of the moderates, José María Tornel in his role as ideologue of the
santanistas and Lucas Alamán from a more conservative standpoint, all focused on the military and
military-state relations.
388 Fowler, Mexico in the age of the proposals, p. 57.
389 Ibid., pp. 43, 58.
390 Ibid., p. 84.
391 Ibid., p. 170.
392 Ibid., p. 237.
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keen advocate of this moderate search for balance and, in addition, called for the
establishment of a police force to ensure that an entirely civilian force dealt with the
people.
Otero’s historical analysis of the role of army starts with the colonial period.
According to Christon Archer, many of Otero’s contemporaries described the army in
terms that “blamed the Spanish regime for the problems of the Republic.”393 He singled
out Lucas Alamán and José María Luis Mora as pinpointing the emergence of an
“espíritu militar” in the colonial period. However, both these men belonged to a
generation born in the early 1790s, growing up during the last years of Spanish colonial
rule and deeply affected by the independence movement. Their ties with the colonial
system were close and they wanted to establish a sense of continuity in their work;
Mora in order to criticise the rot and decay the old system represented, Alamán to
highlight the importance of colonial history in the construction of a new Mexico. Born
in the last years of the struggle for independence, Otero never experienced colonial rule
so he believed less blame should be laid on the Spaniards and more emphasis put on the
consequences of the movement for independence and the ensuing struggle to build a
nation.
Otero’s analysis of the situation of the army in New Spain was distanced by time
from those views written in the years following independence, nor did he ever write a
great work which would crystallise his political views in the way that Alamán did.
Otero’s description of the army in the colony was nothing more than an essential part of
his historical analysis, a convenient stepping-off point to investigating the ills of the
nation. He argued that despite the strength of its position in early independent Mexico,
393 Archer, The Army, p. xi.
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the military was a nonentity during the colonial period. 394 In fact, the Spanish
government ensured that all colonos were treated equally under the tight fist of tyranny,
without any special consideration for those classes ─the clergy and the military─ it used 
as tools of suppression, ensuring that they were only ever given a secondary, passive
role, inevitably subordinate to Spanish administrators.395 The power the Spaniards held
over the inhabitants of its colonies was never dependent on the military.396 Otero did
admit that the military had enjoyed a number of civil privileges or exemptions from
certain civil laws but that these never included political privileges.397 To acquire them,
the military would have had to participate in public power and this was never ever
contemplated in the colonies.398 Furthermore, said Otero, it could never be a “poder
político;” it was dispersed throughout the colonies, and its organisation, where any
existed, was that of a peace time force, charged more with policing than fighting.399
Under colonial rule, the military was never called upon to engage in warfare with
foreign powers, and its duties were restricted to border protection and police work.400
Small in number, it was entirely subjected to the dominance of its Spanish overlords.401
Criollos were restricted to the lower ranks under the command of royalist officers; an
394 Archer provides an in-depth analysis of the position of the military during the colonial period, in
which the position of the army is seen as one of disorganization and confusion, due to the fact that the
reconstruction and organization of a military force in New Spain only took shape during the last years of
the eighteenth century.
395 Otero, “Discurso, 11 de Octubre de 1842”, Obras, I: p. 273.
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid.
398 Ibid.
399 Otero, Ensayo, I: p. 51.
400 Archer relates that in spite of the acknowledged disorganisation in the military in New Spain, it was
not until the British attack and capture of Havana, in 1862, that the army was seen as being in need of
reform, and only then to act as a tool of the Spanish Crown in the colony. In addition, Archer points out
the reluctance of the Spanish Viceroys and commanders general to allow too much power to pass to those
who were not Spanish, to the extent that it was planned to ship whole garrisons in from Spain. In many
cases, the powers-that-be went to great lengths to ensure that no attachments were formed with the
colonies where the military were stationed. See, Archer, The Army.
401 Otero is not the only one to make such a claim. Lorenzo de Zavala, writing in 1837 also argued that
“La clase militar era esclava de sus jefes, todos españoles o enteramente adictos al régimen que
conservaba sus fueros y su dominio.” Zavala, Ensayo, p. 25.
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obvious cause of resentment.402 In Otero’s opinion, this was one of the more detrimental
legacies of colonial rule that would affect relations between the army and its fellow
countrymen for generations to come.403
It was during the struggle for independence that the army assumed greater
significance.404 As royalist soldiers turned against their king and fought side by side
with the rebels, an alliance was forged and old resentments, though not forgotten, were
put aside as they united under the tricolour flag and the call for independence in an
eleven-year struggle from 1810-1821. It was then, Otero thought, that the military
acquired a new niche in a society, one where the armed struggle was seen by many as
the only viable means of success. Military chiefs gradually became more influential
figures and, by independence, the army had seized control of civil administration.
Hailed as the heroes of the independence movement, those who fought in the war soon
moved into positions of power usually reserved for civilians, moving up through higher
echelons of the nation, eventually to the presidency itself.405
Otero differentiated between this move by the military men of the 1820s into
the political arena and the one that took place during the struggle for independence from
Spain. According to him, the motives of the latter were pure, their positions forged by
necessity; it was, after all, a time of war and, therefore, understandable that the army
should become involved in political debates. He saw these men as true patriots who had
not chased after the honours lavished upon them, nor selfishly pursued the position of
powers or the high commands bestowed upon them. Unlike those that followed, who
sought only their personal gain under pretexts of liberty or compliance with the will of
the nation, these were not puffed up with misguided patriotism, “Los grandes hombres
402 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 38. “El mismo celo existía en los mexicanos que servían en el ejercito,
siempre en los rangos inferiores, y a las ordenes de los jefes españoles.”
403 Otero, “Discurso, 11 de Octubre de 1842,” Obras, I, p. 273.
404 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 51
405 Ibid.
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de la Independencia que hoy celebramos, no corrieron tras de los honores ni el mando:
su participación nada tenía de equívoco.”406 How could Otero reach such a conclusion
when so many of those who engaged in the struggle for independence went on to
participate actively in high office and in politics? Agustín de Iturbide became emperor,
Guadalupe Victoria and Vicente Guerrero became presidents, and Manuel Gómez
Pedraza, former president, had become the leader of Otero’s own political faction. He
could only justify the contradictions by basing his argument on different times and
circumstances. The heroes of the struggle and the years that immediately followed, were
acting in a wartime environment and only during wartime could the army, a military
organisation, be accepted as a “principio constitutivo,” so that military rule was seen as
not only necessary but actively encouraged until 1824.407 It was thanks to the army that
independence was achieved and that Mexico was able to start on its long road towards
nationhood.
For Otero this was where the crucial divide should have emerged. Once
Independence was consolidated, the military should have reverted to a subservient
position, and Otero lamented “que en nuestros primeros días no se haya organizado la
fuerza pública sobre las bases de una disciplina severa, y de una obediencia absoluta a
las leyes y a las autoridades constitutivas.”408 It was right and proper that the military be
honoured and admired for its role in independence and the nation should be grateful for
the service it had rendered but Otero believed that “Una organización militar en
cualquier estado de la sociedad, no puede venir a ser su principio constitutivo, sino
cuando la guerra es la primera necesidad, y la principal forma de vida de esa nación.”409
Once peace had been declared and political rule re-established, a Constituent Congress
406 Otero, “Discurso, 1843,” Obras, I, p. 471.
407 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 51 ·
408 Ibid., p. 52.
409 Italics in the original. Ibid., p. 51.
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convened and the eventual promulgation of the 1824 constitution, military involvement
should have ceased.410 At this point, the most suitable class ─the middle class, of which 
Otero was a member─ should then have taken over and a system established in tune 
with the ideas of liberty and civilisation.411 This never came to pass, and despite a brief
interval of peace under the Guadalupe Victoria administration between October 1824
and April 1829, it was to be less than four years before the political scenario re-erupted
and military involvement in politics continued and became consolidated.
Otero was not alone in underlining the struggle for independence and its
aftermath as crucial to understanding and explaining the role of the army in later years.
Manuel Gómez Pedraza, who had fought in the royalist army, also argued that it was in
the years following independence that the military became corrupt. Gómez Pedraza was
of the opinion that it was the revolts and revolutions of 1822 and 1823 that had
demoralised and perverted the army, leading to the unrest of the years that followed,
because “no hay nada más propio para corromper un ejército que las revoluciones.”412 It
was not just the moderates who identified these years as crucial. Conservative leader,
Lucas Alamán, in the fifth and final volume of his Historia de Mexico, published
between 1849 and 1852, argued that it was during Iturbide’s reign that the military’s
ruin began.413 The reforms carried out by Iturbide and his ministers, in which the
infantry was reshaped along the lines established by the 1815 Spanish regulations meant
that the army no longer associated itself closely with what it had been; “con los antiguos
nombres desaparecieron los recuerdos de Gloria que cada cuerpo tenía.”414 Alamán used
this point to emphasise his conservative opinion that the legacy of the colonial order
410 Ibid., pp. 52, 72.
411 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
412 Gómez Pedraza, “Memoria del secretario de Estado y del despacho de la Guerra presentada a las
cámaras en enero de 1827,” in Solares Robles, La obra política, p. 126.
413 Alamán, Historia de México, V, p. 508.
414 Ibid., V, p. 261.
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could have been maintained with independence, and that this would have ensured
stability and continuity; both of which had been lost with the ascent of new regimes,
one after another, attempting and failing to reshape independent Mexico. However, it
should not be forgotten that, like his contemporaries, Alamán was very much
concerned with justifying his actions, and he went on to argue that during Bustamante’s
first government ─known to many as the Alamán administration─ the army had been 
reorganised and its discipline corrected. Obviously this could only have occurred if
Alamán were able to prove that the army was in disarray after independence and this
situation could be blamed on his political rivals.415 José María Tornel, in his turn,
blamed Iturbide and his advisers for their action, or inaction, in the early 1820s. He
went so far as to argue that this was when all the revolutions that were to damage
Mexico could have been curtailed “desaprovechando los momentos en que pudo
trabajarse con suceso para restaurar el respeto a las leyes, para fortificar la disciplina del
ejército; para cerrar en fin, el abismo inmensurable de las revoluciones.”416 In his 1851
book, Porvenir de México,417 Luis Gonzaga Cuevas also believed it was the war for
independence that had given the military its influence, springing from the twofold glory
of saving the kingdom for the royalists, and the triumph of independence for the rebels.
But these noble motives were quickly put aside and a military career soon seen by many
as a means to an end, to a quick fortune which could not be achieved so easily
elsewhere. Cuevas, like Otero, distinguished between military acts in wartime and the
situation that should have been established as soon as peace was won and independence
achieved. He too argued that the military role should have shifted accordingly
415 Ibid., V, p. 491.
416 It must be noted that José María Tornel, as one of the leaders of the santanistas had believed in a
strong and numerous army, however, his Reseña Histórica, from which this quote was taken, was written
in the years leading up to his death, and as such, represents a much more conservative facet of the man.
José María Tornel y Mendivil, Breve reseña histórica, p.7.
417 Cuevas, Porvenir, p. 64.
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que durante la Guerra, la profesión militar es la más brillante y la de una
perspectiva más halagüeña. Pero entre nosotros la influencia de esa clase iba a
ser funestísima y hacer imposible toda administración que no contase con ella
como su principal apoyo.418
He also agreed with Otero that recognition of this point in time, as crucial to any
interpretation of the position of the military in independent Mexico, was essential in
tackling any change or improvement to the current situation.
The period that followed the achievement of independence was just as important.
As the military slowly tightened its hold on Mexican politics, it became an influential
factor in every facet of national life through pronunciamientos and planes, revolts and
revolutions, intrigue in the Masonic lodges, and even the legitimate route of elections,
to the extent that Otero felt it too had become a social class in much the same way as the
clergy or the middle classes.419
As the army stranglehold increased, the line between political and military
involvement blurred. Otero argued that the military was no longer seen as a separate
force and its influence permeated all aspects of the political landscape; “los jefes
militares adquirieron importancia en el orden social.”420 Moreover, party politics with
their various factions sprang up among the rank and file, so that soon each political
faction could count on the backing of this or that regiment or garrison. In Otero’s
opinion, armed conflict had become indissolubly intertwined with political ambition. It
constantly fractured and divided, each part supporting the political trend or faction that
best suited its interests and advancement. Mora supported this view, arguing that when
it came to achieving their personal aims, all factions looked to the army for support, but
pointed out that “todas a su vez lo detestan cuando llega la hora de levantar el edificio o
de consolidar lo edificado,” adding that this indicated the army was tolerated as a
418 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
419 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 51
420 Ibid.
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necessary evil.421 This, Otero opined, led to its corruption. Whereas in civilised nations
the military would have been disciplined and subdued by the legitimate constitutional
power, this army had lost all respect for the rule of law in early independent Mexico,
and become nothing more than the pursuer of its own excessive ambitions.422
Otero used the Plan de Jalisco, issued by Paredes y Arrillaga, to illustrate his
assessment of the state of the military in 1841. In this Plan, the army was also presented,
not as the powerful political class that Otero denounced, but as a miserable and
crumbling force unable to muster the strength to stand up to miniscule bands of
adventurers; “el ejército en la miseria y precisado a vivir sobre el pueblo,” the army was
feared instead of revered, disdained instead of acclaimed. 423 And there was no
contradiction here. The Revolución de Jalisco is a prime example. Paredes y Arrillaga’s
initial pronunciamiento could easily have fallen upon deaf ears, or been crushed by the
government. However, although the first call for political change was made by Paredes,
it was seconded by Valencia’s garrison in Mexico City, and soon gathered momentum
and support from a variety of sources. The army, therefore, could well be poorly
equipped, barely organised and in a state of undress and disarray, and yet, military
commanders were able to make key moves with little more than a threat of violence, or
control the destiny of the nation often with no more than a single garrison.424
421 Hale, El liberalismo Mexicano, p. 146.
422 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 52.
423 Ibid., p. 11, and Otero, “Examen analítico del sistema constitucional contenido en el proyecto
presentado al congreso por la mayoría de su comisión constitucional,” Obras, I, pp. 247-248.
424 The phenomenon on the pronunciamiento, the legitimacy of the use of violence and the
pronunciamiento as the expression of the will of the people has been studied in great depth by Will
Fowler. See; “El pronunciamiento mexicano del siglo XIX. Hacia una nueva tipología,” Estudios de
Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México 38 (julio-diciembre 2009), pp. 5-34, Forceful
Negotiations: The Origins of the Pronunciamiento in Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 2010), Malcontents, Rebels, and Pronunciados: The Politics of
Insurrection in Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, in press) and
Celebrating Insurrection. The Commemoration and Representation of the Nineteenth-Century Mexican
Pronunciamiento (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, in press).
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When Tornel blamed the Iturbide government for not putting an end to revolts
and revolutions, he argued that the decades following independence only served to
worsen the situation. Soldiers no longer felt under any obligation to accept discipline
and obedience and, therefore, “el ejército, lejos de mantener el orden y de corresponder
a los nobles fines de su institución, fue el que tomó sobre si, por entonces la inmensa
responsabilidad de iniciar las revueltas domesticas.”425 Involved with men, such as
Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga and Antonio López de Santa Anna, in many revolts and
pronunciamientos, he understood how the army worked.
Despite Otero’s optimism that the Revolución de Jalisco was to be the one
revolution that truly altered the state of the nation, it scarcely affected the armed forces.
If 1842 had signalled a moment of hope and anticipation, when Otero might have
readily believed that the perfect moment for change had arrived, the events of the years
that followed disillusioned him. Slowly his hope for military reform and the betterment
of this section of Mexican society ebbed away, one crucial event transforming
disappointment into despair, not only for Otero, but for many other Mexicans too, the
war with the United States, 1846 –1848.
The heroes of independence were now plunged into a war with their neighbours,
whose soldiers were fewer, but better trained, and much better organised than their
Mexican counterparts. Mexican forces had won independence in 1821, rebuffed a
Spanish attempt at re-conquest in 1829, and kept the French at bay in 1838. This,
however would be the ultimate test for the Mexican army and, in Otero’s eyes, they
failed it. During the months that followed, with the threat to close congress at the
forefront of every deputy’s mind, it became abundantly clear that any criticism in any
speech, any vote against the established order, was a new nail in congress’s coffin.
425 Tornel y Mendivil, Breve reseña, p.8, 11
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However, the situation in 1847 was radically different. Otero was an experienced
politician who had had years to establish his position among his fellow deputies and, as
the war with the United States progressed and the army’s failure became increasingly
evident, Otero lost all his reticence. In addition, the military constraints that had
influenced him in 1842, when his positions as a member of the Consejo de los
Departamentos and later as a deputy in congress were largely the result of military
backed revolts originating in his home town, no longer applied. Secondly, by the time
his Ensayo had been published in June, it had become apparent to many that any move
that even hinted at radicalism or at the reestablishment of federalism would be stamped
out. 426 Following his attendance at the initial peace negotiations between the two
nations, which took place in the second half of 1847, Otero, who was still officially the
deputy for Jalisco, sent a communiqué to the Governor of Jalisco which was printed and
widely discussed in the newspapers of the time, as well as being published in pamphlet
form.427 Otero’s anger at the poor performance of the military was patent, and he was
able to vent his frustration in a way that would have been impossible in the years
leading up to its failures in the US-Mexican conflict, after which the reality of the
army’s position became clear to many.428
He pointed to the plight of the nation, and emphasised the role that individual
people had played in the war;
426 The correspondence of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, exchanged with men such as Santa Anna and
Tornel, also sheds some light on the thoughts and stances of those who had brought about the 1841
Revolución de Jalisco, but were unwilling to stand idly by as federalism was openly discussed and voted
on by the deputies in congress. Some of the correspondence relating to these months can be found in El
General Paredes y Arrillaga, su gobierno en Jalisco, sus movimientos revolucionarios; sus relaciones
con el general Santa Anna, etc., etc., según su propio archivo, in García y Pereya, Documentos para la
historia de México. Tomo 31 – 33 (Mexico City: Librería de la Viuda de Ch. Bouret, 1910).
427 An advert for the sale of the booklet can be found, among others, in the Monitor Republicano on 10
October 1847. In addition the communiqué was published, in full, in the Monitor Republicano in October
and November, and serialised in The American Star, with comments and discussions, during the last
weeks of October and into November of 1847.
428 Otero, “Réplica a la defensa que el ex-ministro de Relaciones, D. José Ramón Pacheco, ha publicado a
favor de la política del gobierno del General Santa Anna, por lo relativo a las negociaciones diplomáticas
de la casa de Alfaro,” Obras, II, p. 559.
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En menos de un año cuarenta mil hombres han ido a los campos de batalla:
desde el proletario infeliz que apenas tiene idea de la patria hasta el hombre
estudioso, y el propietario cuyos hábitos eran los menos conformes con las
ocupaciones militares.429
Not only had entire battalions been wiped out but civilians, too, had been involved in
the fighting and in the war effort. Enumerating the failures of the Mexican army during
the war with the United States, Otero found that one single factor was the most culpable;
the impunity of those in command. It was their incompetence and inability to form a
cohesive stratagem enabling Mexico to repel the invading forces that had led to the
country being faced with the unfavourable terms being offered by the United States.430
To illustrate his point, Otero listed the defeats suffered by the Mexican military and
emphasised that it was obvious that these were not the fault of the soldiers but of their
leaders.431
He later stated that the intention of the communiqué was nothing other than an
attempt to answer “¿en qué términos y bajo qué condiciones sería posible celebrar una
paz honrosa y conveniente?”, but that he had been aware at the time that his arguments
and analysis would cause controversy.432 Indeed they did, and his criticism of the army
did not go unchallenged. José Ramón Pacheco, Foreign Secretary at the time of the
initial peace negotiations, published a reply, a defence in fact, of his position when in
government attacking Otero’s communiqué to Jalisco. Unable to remain silent, Otero
lashed out at Pacheco in a reply published in 1848 by Ignacio Cumplido, printer-editor
and a close colleague of Otero.433 He vehemently opposed Pacheco’s defence, arguing
that the successes he enumerated were nothing more than anomalies and stated that
El mundo juzga no por las excepciones, por la regla general y las fáciles y casi
fabulosas victorias de Monterrey, de Cerro Gordo y Padierna, y el resultado
429 Ibid., p. 552.
430 Ibid.
431 Ibid., pp. 552-556.
432 Italics in the original. Ibid., p. 559.
433 Ibid., pp. 559-591.
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mismo de la campaña de la Angostura, y el abandono en que se dejó a los de
Churubusco, así como la conducta de la mayor parte de los cuerpos que debieron
estar en Molino del Rey, y las mutuas acusaciones de cobardía e ineptitud que
unos a otros se han hecho nuestros jefes sobre cada batalla, desde Palo Alto
hasta Huamantla, no pudiendo ninguno negar la vergüenza de la derrota.434
The army leaders had failed, not only because they lacked a plan, but because they
abandoned those in desperate need of aid and failed to send backup, proving that they
were at best inept and at worst negligent. Furthermore, Otero argued that these leaders,
and the men under their command, were not even focused on finding a solution. They
bickered incessantly, accusing each other of cowardice and ineptitude, constantly
attempting to shift the blame onto their supposed brothers-in-arms. In Otero’s eyes,
each and every one was to blame for the failures of the country during the war. They
had disgraced themselves, the men they led and the country they represented. Military
chiefs who directly caused some of the defeats, who had officially been branded
cowards, not only went unpunished, but were allowed to continue in command.435 He
broadened his attack to encompass not only those in command, but the soldiers
themselves. He accused them of cowardice, of having fled from countless battlefields,
of a lack of discipline, for contravening the orders of their superiors, for treason, for
handing over entire towns without even a minimal attempt at defending them. 436
Furthermore, Otero was outraged by the fact that the military was unable to face its
defeat honourably by admitting its error. The attitude of the armed forces towards their
fellow countrymen was one of disdain; there could be no other explanation for their
attempting to defend their position, stating that “el soldado cumple con pelear” and “la
victoria depende de la caprichosa fortuna,” without accepting their responsibility for the
defeat of the nation.437
434 Ibid., p, 568.
435 Ibid., p. 584-586.
436 Ibid., p. 568.
437 Ibid.
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In Otero’s view, this should have been a moment of truth. However, even after
the war with the United States ended, the army was unwilling to accept that its position
at the head of the nation had been lost along with the war. As the months passed, Otero
complained in his private correspondence that the last vestiges of the defeated force
were still insistent on playing a role in politics. While he was Minister of Home and
Foreign Affairs in 1848, Otero was faced with a revolt, orchestrated by Paredes y
Arrillaga, where over one hundred men from the 14th Infantry division in San Juan de
Lagos pronounced in favour of the plan by Father Jarauta.438 This was the final straw
for Otero. He had thought that the war would finally reveal the incompetence of the
army, and it could be reformed. However, this showed that nothing had really changed,
and that the military were still pressing for involvement in politics. José María Luis
Mora agreed with Otero and said that although it had been proved that the military had
been unable to defend the nation, it would remain one of the government’s greatest
problems, “pues es de temerse que si anteriormente se sublevan por diferentes pretextos,
ahora lo harán hasta sin ellos.”439 As Otero neared the end of his term of office, he
appeared to share this pessimism, and it seemed he had lost all hope. While the army,
one of the main social segments of the country still remained in complete chaos, there
would be little or no hope for the nation.440
Now that we are conversant with the historical chronology of the 1840s decade,
it gives us a clear picture of the background to army reforms Otero was convinced
would lead to stability and allow Mexico to take up its rightful position in world affairs.
He firmly believed that the military should be nothing more than a tool of the state,
438 Letter from Otero to Mora, 13 June 1848 in Obras, p. 755-756. See also, Will Fowler, The
Pronunciamiento in Independent Mexico, Database for the Plan de Lagos, 1 June 1848, and associated
plans. http://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/dates.php?f=y&pid=641&m=6&y=1848
439 Letter from Mora to Otero, 28 July 1848, in Lillian Briseño Senosiain, Laura Solares Robles, y Laura
Suarez de la Torre, José María Luis Mora. Obras completas (Mexico City, Instituto Mora, Consejo
Nacional para la cultura y las Artes, 1986), VIII: p. 256.
440 Letter from Mariano Otero to J. M. L. Mora, 14 October 1848, in Otero, Obras, II, p. 762.
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controlled by a strong constitution; a tool whose prime purpose was to protect the nation
from external threats. Once the army had been reformed, its political involvement would
be curtailed which in turn would put an end to the revolts and revolutions that had
weakened the nation since independence. In addition, Otero hoped that a National
Guard, made up of members of the middle classes, would ensure that the army need not
be called upon to deal with the internal affairs of the states, and that this too would
remove political power from the standing army. Otero argued that what little power the
executive possessed had been weakened by the constant civil wars leading to decisions
being taken on the basis of the outcome of revolts and battles.441 In order for the nation
to restrict the political influence of the army, even in the 1840s, all that was needed was
the institution of discipline, obedience and constitutional control. Failure to do so in the
past had led to government by the points of bayonets and it was now essential that the
balance of power be redressed.
In addition, one of the most serious consequences of military involvement in
politics was, in Otero’s view, the fact that it led to revolts and revolutions, making it
impossible for a rule of law to be established under such conditions. The rule of law
paired with a strong constitution strengthened a nation and afforded it power. It was
essential to establish a system by which any differences that occurred were solved by
the nation as a whole, via elections, political discussions, and the election of
representatives within the terms of the constitution. This led to prosperity and stability.
This was impossible in Mexico in the 1840s. The way things stood, all decisions were
taken by a small group, whose only claim to power lay in the weapons they wielded
and Otero asked himself,
dónde está adoptado el horroroso principio de que esas cuestiones han de ser
decididas por una minoría nomás porque está armada, aunque lo está
441 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 52.
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precisamente para hacer obedecer las disposiciones de la mayoría, no como ella
las interprete, sino como las expliquen las autoridades civiles. 442
In Otero’s opinion, an army was armed only so that it could ensure observance of the
will of the majority, and even then, only by obeying a direct order from the properly
constituted civil authorities. If the revolts and uprisings were to continue all would be
lost “y de desastre en desastre el pueblo pasará sucesivamente por el yugo de cien
vencedores.”443 Otero believed that justice and patriotism would disappear, the nation
would be submerged in chaos and the future would hold nothing more than a string of
disasters, each worse than the one before.444 This he argued was why it was obvious
what the first, and most important step towards a permanent solution should be, “hacer
desaparecer de una vez la funesta manía de las revoluciones,” to ensure that the military
and the armed forces, instead of protecting and supporting these revolutions, be forced
to give unwavering obedience to established laws and the constituted authorities.445 An
end to revolutions and pronunciamientos meant that Otero and other members of the
political classes would be able to proceed to stabilising the country through legislative
and political means, without the constant threat of armed revolt or military rebellion.
José María Tornel agreed with Otero that ending revolutions was a government
priority and, despite his military position, he too argued that the best way to ensure this
was through the rule of law. “Una revolución que ha asumido el carácter popular, no
puede ser vencida sino por la fuerza pública, que reivindica el respeto y obediencia
debida a las leyes.”446 It was essential therefore, that the rule of law, and the constitution,
be strong enough to withstand challenges and attacks from any dissenting faction. In
Tornel’s opinion, they never had been and the various constitutions that had existed, had
442 Ibid., p. 86-87.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid., p. 86.
446 Tornel y Mendivil, Breve reseña, p.177.
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never been anything more than a deception and it was not surprising that governments
had been unable to establish a sense of legitimacy, and “tan reiteradas hayan sido las
revoluciones para derrocarlos.”447 Cuevas, too, held this to be the case, agreeing that the
state of the nation, under military domination and plagued by revolutions, could be
attributed to the fact that Mexico had never established laws and institutions capable of
asserting their dominance over the nation.448 He argued that with the achievement of
independence, the status quo had been altered and “los generales, jefes y oficiales de
aquella época, y lo que es más notable, los que les sucediesen iban también a presentar
con el título de nuestra libertad el poder que los autorizaba para no obedecer ni
gobiernos, ni leyes, ni instituciones.”449 Because of this Cuevas continued, it was not
entirely surprising that each time a revolution exploded, there came with it a call for
“algún nuevo sistema o algún cambio opuesto enteramente a la Constitución existente”
on the basis of the power vested in them by their previous positions.450 Without the
establishment of an unchallengeable constitution, it was impossible for these military
men to be returned a position of subservience and obedience that was essential for the
wellbeing of the nation.
At the same time, however, Otero was willing to admit that a standing army was
essential to any nation, its role restricted to repelling any foreign advances, recovering
territory usurped by foreign powers, maintaining public order, and defending the rights
of the nation at borders and entry points.451 Writing in 1842, he was forced to reassure
the military that this meant that the role of the army was safe. To assuage it further, he
stressed the importance of its role and assured it that all honours for its services to the
nation would be retained. He said it was this sentiment of admiration and affection for
447 Ibid., p.296.
448 Cuevas, Porvenir, p.171.
449 Ibid., p. 65-66.
450 Ibid., p. 173.
451 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 71.
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the military which led him to insist that it needed to be reformed. He was not attacking
the army; he was merely led by the desire that the army be “digno de su gran
destino.”452 To do so, it needed to be organised and disciplined. This was not a new
stance. José María Tornel, in his position as Minister for War to the santanista
government, which had been established by the Bases de Tacubaya, held a similar
view.453 For the three years Santa Anna was in power, from1841-1844, Tornel sought to
reform the army. As early as 1835 he had argued that promotions and the monetary
prizes that came with them had “created a privileged class that, due to its lack of true
merit, would appear to the people as a false meritocracy that would never be able to
represent them.”454 Tornel took this idea to the extreme, arguing that no award of any
kind should be given to any military personnel who had participated in a civil war, a
belief he reiterated in 1844. This would ensure that the army gained respect among the
civilians and, in addition, be seen as an institution worthy of admiration. Despite the
rhetoric, Tornel’s actions betrayed the truth ─he had been quite willing, over the years, 
to award prizes and money to those who had supported the santanistas in their rise to
power.
Otero created an ideal view of what the army should be, explaining that it
needed to set an example of virtue and moderation, courage and obedience, and that the
only exploits it should boast about should be those carried out in the defence of the
nation against outside forces.455 The real enemy of the military, he continued, were
those, if heaven forbid anyone could harbour such terrible notions, who sought to turn
the army into the nightmare of their fellow countrymen, forcing it to destroy the nation
with incessant civil wars and refusing it its rightful glory as the saviours of national
452 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 71.
453 Will Fowler, Tornel y Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo, Mexico 1795-1853 (Westport,
Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 2000), p. 196.
454 Ibid., p. 215 - 218.
455 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 72
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unity. These, the “others,” were the real enemy of the military, and Otero and his
supporters were the ones who wanted only what was best for Mexico’s great military.
Once this was achieved, and the military disciplined and organised, the first step
towards its improvement would have been taken, and once this was done, the next issue
could be tackled to ensure its unquestioning obedience to the constitution and to the law.
This typically moderate approach, slowly, one cautious step at a time, would ensure that
while changes were being introduced, and stability accomplished, the country would
have the support of the military. Afterwards, the moderates would be able to curtail the
power of the army through the constitution and legislation, bringing it under state
control.
However, these theories needed to be put into practice and his time in congress
in 1842 meant that he was directly involved in, and even responsible for, such reforms.
At the same time, however, he did not underestimate the considerable power of the
army. In a private letter to Ignacio Vergara, one of his fellow deputies and a mentor
from Jalisco, Otero outlined his agenda in congress.456 The parts relating to the army
demonstrate that Otero was aware just how important it was for any proposed reform to
be as unthreatening to the military as possible, so there was to be no discussion on
discharging the armed forces, nor was there to be any question of attacking their fueros.
He also argued for the removal of the power of the executive to dispose of the army as it
saw fit, making it, making it subservient to the constitution and to the law. Neither the
executive in power, nor those seeking it would be able to wield the army as a juguete.
The army would serve only the interest of the nation.457
As a moderate liberal of the 1840s, Otero naturally believed that reform should
take place, but that it should be done so that it did not cause a backlash from those who
456 It should be noted that despite Ignacio Vergara being elected to the 1842 Congress, as the deputy for
Jalisco, he declined the position. Letter from Otero to Vergara, Obras, I, p. 153-156.
457 Ibid., p. 154.
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feared radical reform. This was perhaps one of the main points that distinguished him,
and set him apart from his radical liberal contemporaries, to the extent that he argued
“que mi plaza es de ser sansculote para los cuernavaquistas y servil para los
sansculotes.”458 Mora had no such qualms, and his radical liberalism demanded that
reform be immediate and in depth. Whereas Otero thought that leaving the fueros intact
would help to reassure the army, Mora argued in his Revista Politica that they should be
abolished, outright. He saw the military as a supporter of the reactionary factions,
characterised by insubordination and a complete lack of respect for the laws, interested
in nothing but “fueros y privilegios.”459 Again, Mora’s personal situation, writing in
1837, and from exile, meant that he did not have to fear any of the reprisals that Otero
might have faced in 1842.
By January 1847, as the war with the United States continued, congress met to
discuss a proposal to allow the government to sell and auction the mortmain properties
held by the Church in a desperate effort to provide the army with the resources they
needed to continue the war. Otero still argued at this point that a strong military
presence was essential. It must, of course, be remembered that the country was at war,
and any call for a reduction in the armed forces could have been seen as traitorous.
During the discussion on emergency funding debated in congress on 7 January, he
agreed wholeheartedly that it was necessary to maintain a respectable force, and yet it
was imperative that such a force be kept within acceptable limits, its expenditure and
administration costs closely monitored and numbers restricted to what could be
afforded.460 This applied particularly to those in the higher ranks, and Otero argued that
the number of generals was draining the budget, and it was these positions that needed
458 Ibid.
459 José Maria Luis Mora, “Revista Politica de las diversas administraciones que la República Mexicana
ha tenido hasta 1837,” in Senosiain et al., José María Luis Mora. Obras completas, II, pp. 290, 342, 356.
460 Otero, “Discusión en general sobre el proyecto de quince millones de pesos”, Obras, II, p. 524.
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to be reviewed.461 However, his ideas were more than mere rhetoric his involvement in
congress, his position in the senate and his time as minister for the Herrera government
meant that he was able to put into practice some of the theories he had developed.
Indeed, his position at the forefront of the commissions responsible for writing the new
constitutions, in both 1842 and 1847, meant that he was able to introduce and shape the
legislation that would affect the military. Of course, the constitution of 1842 never
materialised, and the 1847 Acta de Reformas merely reformed an existing constitution,
but both give us with a glimpse of what Otero believed should be done.
In the “Voto de la Minoría” signed by three deputies but largely attributed to
Otero, one of his priorities was to bring the army under control of congress. Command
of the army was to be wrested from the hands of the executive. The President would still
be able to deploy the armed forces where necessary for the safety and integrity of the
nation, and even to face internal strife, but he would not be allowed to command it in
person.462 This would have instantly reduced the head of the executive to a civilian. The
president would not be seen actively leading the military forces and would be less likely
to be identified with the acts of the army. The legislative branch, through a bicameral
set up of a chamber of deputies and a senate, would take over the administration of the
army. Under the 1824 Constitution the executive had power to name senior officers, and
congress the power to deploy the military, as well as establish the quota and issue
ordinances for its organisation.463 In the Voto de la Minoría, Otero went one step further.
It was to be the prerogative of congress, not only to decree the number, organisation and
461 Ibid., p. 524.
462 This had also been stated as a restriction in the 1824 Constitution. For the “Voto de la Minoría” see
Titulo VII, Sección Segunda, De las facultades del presidente – Articulo 60. IV, V, “Voto de la Minoría”,
in Otero, Obras, Vol. 1, p. 193, for the 1824 Constitution see “Constitución Federal de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos”, Título IV, Sección IV. De las atribuciones del Presidente y restricciones de sus facultades.
Título III, Artículo 110, secciones VI y VII.
463 “Constitución Federal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos”, Título IV, Sección IV. De las atribuciones
del Presidente y restricciones de sus facultades. Artículo 112, sección I and Título III, Sección V, Articulo
50, XVIII and XIX.
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service of the permanent army, but also to oversee their fueros and tribunals. This was a
fairly radical step to take in 1842. No mention was made of there being any change in
the fueros, but at the same time, once congress had exercised its prerogative, it would
have been in a position to take the first tentative steps towards changing the rules and
regulations that set the military, like the Church, apart from the citizenry when it came
to criminal legislation.
In addition it was to be the responsibility of congress to define on what basis the
National Guard would be organised, and it would be congress that held the power to call
for its service at any time. This was nothing new; the National Guard, referred to under
other terms such as cívicos or militia, had been the prerogative of congress, not only
under the 1824 federalist constitution but also under the 1836 centralist one, and even
under the 1812 Cadiz constitution. Finally, the national congress would have the power
to reduce the police force if any individual state surpassed its quota, but the police
would, for the most part, be under the control of the state governors.464
It is in this draft constitution that we see, once again, Otero’s preoccupation with
the need for each and every aspect of the regulations governing the military to be
established in the constitution itself in order to lend force and weight to any change
affecting it. Here he suggested the division of the “armed forces” into three sections; a
standing army, a National Guard and a police force.465 The first, the army, would be for
the defence of the republic against exterior threats and, in certain cases, the protection of
national unity. The National Guard would be made up of all citizens between the ages of
21 and 60, in possession of certain rights. It would be destined to the protection of the
institutions and of public order in the interior of the states. This force was not to be
464 Título VI, Sección Segunda, de las facultades de congreso general y de las cámaras – Artículo 35, IV,
“Voto de la Minoría”, Otero, Obras, I: p. 188, and Titulo VII, Sección Segunda, De las facultades del
presidente– Artículo 60. IV, “Voto de la Minoría”, ibid., p. 193.
465 Titulo IX. De la fuerza armada y la hacienda pública. Sección primera. De la fuerza armada. Art. 7,
ibid., p. 196.
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called upon unless it was under the terms of the constitution, and would, unlike the
army, have no fuero. The police force was to be established solely with the purpose of
ensuring the security of the individual. Establishing it would be the responsibility of
each state, and it would comprise small sections, commanded by secondary agents and
spread across the territory. Never should two or more companies be put under the
command of one chief, nor should they be placed in the same section. Otero added one
last clause; it was in the nature of all the armed forces, he stated, to be passive and as
such they would be unable to act unless it was under the direct order of the competent
authority. Any involvement in matters of state would be considered a criminal act.466
During a congressional debate on 11 October 1842, Otero outlined more of his
views on the military. The role of the soldier, as far as he was concerned, was to show
valour and strength when facing the enemy. He would fight the enemy and only the
enemy, and only for the protection of the nation. He would always be a part of a whole,
whose actions would never be that of an individual and which would be judged only by
his superiors and his equals.467 The presence of the soldier would scarcely be felt; he
would exert no power, no pressure, would be disengaged from the citizenry and would
only engage in conflict with an enemy of the nation. However, if the soldier were to be
asked to carry out the duties of policeman, as had happened in the past, this would lead
to nothing but disaster. If the army were given the task of running the prisons, of
guarding prisoners, of policing roads, of keeping the order at public gatherings, then
their role would become tainted. Under such circumstances, soldiers would be facing
their fellow countrymen as the enemy, leading to resentment in the very people they, the
soldiers, were expected to protect.468 This in turn would lead to a lack of trust and
466 Titulo IX. De la fuerza armada y la hacienda pública. Sección primera. De la fuerza armada. Art. 76,
Ibid.
467 Otero, “Discurso, 11 Octubre 1842”, Obras, I, p. 274.
468 Ibid., p. 274.
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would end, as it had in the past, by undermining relations between the army and the
government, between military and civil authority. Were that to happen,
aquella subordinación que debiera siempre existir entre el que manda y el que
ejecuta se pierde, y el poder que obedece conoce su fuerza, pone a discusión su
cooperación, la presenta como un favor y reclama su premio: quiere dirigir y
mandar y para ello destruye la autoridad civil y la usurpa después, con lo que se
consigue, en fin, esa unidad entre el que manda y el que ejecuta; pero se
consigue violando todos los derechos, confundiendo todos los principios y
estableciendo el gobierno militar.469
The only possible outcome would be the annihilation of civil power, and the military
government that would take over would be characterised by force and cruelty, which
would lead to the disintegration of any nation.470 This was beginning in Mexico and the
nation was disintegrating due, in part, to the political involvement of the military. The
time to stop and reverse this trend had arrived and a division of the armed forces would
ensure that each section would have clearly defined roles, set in stone, in the
constitution. Once the army accepted its new role, the country could begin the slow and
arduous road to recovery.
Melchor Ocampo, deputy to the 1842 congress with Otero, and later governor of
the state of Michoacán felt that there was little use for a standing army. He believed that
“un pueblo libre y un ejército permanente son elementos de pugna y de conflicto,” and
the only way that any balance was possible was if the soldiers never forgot that they
were also citizens, and that the military was, and never should be, anything more than a
servant of the nation.471 Alamán, arguing from a conservative view point, believed that
the army was a necessity, but he too believed that it was essential that the military be
“en número competente para las necesidades del país,” these involving mainly the
persecution of indios bárbaros and the defence of the highways. However, Alamán was
469 Ibid., pp. 274-275.
470 Ibid.
471 Melchor Ocampo, “Discurso que pronunció el Diputado Melchor Ocampo en la discusión del artículo
26 del reglamento interior del Congreso – Agosto 1842,” in Raúl Arreola Cortés, Melchor Ocampo.
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an economist as well as a politician and felt strongly that any force must be
“proporcional a los medios que haya para sostenerla, organizando otra mucho más
numerosa de reserva como las antiguas milicias provinciales, que poco o nada contaban
en tiempo de paz, y se tenían prontas para caso de Guerra.”472 Organised along these
lines, if the army could be financially maintained and its numbers kept steady, soldiers
would be paid regularly and promoted according to their legal actions and participation,
thus removing their need to revolt and support pronunciamientos.
In these views the army was seen as a hindrance, or at best, a necessary evil, to
be accepted while indispensible changes could be carried out, eventually rendering the
military obsolete. Indeed, Mora believed just that, that there needed to exist a privileged
army, as a necessary evil, until such a time as the power of the state could be
strengthened. 473 There was, however, one faction convinced that the army was an
essential part of Mexico. For the santanistas, the army was one of the most important, if
not the most important, pillars of Mexican society.474 For Tornel, it was clear that the
nation owed its independence to the military, and that if peace and stability were to be
achieved the army would be a key factor in this. The santanistas were firmly committed
to protecting the military’s position and privileges, as well as increasing its number.
However, in their defence, it must be said that they were not advocating the use of brute
force. Tornel, as a minister in the Santa Anna government in the early 1840s also sought
to educate and professionalise the army, introducing a corps of engineers and improving
472 Lucas Alamán, “Carta a Santa Anna, 23 Marzo 1853,” in Álvaro Matute, Lecturas Universitarias.
Antología. México en el Siglo XIX. Fuentes e interpretaciones históricas (Mexico City: UNAM, 1992), p.
285. See also, Lucas Alamán, Historia de México, p. 516-517, where Alamán outlined the ills of the
military and how, following revolt after revolt, the two warring sides would get back together and honour
the promotions and medals afforded by each side to their members, thus ending up with far more officers
and generals than the army could support.
473 Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano, p. 147.
474 For an introduction to the Santanistas during the first half of the nineteenth century, as well as an
insight into José María Tornel, one of their principal ideologues, see Fowler, Tornel and Santa Anna and
Mexico in the Age of the Proposals.
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the artillery.475 For the santanistas, Mexico would be unable to progress without the
military. For them the army was the equivalent of a strong constitution.
What Otero defined as the second section of the armed forces, the National
Guard, had been established in the 1820s in Mexico and had originally been set up “as a
reserve force of citizen-soldiers to preserve domestic order and security and to protect
the rights of the states and curb the army’s political strength until civilian power could
be consolidated.”476 Because of this, the militia was seen as especially important in the
estados, where they were to be established under the control of the governor; “this force
had been conceived by the 1824 federal constitution as the state government instrument
for the defence of the federal system and the representative institutions associated with
it. In the states themselves, regional politicians had seen the civil militia as the
authorised counterbalance to the regular army.”477 For Benito Juárez, a lawyer and the
radical liberal Governor of Oaxaca who would go on to be president, the National
Guard, which came under his control, was “a defence from within the states against the
national ambitions of military politicians.” 478 The santanistas on the other hand
regarded the National Guard as a nuisance that only interfered with their plans for a
strong military. If the army was allowed to take its rightful position, there would be no
need for the existence of a civil militia.
For Otero, however, the militia was an essential part of Mexico’s armed forces,
in conjunction with the police and the army. In the discussions that followed the
presentation of Otero’s two constitutional proposals in 1842 and 1847, he developed
these views further, stressing the importance of the civil militias. In his opinion this
475 Fowler, Mexico in the age of the proposals, pp. 240-243.
476 Pedro Santoni, 'Where Did the Other Heroes Go?' Exalting the "Polko" National Guard Battalions in
Nineteenth-Century Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov. 2002), p. 809. See
also; Pedro Santoni, “The Failure of Mobilization: The Civic Militia of Mexico in 1846,” Mexican
Studies/ Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Summer, 1996).
477 Brian R. Hamnett, “Benito Juárez, Early Liberalism, and the Regional Politics of Oaxaca, 1828-1853,”
Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1991), p. 10.
478 Ibid., p. 10.
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force was essential for the stability of the nation, and therefore it should be regulated by
the provisions of the constitution itself so that it could never be regulated by subsidiary
laws.479 In his 1847 Voto Particular, which would become the Acta de Reformas to the
1824 Constitution, Otero established that the right of citizenship brought with it the
right to vote in elections, to exercise the right to petition, to gather to discuss public
matters and finally, to belong to the National Guard.480 In stating that these were rights
and not obligations, Otero was, in effect, allowing each person to decide what actions
they wished to take. He truly believed that the participation of the middle classes and of
“honest” men in the Nation Guard would lead to stability. If these men could be
convinced to work together towards eliminating the dominance of the military, the
power, rightfully theirs, would enable them to press on with constitutional reforms and
laws.481 This opinion had been put forth by both Mora and Zavala in the 1830s, arguing
that if the local militias were made up of middle class property owners it would be in
their own interest to establish peace and assert the authority of the legitimate
government.482 Herrera’s government passed the National Guard legislation while Otero
was in office as Minister of Home and Foreign Affairs, and Otero had great hopes for
it.483 However, he noted an apathy in the Mexican middle class, which meant that while
many were willing to complain about the state of the nation, few were actually willing
to do anything about it and, without their participation, a National Guard would never
work.484 During the months that followed, Otero’s fears were confirmed. The National
Guard remaining nothing more than an insignificant group, small in number and highly
479 Otero, “Discurso 11 Octubre 1842,” Obras, I, p. 273 and “Voto Particular,” Ibid., p. 362.
480 Otero, “Voto Particular,” Obras, I, p. 362.
481 Letter from Otero a Mora, 15 Sept. 1848, Obras, I, pp 759-760.
482 Hale, El liberalismo Mexicano, p. 147.
483 For more on the National Guard at this time see; Pedro Santoni, “Where Did the Other Heroes Go?”
pp. 807-844.
484 Otero was not the only one to draw attention to the apathy displayed by his countrymen, Alamán too
argued that there was a sense of complete indifference but he argued that this stemmed from the “funesto
estado de las cosas” and not the other way around. Lucas Alamán, Historia de México, V, p. 508.
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disorganised.485 Otero blamed the selfishness, the indifference and the costumbres of his
fellow countrymen for their negligible participation. His dejection was such that he was
even willing to consider one final, extreme solution, the introduction of a foreign force
of disciplined soldiers and officers, whose support could be counted on in times of
conflict.486 He felt that perhaps in this way stability might finally be achieved.
The final section Otero discussed was a dedicated police force. Otero believed
that if the army were allowed to continue acting as a police force, the consequences
would be as disastrous as they were during the colonial period, and as such an
alternative needed to be found. Tornel also argued that part of the reason the army acted
as it did after independence was related to the fact that it was constantly distracted by
having to behave as a police force. Stationed in the centre of large cities, in Tornel’s
opinion, the army became undisciplined and this very location made their seduction by
warring factions all too easy, “y llegaron a persuadirse de que el arreglo o desarreglo de
la sociedad les pertenecía, sino como directores, al menos como agentes principales.” 487
Otero saw this quite clearly and felt that one option would be to use the National Guard
in this role, though he felt their role should be precisely defined and this meant that
certain aspects of law enforcement would still need to be covered. Because of this,
Otero felt that the existence of a police force, formed by civilians and not the military,
and whose task was to protect individual interests, was essential in civil administration.
He went so far as to assert that without a police force, there could be no government.488
As he did with the army in the congressional debates in October 1842, Otero outlined
the role he believed the police should play. The police would act at a local level which
would allow the authorities to be aware of what was going on in the areas concerned. In
485 Letters from Otero to Mora, 14 Dec. 1848, 12 Feb. 1848, 13 May 1849 in Otero, Obras, II, pp. 767,
772-773.
486 Letter from Otero to Mora, 14 Oct 1848, Ibid., p 762.
487 Tornel y Mendivil. Breve reseña, p.21
488 Otero, “Discurso 11 Oct. 1842,” Obras, I, p. 273
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addition, they would be in charge of patrolling the streets and the roads, ensuring
gatherings remained peaceful and apprehending and guarding criminals. In order to
fulfil their role it was not necessary for them to be men of great valour, nor those in
search of glory. They would be organised in small forces with no reason to be
commanded by men of importance or distinction. Their role would be played closer to
the people they were watching over than to that of the armed forces.489 The policeman
would reject any glory sought in perilous deeds. He would have total faith in the
pacifying force of the law. His role would be to inspect and not attack and he would
always be facing a fellow citizen, never an enemy. At no point would the policeman be
in any way set apart from the society he came from; any criminal act he committed
would be judged by the civilian power.490
Despite the solutions he proposed, as the country stood in 1848, Otero saw little
or no hope for the future, although he still believed that if certain steps were taken, then
the country would be wrested from military control and a brighter future would ensue.
Federalism was the only possible political system for Mexico. Without it, the nation
would be subject to revolts and revolutions which would degenerate into riots. If this
were to happen, all social order would be lost, and those who sought power would no
longer need an excuse or a cause to fight for power. Civil war would ensue. When this
happened, Otero prophesised to his fellow deputies “¡ay! extrañareis esas revoluciones
que necesitaban al menos un hombre y una causa nacional y en la que la nación no era,
como será muy pronto, simple espectadora del combate en que se juega su suerte.”491
Federalism would ensure that the Estados would no longer be weak, subordinate to the
omnipotent and energetic will of a national government, and would give them the power
489 Ibid., p. 273-274.
490 Ibid., p. 273-275.
491 Ibid., p. 315.
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to control and subdue their military leaders, bringing them under state control.492 It was
essential for the sanctity of the constitution to become an established fact. 493 The
constitution would have to graft onto society those institutions which would set it on the
path to stability.494 Congress needed to be the representative of the people, but at the
same time, as their elected body, its decision had to be final. This ensured that congress
would act in the best interest of the entire nation and could not be coerced into taking
decisions to favour a certain group or political faction. In 1842, Otero stated that he
openly supported the Derecho de Petición as a means for individuals to be able to make
their voices heard, but only if it were presented before congress. In addition, Otero
insisted that this petición would be just that, and no more, that the congress should be
able to deal with issues as they saw fit.495 Previous events had meant that this right to
petition,
dirigidas siempre al principio con el tono de la sumisión y bajo las mayores
protestas de obediencia, han sido primero la señal y luego el título con que en
nombre del bien público y de la voluntad general han destrozado las facciones a
la República y destruido de año en año a las leyes y el orden establecidos.496
A powerful and stable congresss would ensure that any correctly submitted petition,
could be heard; the will of the people debated before it, leaving the military with no
recourse to complain in any but the established manner. Otero argued that the current
institutions were nothing but brilliant theories, abstracts, and in no way related to the
individuals they were meant to govern.497 It was essential that these institutions be able
to instil, once again, a sense of respect for the law, to protect individual guarantees, to
provide a solid justice system. Without this, Otero believed that there would be little
492 Ibid., p. 275
493 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
495 Otero, “Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Diputado Lic. D. Mariano Otero, en la discusión del artículo
26 del proyecto de reglamento, 21 Agosto 1842,” in Otero, Obras, I, pp. 159-167.
496 Ibid., p. 161.
497 Otero, “Réplica,” Obras¸ II, pp. 585-586.
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room for change; public power would remain the object of “los más criminales e
ignominiosos motines” and the nation would become “la propiedad de sus legiones de
empleados civiles y militares, y dominante siempre sobre todos los sistemas y a pesar de
todas las constituciones un régimen puramente militar, que todo lo corrompía y lo
devoraba.”498
Otero’s introduction to the national political stage came via a military
pronunciamiento that swept through Mexico in 1842, bringing down the established
government and replacing it with those who had supported the Revolución. However at
the same time, he was a member of a congress struggling to survive in the face of
another string of pronunciamientos, led by those same people, who were not happy with
the political direction congress was taking. This must be taken into consideration when
drawing any conclusions from Otero’s political thoughts, as outlined above. The Ensayo,
fulfilled a twofold task of supporting the actions of those who had initiated the
pronunciamientos, and of garnering support for a congress that had emerged from the
demands outlined in those same pronunciamientos. It is easy to see that the apparent
contradiction of pronouncing the Revolución de Jalisco as the greatest event to have
befallen the nation while simultaneously condemning the proclaiming of
pronunciamientos as a vile practice which served only to fragment the nation, was
Otero’s way of accepting the actions which had led to the situation as it stood, while
paving the way for future reform.
Otero’s historical analysis was carried out from the perspective of someone who
had not endured colonial rule and never experienced the struggle for independence. He
argued that the military had not been a political force during the colonial period and had
only risen to prominence during the struggle for independence. During this struggle,
498 Ibid., p. 586.
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Otero argued, the intervention of the military in political affairs was understandable as
to all intents of purposes there was a war in progress. However, it was unforgivable, in
his opinion that this intervention had been allowed to continue after independence.
From that point forward the army should have reverted to its position as a tool of the
legitimately constituted state. As we have seen, he was not alone in this view. Most also
shared Otero’s view that the army needed a just recompense for its involvement, not
only in the struggle for independence but its part in any action on a national scale
defending this independence from foreign powers. However, he believed that this
should be the only time that the military was rewarded.
Factionalism and party politics could also be blamed for their corruption of the
army, as warring political interests continually sought military backing to achieve their
aims. This was a common view in the 1840s. Tornel, Pedraza, Alamán, all agreed with
Otero that political manoeuvring encouraged military intervention in politics, splitting
into factions, with different sections supporting different political elements. At the same
time, Otero portrayed an army in disarray, in urgent need or reform; feared where it
should have been revered, fractured where it should have been united. It was poorly
equipped and often impoverished, its regiments disorganised. This view of the army
was typical for the first half of the 1840s, where even the santanistas, the most ardent
supporters of the military, agreed that reform was essential to ensure its position in
Mexico was maintained. However, ever the moderate, Otero was unable, or unwilling,
to challenge the status quo, believing it would cause a backlash by the army.
The war with the United States was a turning point in Otero’s attitude to the
military. The army had failed to defend the nation from invasion, and Otero blamed its
leaders whose incompetence had been clearly demonstrated by its defeat at the hands of
a smaller US force. During the years that followed Otero joined his contemporaries in
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criticising the military and in blaming the armed forces for the state of the nation. What
Otero had identified as a turning point in 1848 was not and, as he pointed out in the
month following the signing of the peace treaty with the United States, the Mexican
military insisted on continuing to play a role in politics, unable, and unwilling to accept
its defeat. Otero had truly believed that its failures during the war would finally reveal
its need for reform and that its weakened position would make this possible, but little
was actually accomplished.
None of this, of course, negated the need for a standing army, but a reformed
army, confined by a strong constitution, ensuring the observance of the rule of law
removinge the army as a tool of political factions and ending once and for all, the
“funesta manía de las revoluciones.”
Otero’s views on the military were inextricable from his analysis of the state of
the nation in the 1840s. However, national circumstances were such that although he
agreed wholeheartedly with other radical factions on its reform, he understood, as did
most of his contemporaries, that the army wielded the power to make or break
governments. Unfortunately, once it had lost much of its power and influence after its
resounding defeat by the US forces, the nation was in no state to do so. Otero’s final
years saw him introduce legislation to make a strong National Guard a reality, but the
loss of the war had taken its toll and the middle classes, who were key to making it a
success, displayed nothing but pessimism, apathy and political inaction. Otero’s
moderation and caution had meant that while he had achieved his goal of introducing
reforms to the military forces, they were too few and too late. Weeks before his death he
abjectly stated he had no hope for the future, and that perhaps the nation’s only hope for
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salvation rested with the introduction of foreign forces to deal with the Mexican military
situation, once and for all.499
499 Letter from Mariano Otero to José María Luis Mora, 14 December 1848, in Otero, Obras, I, p. 767-
769.
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5.
The Church
The multifaceted roles played by the Church in the Americas are central to any
discussion or study of the nineteenth century. It was involved in the life of the new
colonies from the very beginning of the Spanish conquest of the Americas on all
fronts –political, social, economic, cultural and educational. As the conquistadors
moved outward from their original landing places, they did so accompanied, in most
cases, by members of the clergy. These representatives of the Church, from both regular
and secular orders, eventually permeated all levels of colonial society; from the
conversion of the Indians at the very borders of the newly conquered lands to the
education of the children of the upper classes in the capital cities. This meant the
influence of the Church reached out far and wide, felt by all, the poor, the rich, the
disenfranchised; they all came into contact with the clergy at one point or another of
their lives. For the monarchy, the Church in the colonies was, above all, a source of
wealth, through property purchase and the rents, loans and the income it received from
tithes, constantly attracting the attention of the Spanish crown which coveted it and
harnessed it through the Patronato de Indias; “the power to nominate or present a cleric
for installation in a vacant benefice.”500 In addition following three hundred years of
evangelisation, conversion and guidance, reforms introduced into New Spain by the
Bourbon monarchs from the mid-1700s, which came to be known as the reformas
borbónicas, led to a series of changes and developments across the colonies, some of
which were aimed specifically at the Church. Whereas service in the military was made
500 For the full definition and further examination of the Patronato see J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and
state in Latin America: a history of politico-ecclesiastical relations (North Carolina: University of North
Carolina Press, Revised edition 1966), the quote is from p. 4. For information on patronage in
Independent Mexico see Michael Costeloe, Church and State in Independent Mexico. A study of the
patronage debate, 1821 – 1857 (UK: Royal Historical Society, 1978).
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more accessible and its position strengthened, the object of the clerical reforms was to
bring the Church under the closer control of the Spanish monarchy in order to target its
increasing wealth. However, the Church’s firm grip on all levels of society also meant
that the Bourbon monarchs needed to introduce measures designed to inch slowly
towards secularisation.
With the eruption of the struggle for independence, the Church split, as did the
army and the nation, some favouring separation from Spain, others remaining loyal to
the monarchy. Once independence had become a fact, the Church faced the challenge of
carving a niche for itself and establishing its position in the nascent Mexican nation. In
doing so it was vying for position and influence with the military and the new statesmen.
Even the latter were divided, and after the failed Mexican empire, a number of them
were keen on forging a new, liberal, nation, and continuing the reforms initiated by the
Bourbon monarchs, their eventual target being the complete separation of Church and
state, although this was not to be achieved until the Liberal constitution of 1857. This
secularisation of the Church was aimed solely at its political position in the nation.
There was no attack during the early national period on the spiritual role of the Church.
It was the work of the politicians of the three decades following independence, joined
later by Mariano Otero and his contemporaries, whose goal in defining, addressing and
eventually eliminating the political power and influence of the Church was a major
factor in the nation they sought to build.
With this historical backdrop in mind, this chapter seeks to analyse Mariano
Otero’s views on the position of the Church and the clerical debate during the early
national period. Michael Costeloe identified several of the outstanding issues that most
preoccupied the reformers and nation builders during the decades leading up to the
reforma; patronage, reduction of the religious orders, amendment and eventual abolition
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of the fueros, confiscation and management of Church properties and wealth, and the
wresting of education from the grasp of the Church.501 After briefly exploring his
separation of personal faith and political beliefs, each of the key themes that Costeloe
flagged will be explored with particular reference to Otero’s ideology. First this chapter,
like the previous ones, will present Otero’s historical view of the Church, in order to
understand the issues he saw arising from this background; the very same issues that
would echo into the decades following independence. As far as the Church was
concerned, Otero believed that the colonial legacy had been detrimental to the power of
the Church. He described an organisation that was wealthy and influential but unable to
consolidate any direct political power. Otero’s views on the decline of the Church in the
late colonial period, the impact of the Bourbon reforms and the Cádiz Constitution, as
well as his views on the Church hierarchy, division and the role it played during the
struggle for independence will be examined first. The second part of this chapter will
explore the different areas of influence identified by Otero in the early national period;
patronage, Church wealth, particularly with regard to the alienation of mortmain
properties and ecclesiastical influence on education. Each of these sections indicates a
different attitude. Some he saw as irrelevant to the 1840s and others he used to
demonstrate that slow, gradual, moderate reforms could work. The final sections will
look at his active involvement in the Church/state debate, with special focus on two
specific moments in time; his willingness to compromise with the Church in 1842, and
the motivations behind his actions during the mortmain debates of 1847. The ideology
that can be gleaned from this is in stark contrast with that which emerged in the
previous chapter. The urgency he displayed when referring to the reform of the military
501 Costeloe, Church and State, pp. 1-4.
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is not to be found here –Otero’s position vis-a-vis the Church were typical of the
moderate stance of the decade, slow, gradual reform coupled with compromise.
In order to differentiate between his apparent anticlericalism and his ardent
Catholicism, it is important to bear in mind the distinction that he, like so many of his
contemporaries, made between the Church as a political institution, and the Church as a
spiritual and moral guide. It may appear, at first glance, that these terms are
contradictory but in the early national period the separation between Church and state
“significaba la expulsión del poder de la Iglesia de todos los campos temporales o
civiles y, al mismo tiempo, que el gobierno protegería a la religión católica.”502 His anti-
clericalism is to be understood merely as his opposition to any religious involvement in
the political affairs of the new nation, his ultimate goal being the complete separation of
Church and state. Otero was a Catholic and he believed that “la religión eleva el alma”
and “moraliza”503 and maintained that Catholicism should be the official religion of
Mexico arguing that much of what made Mexico great was the spiritual connexion that
their shared religion gave its people.504 He believed that the Church should indeed play
an important role in society but one restricted to the spiritual and moral spheres. Otero
was not the only one showing this contradiction. Despite his mostly radical stance on
ecclesiastical reform, Valentín Gómez Farías was unwilling to allow his daughter to
marry a Protestant. 505 Gómez Farías openly proclaimed that “no es opuesto a la
profesión del catolicismo el uso de las prerrogativas inherentes a la soberanía de la
nación,” and was, therefore, capable of making a distinction between faith and political
502 Hale, El liberalismo mexicano, p. 133.
503 Otero, “Indicaciones sobre penitenciarias,” Obras, II, p. 657.
504 Otero, “Voto de la Minoría,” Obras I, p. 325.
505 Will Fowler, “Valentín Gómez Farías: Perceptions of Radicalism in Independent Mexico, 1821 –
1847,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 47.
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prerogative.506 The conservatives, embodied by Lucas Alamán held a different view;
that Catholicism was to be preserved because, as well as divine; it was “el único lazo
común que liga a todos los mexicanos.” 507 Alamán, writing on behalf of the
conservative factions in the early 1850s, believed that worship should be sustained at all
costs, and guarantees offered to the clergy on this point, indicating his disbelief that one
could be separate from the other, because issues of politics and faith were so closely
integrated.508 The traits that characterised the moral teachings of the Church not only
united all Mexicans but could be transferred to the political arena too.
As was his custom, Otero approached his analysis of the Church with an initial
historical appraisal in order to establish the nature of its colonial legacy and how it had
emerged after independence. First and foremost, according to Otero, the Church had
become wealthy in New Spain under the Spanish Catholic Monarchy in terms of capital
and properties. He described the Church –along with the army– as “las altas clases de la
sociedad.”509 In other words, the echelon of society wielding most influence, by one
means or another; in the case of the army it was physical force; in the case of the
Church, moral superiority and economic clout. Otero argued, however, that while its
wealth afforded the Church considerable influence, it did not grant it political power per
se. He pointed out that while the monarchy used both the Church and the military as
instruments of oppression, the Crown used both passively and their respective roles had
always been secondary and subordinate to the wills of the Spanish king.510 It was
Otero’s belief that “nunca hubo privilegios políticos; éstos consisten en la participación
506 Valentín Gómez Farías, “Sr. Gómez Farías, al cerrar las sesiones extraordinarias, el 31 de Diciembre
de 1833,” in J. A. Castillón, Informes y manifiestos de los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo de 1821 a 1824
(Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobierno Federal, 1905), I, p. 168.
507 Lucas Alamán, “Plan de los conservadores, expuesto por Lucas Alamán en una carta dirigida en marzo
de 1853 al general Santa Anna,” in Antología in Gastón García Cantú, El pensamiento de la reacción
Mexicana. Historia Documental (1810 – 1859) (Mexico City: UNAM, 1994), I, p. 315.
508 Ibid.
509 Otero, “Discurso, 11 Oct. 1842,” Obras, I, p. 324.
510 Ibid., p. 273.
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del poder público y nadie participaba del poder público en las Colonias.”511 In this, he
was not entirely accurate. While it might have been true that the Church did not
participate politically in the colonies in the way that Otero and his contemporaries
participated in the building of the nation after independence, certain members of the
colonial Church definitely exercised political power.512 The mere fact that the Spanish
crown introduced Church reforms in New Spain during the second half of the eighteenth
century suggests that there was a power that needed to be curtailed and brought back
under monarchical control. David Brading asserts that “the clergy had come to enjoy the
authority and prestige that elsewhere was exercised by the civil power,” arguing that in
certain areas members of the Church doubled as judges or officers of the crown.513 The
power of the Church was all the more threatening because it was not a power acquired
simply through laws but through beliefs and faith.
Otero also believed that the schisms within the Church structure went a long way
to explaining why, despite its wealth and influence, it never achieved the political
pinnacles that the army enjoyed after Independence and argued that what influence it
had been able to garner had been split between what often turned out to be rival
factions.514 Otero described the clergy as being divided into three clases. These can be
defined as follows:515
1. The High Clergy – Made up of bishops, canons and members of ecclesiastical
councils.
2. The Secular Clergy - composed of “los curas y los simples sacerdotes.”
3. The Regular Clergy – members of the religious orders.
511 Ibid.
512 For further general information, and with specific reference to Michoacán, see D. A. Brading, Church
and State in Bourbon Mexico: the diocese of Michoacán 1749 – 1810 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
513 Brading, Church and State, p. 7.
514 Otero, Ensayo, p. 32
515 A full description can be found in Ibid., p. 33-35.
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Otero spoke critically of the first group, the High Clergy. The picture he painted
was one of riches and power, of a group of men enjoying all the benefits of their Church
position. He defined them as wealthy individuals who lived in the biggest cities,
wielded the most influence and power, and more importantly, were usually Spanish.
From the start this set them apart. With the advent of the Bourbon reforms, and a liberal
exercise of the patronato, the monarchy ensured that these higher positions were open
only to Spaniards. As a result, Otero argued, the much more numerous criollos were
bitter, feeling excluded and treated as a subservient class in their own nation. It is true
that the higher echelons of the clergy held the most wealth, and equally true that
Spaniards dominated such positions.516 However, though this section of the Church was
most willing to support and implement the reforms suggested by the monarch, they too
saw themselves affected by them. Indeed, their wealth and power were targeted directly;
the Spanish crown demanded that the administration of the tithe be transferred to the
hands of the civil administration and introduced taxes which targeted the cathedral
chapters specifically.517 The fact that Otero was critical of this section of society fits in
with the radical liberal view of men like Zavala who believed that the colonial legacy
had been disastrous for Mexico, particularly the hold exercised by the Church over
education, perpetuating the ills of faith over knowledge.518 The High Clergy were seen
by Otero, as having sided with the monarchy and the royalist troops during the struggle
for independence and having actively sought to hinder the birth of an independent
Mexico.
516 Brading, Church and State, pp. 210, 215.
517 Ibid., pp. 8, 212.
518 As noted in Chapter 3, Zavala considered that under the colonial system the non-Spanish born
inhabitants had been crushed into a blind, passive obedience, unable to question or challenge the status
quo. He described them as being wilfully kept in a state of ignorance by their colonial overlord, educated
only in religion and superstition and unable to break the Spanish monopoly on commerce, property
ownership or administrative jobs. Zavala, Ensayo Histórico, p. 21.
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In stark contrast with his description of the higher clergy, Otero viewed the
secular clergy with a touch of affection. He described them as living, for the most part,
outside the metropolises, having greater contact with the people, and little access to the
abundant wealth of the Church. They lived mainly on the income from their parishes
which, when remote or small, was often miniscule. They were the most numerous and,
were for the most part, born in Mexico. This, he said, was the most well respected and
loved section of the clergy. Jan Bazant agreed with him when he said that the regular
orders derived their wealth from real estate and invested capital while the secular clergy,
the parish priests, relied on the tithes, legacies and parochial fees.519 This was supported
further by accounts of priests whose positions in certain parishes left them impoverished
and dependent on alms.520 On the other hand, many priests enjoyed a degree of comfort,
being able to live adequately of the income they received.521 William B. Taylor, while
mostly agreeing with the Otero –arguing that many priests were rural, and spent most of
their time “in spiritual exercises, visiting the sick, saying mass, and coordination of the
observances of small numbers of the faithful in far-flung places”– also states that these
priests “enjoyed less influence than most commentators have imagined.”522 For Otero,
however, these sections of the clergy represented much of the greatness of the
independence movement. As he saw it, it had been the lowly priests who had initiated
the struggle for independence and the nation was indebted to them. Taylor supports this
view when he points out that the clergy, particularly the parish priests, found themselves
torn, pulled one way or another by differing interests. On the one hand, they were the
representatives of the Bourbon monarchy, and on the other, they were “called to a
519 See, Jan Bazant, Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico. Social and economic aspects of the liberal
revolution 1856 – 1875 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 8.
520 Quoted in Brading, Church and State, p. 109.
521 Ibid., p. 112.
522 William B. Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred. Priests and Parishioners in Eighteenth-Century Mexico
(US: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 12.
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higher law; and they were overwhelmingly American- born and educated.”523 It was this,
Otero believed, that made them instrumental in the struggle for independence. Men
such as Zavala and Mora “found little good and much deplorable in the 1810 insurgency”
and Alamán had lived through what he described as the horror unleashed by Hidalgo
rallying the masses.524 Otero believed that these were the men who had brought the
change. Indeed, this was a fairly common view among the younger generations who,
despite showing scant interest in involving the lower classes in the political decision
making process, were happy to honour the heroes of independence, many of whom had
been members of the lower clergy, including, of course Hidalgo and Morelos.
Otero expressed no opinion on the Regular Clergy contenting himself with a
description only. It was seen as a section of the Church which was isolated from the
other two. As with the higher clergy, they were mostly Spanish. They had settled in
monasteries and convents in the principal towns, and maintained their influence through
the cofradías, and on the basis of the assets they retained.525 This apparent dismissal of
the regular orders was Otero’s response to the situation as he saw it in the 1840s. The
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 had curtailed the influence of the regular orders and
those that remained, such as the Franciscans, were mainly based in the frontier regions
of the Mexican nation, where they exerted little or no political influence. Serving in the
Mexico State legislature, Mora called for the dismantling of the monasteries, and it was
one of the common goals of the puro liberals from the late 1820s.526 However, in
523 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p. 450.
524 Alamán “appears never to have forgotten the terrible days of 1810, when as young man of eighteen, he
witnessed the populace of Guanajuato join the rebel forces of Hidalgo to roam the streets in search of
plunder” and he “cherished an image of a Mexico founded by Cortés and led to independence by
Iturbide.” In Alamán’s imagery there was no room for the lower clergy who had rallied the masses. D. A.
Brading, “Creole Nationalism,” pp. 151, 155.
525 Otero does not explore the Regular Clergy in any great depth, so there is no analysis of this section of
the Church. Further information on it can, however, be found in; D. A. Brading, The first America: the
Spanish monarchy, Creole patriots, and the liberal state, 1492-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), Brading. Church and State, and Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred.
526 Hale, El liberalismo Mexicano, pp. 118, 135.
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Otero’s opinion, two decades later, these men, with their limited political influence,
barely warranted a mention. His description of the different sections of the clergy was
representative of his moderate viewpoint. He was willing to demonise the higher clergy,
who exerted most of the political power within the Church, while looking favourably
upon the more humble, lower clergy, whose power was mostly moral and spiritual.
In his eyes, the sundering from Spain had been inevitable; part of the natural
progress of colonies.527 As Otero saw it, the secular clergy, was instrumental in bringing
about independence. They provided leadership and guidance for the people.528 This
section of the clergy fought for independence alongside the lower classes, as well as the
members of the military, who Otero described as being subjugated to the will of their
Spanish masters, and alongside merchants who were victims of the Spanish trade
monopoly.529 This was not a view shared by the older generations, those who, in the
first years after Hidalgo’s grito, had experienced all that these leaders from the lower
clergy had unleashed upon the nation. For this generation, scarred by these events, the
clergy’s role in the initial stages of independence was often judged more harshly. Both
Alamán and Mora, ideologically opposed on most subjects, agreed that “Iturbide was
the true father of independence” and both condemned a priest, Hidalgo, for allowing his
troops to massacre creoles and attack their properties.530 Both had experienced at first
hand the effect of the influence of the clergy on the masses. Otero, removed from those
events, saw the priests that participated in the struggle for independence as the fathers of
a movement which ended with the liberation of Mexico from the yoke of its colonial
masters.
527 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 38.
528 Ibid.
529 Ibid., p. 38-39.
530 Fowler, “Dreams of Stability,” p. 288.
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So when Otero listed those ranged against independence, not only did he
mention the established administration and Spanish commercial interests as being on the
‘other’ side, he also heaped recriminations on the high clergy. Not only were they
opposed to the independence movement, he also accused them of being in favour of the
slavery Mexico had suffered under colonial rule. They openly supported the Spanish
government’s attempts to repress the movement, neither knowing nor caring where such
a struggle might lead.531 Singling them out, in a struggle he defined as a fight of
privilege against liberty, he was once again emphasising his distinction between the
moral and political duties of the Church. Otero, like many of the men that participated
in the independence movement and those that wrote about it in the years after it was
achieved, overemphasised the role of the clergy.532 Some, like Mora or Alamán, did so
in order to ensure that the disasters that had characterised the early years of the struggle
were not forgotten. Otero, however, took the view that the role of the clergy was
important because these men took the very first steps towards the independence he saw
as inevitable, and should be credited with the glory they justly deserved.
Seemingly there is a contradiction between Otero’s accounts of the
independence movement and his support of it, and the ideology we know him to hold.
Like many of his contemporaries, he did not believe in universal male suffrage; he
believed the only way to improve the state of the nation was for the middle classes to
take control of all the political aspects. Why then his support for the role of the clergy
during independence? Otero saw independence as an isolated moment in time, a specific
set of circumstances, a time of war. Otero mentioned and called down glory upon such
leaders as Morelos and Hidalgo, clerics both. However, this did not restrain him from
531 Otero, “Discurso 1841,” Obras, II, pp. 412-413.
532 Taylor quotes Lucas Alamán and Henry G. Ward but points out that priests appear as prominent
leaders and fighters on the side of the insurgents in many of the “standard” accounts of the independence
movement written by Otero’s contemporaries. Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p. 452.
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drawing attention to their participation as leaders of a lower class, a multitud
desgraciada, who rained death and destruction upon those who stood in their way.
Otero justified the roles of these warrior priests by stating that those were trying times
and exceptional circumstances but arguing vehemently that they should never be
repeated; “¡Horror a estos ejemplos, y que jamás sean repetidos!”533 Therefore, he
understood, and echoed, the concerns voiced by the older generation, of men like
Alamán and Mora, while insisting that such a movement had been the only means of
securing independence at that particular point in time and as such the heroes of the
movement were to be praised.
The last years of colonial rule and the war of independence had been a turning
point for the influence of the clergy. Otero considered that had independence been
achieved in the 1770s, the Church’s position of power was such that there was little
doubt that it would have seized control of the civil and political administration.534
However, as Otero noted, “las revoluciones transforman asombrosamente los elementos
sociales.”535 What limited political power he believed that the clergy did possess under
the Catholic Monarchy was initially reduced by the reforms introduced in the colonies,
and undermined further by the events and changes of the years of the struggle for
independence. Therefore, he claimed, the situation of the Church in 1821, in the newly
independent Mexico, was radically different from that of a Church at the height of its
power in the 1770s. By the time Otero was writing, in the 1840s, the political power of
the Church had declined even further.536 The reforms to which Otero was referring were
533 Otero, “Discurso 1841,” Obras, I, p. 413.
534 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 41.
535 Ibid.
536 This view is supported by Costeloe when he comments that the Church was “clearly an institution in
decline, far removed from the once all powerful corporation, privileged and protected by the Spanish
Crown as an essential instrument of regal domination. Internal division and the reformist zeal of the
Bourbon monarchs throughout the 18th century had reduced ecclesiastical privileges and immunities” in
Michael Costeloe, Church and State in Independent Mexico. A Study of the patronage debate 1821 –
1857 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), p. 29.
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the Reformas Borbónicas. 537 These were reforms introduced by the Spanish Monarchy
to tighten or regain power over different sectors in its colonial administration, which
included the Church and the military.538 Otero noted that changes after 1770 brought the
Church under the monarch’s control through exercise of the patronato, ecclesiastical
benefices or through the magistratura.539 A measure was introduced in 1795 revoking
the immunity hitherto enjoyed by the clergy from prosecution in the royal courts.540
And, as noted above, the Spanish crown eyed the Church in New Spain as a source of
wealth, and many of the reforms of the final decades of the century were aimed
accordingly.541 This was why Otero asserted that as a colonial institution the Church
was weakened in the years leading up to the struggle for independence, and that these
attacks led to the role that certain sections of the clergy played in the 1810 insurgency.
This role was, in the words of Brading; “a reaction to the prolonged and reiterated
assault on the privileges, jurisdiction, wealth and income of the Mexican Church
launched from Madrid by ministers inconversant with the realities of New Spain.”542
However, Taylor says that although some priests did stand behind the ideals of the
independence movement, most never changed their attitude to “hierarchy, custom,
537 The reforms targeted all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Though Otero dated the major changes
to the 1770s, the reforms had begun just after the middle of the century with laws that signalled the
beginning of secularisation in New Spain, whereby the administrative and religious duties of the regular
orders were transferred to the secular clergy. However, it was indeed from the 1770s that the attacks on
the clergy became more general, in an endeavour to curb their overall power. Brading, Church and State,
p. 8.
538 As already mentioned, for further information of the Bourbon reforms and their impact on various
areas of colonial life see; D. A. Brading, Taylor, Bazant, among others.
539 The patronato allowed the monarch to nominate and appoint a cleric of his choice to any vacant living
and, while it was not one of the Bourbon reforms, it did ensure that he could place and promote his
favourites as he wished.
540 Ibid.
541 Such measures included, but were not limited to: the move towards secularisation and taxing the
income of the cathedral chapters, the consolidation of Church capital, the removal of the authority of the
bishops over tithes, the removal of immunity from royal prosecution, the introduction of specific fees for
services the priests rendered their parishioners, restrictions on holidays, reduction in stipends, a
redefinition of public and Church property, in addition to a variety of measures directed at curtailing and
seizing Church wealth and properties and which were often accompanied by anticlerical rhetoric.
Brading, Church and State, pp. 8, 9, 212, 222, 226-227, Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, pp. 13-16.
542 Brading, Church and State, p. 9.
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submission and mediation.”543 Furthermore, Anne Staples takes this one step further,
confirming that during the War of Independence, as well as the horizontal divide
proposed by Otero, there was a vertical divide; that “clergymen possessed a wide
variety of interests, concerns, political views, styles and means” and as such, the Church
“reflected the divisions of the society in which it lived.”544
Otero believed that, apart from the effects of the Bourbon reforms, the power
and position of the Church had come under further attack on the introduction of the
1812 Cadiz Constitution, initially in Spain itself, and then in New Spain. Otero argued
that it was a fear of such radical constitutional reforms that ensured that when
independence was finally achieved, the Church was more than happy not only to accept,
but to support, the new Empire and Republic in the years that followed.545 Otero noted
that when it became evident that the only way for the nascent republic to be governed
was by a civil, non-monarchical, non-religious administration, the Church was left with
no other option than to do its best to hang on to its precarious position in the nation.
Precarious, according to Otero because the clergy, unlike the army, were weakened by
independence. He believed, therefore, that the clergy’s main aims in the years
immediately following independence had been to strengthen their position in the new
republic and to avoid the dangers threatening them in the 1812 constitution and
subsequent liberal reform. In addition, the conflict and divisions experienced by the
clergy during the War of Independence did not magically disappear with the victory of
the insurgents. Indeed, it can be argued that once the common cause of liberty had been
removed, further divisions emerged as the Church sought to find its position in the new
nation. Moreover, the position of the Catholic Church itself was precarious; the Vatican
543 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p. 451
544 Staples, “Clerics as Politicians: Church, State and Political Power in Independent Mexico,” in Jaime E.
Rodriguez O., Mexico in the Age of Democratic Revolutions, 1750-1850 (UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Boulder & London, 1994), pp. 240-241.
545 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 42.
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refused to recognise Mexican independence from Spain until the last few months of
1836, leaving the Mexican Church to face the double standard of following the orders of
the Vatican, as head of the faith, and carving a position for itself in the new nation.
Iturbide’s trigarante army proclaimed religion as a bastion of the Empire and the 1824
constitution proclaimed that Catholicism was to be the only religion of the nation. For
Otero, writing from his 1840s viewpoint, where even his moderate liberalism called for
the separation of Church and state, it was easier to portray the Church as a noble entity
during the war of independence, and a weakened one on emerging from it. In hindsight,
he could highlight the moral and spiritual role of the Church at the same time as he
denounced its struggle for political power in the years following independence from
Spain.
Otero argued that it was natural after independence that questions should arise
on the limit on ecclesiastical interference in state affairs, especially in a nation, such as
Mexico, where the clergy had exerted so much influence over all levels of society. He
argued that this influence had come, not only from their position as landowners but also
from “la intervención que ejercía en los actos civiles, por su influencia en la población,
por su calidad de encargado de los más de los establecimientos públicos, y por la
intolerancia de las leyes.” 546 Otero believed that all of these things ensured that,
liberated by independence from the ties and control of the monarchy, the Church was in
a perfect position to establish itself as a key political player in the new republic. As a
liberal, moderate or otherwise, he thought that the consequences of such a role would
have been disastrous –if the moral and spiritual influence the Church exerted had been
turned into political power, the separation of Church and state would have become well
nigh impossible. In his opinion, this never came to pass. He did not deny its influence
546 Ibid.
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and its strength in other areas, but he did not see it as maintaining a strong political
position. He believed that the new political classes had, from the very beginning, been
aware of this possible opponent and acted accordingly. Otero ardently believed that in
the years that followed independence, as certain aspects of this influence were
addressed step by step, the nation was working towards the eventual complete
separation of Church and state.547 This is again, a reflection of his moderation, and an
argument which can be used to support his stance later in his political career. Ending all
Church involvement in the affairs of the state needed to be gradual in order to avoid a
backlash and it was Otero’s opinion that the small measures introduced from the very
first years of independence had ensured that the Church never consolidated what could
have otherwise been a position of enormous political power. Indeed, he felt that, unlike
the army, the influence of the Church in political life had been curbed yet further in the
years following independence and he used this view to underpin his call for moderation
when dealing with matters of such delicacy. This also explains the fact that he displayed
less urgency when calling for Church reform than when he fought for the re-
introduction of federalism or clamoured for the curbing of military power. The latter
issues were latent and urgent, the former was less urgent and gradual reform was
already happening.
Legislatively and in his writings, Otero identified specific areas of Church
influence. The manner in which he described these areas of influence and the way in
which they had been handled supported his theory –reform was possible if introduced
slowly, over time and handled with care. Some areas he analysed merely to demonstrate
how events had worked in such a way that the political power of the Church was
diminished without causing any upheaval, perhaps as examples of what could work –
547 Ibid., p. 42-3.
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such as the patronato. Others areas such as the fueros, were not yet ripe for reform, or
could be guaranteed in order to soften other blows, and there were still others where he
himself could legislate, in the hope of further widening the gap between Church and
state.
In the years that followed independence the patronage debate had been of
considerable importance to those responsible for constituting the nation.548 Prominent
political figures from Mexico had attended the Cortes de Cadiz, and these same men
were those called to participate in the construction of the republic. With the removal of
the rigid controls exercised by the Monarchy and the Inquisition, new political and
philosophical notions began to flow into Mexico. Otero described the hold that the
monarchy had had over the Church, as being in two critical areas, which were
interlinked. Firstly the “derechos de patrón” and secondly through the magistratura.549
These had ensured that the power of the monarchy was upheld and administered
correctly in the colonies. However, once the monarchy was no longer a consideration,
with the advent of independence, the “learned classes,” in Otero’s words, responsible
for administration of the nation, were faced with a dilemma. Who should hold the
power of the patronato in the new order?550
According to Otero, opinion was divided. There were those who believed that
after independence from the Spanish monarchy, the Church represented by the Vatican,
should exercise the patronato. On the other hand, he identified a second faction who
548 For a more in-depth analysis of patronage during the early national period, see; Michael Costeloe,
Church and State in Independent Mexico, and also, Brian Connaughton, “Republica federal y patronato:
el ascenso y descalabro de un proyecto,” in Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea de México,
No. 39, Mexico City, Enero-Junio 2010.
549 Otero, Ensayo,Obras, I, p. 41-42.
550 Ibid. Sordo Cedeño identifies a three-way split comprising secularizantes who wanted the complete
separation of Church and state, the ultramontanos, who believed after independence that the patronato
devolved to the Church, and the regalistas, who were in favour of the State taking over the privileges of
patronage. Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, “El congreso nacional: de la autonomía de las provincias al
compromiso federal,” in Josefina Z. Vázquez (Ed.), El establecimiento del federalismo en México (1821-
1827) (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2003), p. 146.
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believed that such patronage should automatically come under the jurisdiction of the
state. He also pointed out that Mexico had always been plagued by this debate, from the
very moment of its independence, pitting one faction against another at critical points in
the country’s history.551 As Otero saw it, the general feeling initially appeared to veer in
favour of the latter faction, forcing the Church into dependency. However, it soon
became clear that this subjugation of the Church to the will of the state rose from an old
order that had been eliminated with the freeing of the colonies, and as such, had no
place in modern nations. Anne Staples supports Otero’s argument, stating that while it
was discussed in the years of War of Independence, with important figures such as
Servando Teresa de Mier supporting a national Church, those that participated in the
emergence of the new nation “agreed that the patronato could not be considered as an
inherited attribute of the Spanish Crown and, therefore, transferable to Mexico.”552 This
was the opinion held by the liberal factions who sought the complete separation of
Church and state, above all else, and this separation worked both ways; the Church
should not interfere in affairs of state nor should the state interfere in the affairs of the
Church.553 The Vatican had recognised Mexican independence in 1836 and the filling of
vacant clerical posts was a spiritual matter. So by the time Otero was writing in the
1840s the affair had been settled and was no longer under discussion but he obviously
still considered it important. Perhaps he was using it to endorse his argument for
moderation? The issue of the patronato demonstrated that so long as the Church was
treated fairly and it was given complete control and influence over moral and spiritual
issues, it would have no need to struggle for political power. Thus, if reforms were
carried out slowly, with moderación, there would be no cause for retribution, and
therefore the removal of Church influence in the affairs of the state was a viable reality.
551 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 41-42, and, for a detailed analysis see Michael Costeloe, Church and State.
552 Staples, “Clerics as Politicians”, pp. 224-225.
553 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 43.
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Another contentious issue for the political classes in the decades following
independence was that of Church wealth. Where a wealthy Church exists alongside an
impoverished state, it is not unusual for the confiscation and sale of Church assets to be
considered a feasible solution by the ruling political class.554 Such a situation existed in
Mexico, where the decade-long war of independence, the short lived empire and the
first tentative steps of the Republic had bankrupted the treasury. Although it had
weathered the attacks upon its wealth in the last years of Bourbon rule and the effects of
the War of Independence, it had also been able to recoup its financial standing in the
years that followed. 555 As a result the question of Church wealth, particularly its
property holdings, surfaced over and over again in the early national period.556 Bazant
defined the period from Independence to 1861 as “a struggle between the liberals, who
by various means attempted to confiscate Church property, and their adversaries who, in
spite of their declared intentions to the contrary, found themselves obliged to utilise
Church property for their own financial needs.”557
As already mentioned in chapter 3, Otero’s views on the clergy were strongly
influenced by the question of the distribution of property, a large portion of which he
described as being “estancada a favor del clero.”558 His argument was that it was closely
tied to the “cuestión social,” because much of the property owned by the Church was
leased to individuals or used for the benefit of society in the form of schools, convents,
orphanages or hospitals.559 Otero argued that despite the destruction of the Compañía de
Jesús and the rest of the conventos hospitalarios, the ravages of the War of
Independence, and multiple property sales, the Church still owned 18 million pesos
554 Bazant, Alienation, p. 1.
555 Staples, “Clerics as Politicians,” p. 226.
556 Bazant, Alienation, p. 5.
557 Ibid.
558 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 29.
559 Ibid.
181
worth of country estates and town houses.560 Added to the direct pecuniary benefit
derived from this ownership, it also received sizeable contributions, alms and individual
perquisites, facts which made it the richest property owner in the new republic.561
Furthermore, not only were the lands and buildings it owned spread far and wide, but
the diezmo and other Church contributions, ensured that “no hubiera un solo hombre en
el más pequeño rincón de la tierra que estuviese exento de tener relaciones personales y
precisas respecto de la propiedad eclesiástica.”562 As a result, its influence too stretched
far and wide; “su acción se hacía sentir en las grandes ciudades, y en las pequeñas
poblaciones, en los más miserables pueblos, y en los campos mismos apenas
cultivados.”563 In his analysis, Otero separated the different sources of Church wealth,
with specific emphasis on property ownership, into two separate categories, inactive and
active. The former included “los edificios destinados al culto y a la morada de sus
individuos, y […] los demás capitales de un valor positivo, que emplea en el culto de
una manera improductiva” and the latter, those assets and properties that provided a
financial return.564 Though the first of these counted towards the overall wealth of the
Church, they did not, in Otero’s opinion, actually provide any active income.565 In
addition, while Otero accepted that the wealth of the Church was vast, he believed that
much of this was not as solid as it might seem. Arguing that precisely because part of
this wealth came from contributions and donations, the Church rentas were liable to
suffer “todas las modificaciones o cambios que las instituciones sociales o el estado de
la opinión hiciera en ellas.”566 This he felt was particularly so in the case of the two
main contributions that the Church relied on for its income, the diezmo –tithe– and the
560 Ibid., p. 29.
561 Ibid., p. 30.
562 Ibid.
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid.
565 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
566 Ibid., p. 33.
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parochial fees. Widely derided by the general population, there was always an inherent
risk of their not being paid. Again, the analysis provided by Otero defined his moderate
stance. In instigating any reform, it was essential to distinguish between the active and
inactive assets as any attack on the former would have negative repercussions on the
cuestión social as it was used for the betterment of certain segments of the nation. With
the second, however, there was no such concern.
Despite the fact that Otero highlighted the extent of the Church’s property
ownership, and the influence it provided, further analysis of his argument shows that
while he believed that this had stood it in good stead during the colonial period, the War
of Independence challenged and changed this position. Although its territorial
possessions varied little, there was not the profit there had once been. Suddenly,
el clero se encuentra en la imposibilidad de realizar esos capitales, no tiene cosa
mejor que hacer con ellos, ya porque no encontraría ni donde imponerlos con
más seguridades, ni otro giro más ventajoso en que emplearlos; está sujeto a no
exigir las redenciones sino en el último extremo, sufre constantes retardos en el
pago de los réditos, y experimenta frecuentes pérdidas de capital cuando llegan
los casos bien repetidos de los concursos, circunstancias todas que disminuyen
incalculablemente la dependencia de los particulares, y las ventajas pecuniarias y
sociales del clero.567
This view was shared by Mora, who maintained that capital held by the Church was
more than sufficient to repay the nation’s public debt and, at the same time, to cover
expenses incurred by the Church in the maintenance of worship, but at the same time,
he suggested that as much of the land was held was in “universal bancarrota,” indebted
and worthless, its monetary power had been reduced.568 The debate on the amortización
de bienes eclesiasticos was a constant during the decades following independence, and
Otero was involved in frequent debates and discussions on the topic. However, it
became a pressing national issue during the Mexican war with the United States and it
was during this period that Otero’s views become most clear.
567 Ibid., p. 32.
568 Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano, p. 133, 141.
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During the final weeks of 1846, as the war with the United States continued
unabated, it became apparent that the exhausted treasury would be unable to support the
war effort much longer. Santa Anna, at the head of the army, was sending desperate
pleas back to the man he had left in charge of the presidency, Valentín Gómez Farías,
highlighting the terrible plight of his men, barely clothed and barely fed. Gómez Farías
insisted that there was no money, although he did try to obtain the necessary fund, by
decree on 30 December 1846, mortgaging the nation’s rentas generales and offering
them as surety.569 The loans and other sources of income usually tapped by the flailing
treasury had dried up. There was, however, one remaining source of income which the
government had been able to turn to in the past; ecclesiastical wealth. It became
essential to request funding from it, and should this not be forthcoming, to pass a law
which would enable the State to appropriate and sell the Church’s mortmain
properties.570 Mariano Otero engaged in the debates and deliberations carried out by the
deputies in congress, which had first convened in November 1846. It is Otero’s words
during these debates, and his actions outside parliament that give us a greater insight
into his opinions on the clergy and his view of the Church. It would be easy to attribute
Otero’s actions in the early months of 1847, when he voted against the proposal in
congress coupled with his alleged involvement in the Church backed Polkos revolt, to a
pro-clerical standpoint, especially with reference to the requisition and sale of the
Church’s mortmain properties. Moreover a cursory glance at the events would easily
support this view; he voted against the law in congress, and when this was passed, took
569 For letters exchanged between Valentín Gómez Farías and Antonio López de Santa Anna see; Laura
Solares Robles, “Gómez Farías y Santa Anna: correspondencia de tiempos de crisis, 1847,” in Secuencia,
Nueva Época, no. 19 (Jan-Apr. 1991), pp. 109-112. Lilian Briseño Senosiáin, Laura Solares Robles,
Laura Suarez de la Torre, Valentín Gómez Farías y su lucha por el federalismo 1822-1858 (Mexico City:
Instituto Mora/Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, 1991), p. 230.
570 For an in-depth account of the events surrounding the Ley de Manos muertas published 11 January
1847, which eventually led to the 1847 Polkos revolt, the return of Santa Anna to Mexico City and the
repeal of the law in question, see Michael P. Costeloe, ‘The Mexican Church and the Rebellion of the
Polkos,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 46, No 2, (May, 1996), pp. 170-178.
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part as a leader and instigator, albeit in the shadows, in the Polkos revolt which, having
toppled the Gómez Farías regime, recalled Santa Anna to Mexico City. Otero’s
contemporaries and colleagues, Jose María Lafragua and Guillermo Prieto confirm
Otero’s participation while saying little, or nothing, of his motivation, other than to
mention the Polkos desire to topple the Gómez Farías government. It must be noted here
that Lafragua gave that as being the only reason, and there is no mention of Otero
having an opinion either way on the plight of the Church. In fact he argues “no
deseaban la derogación de la ley sino la caída del gobierno,” suggesting that the Church
was not an ally but merely the excuse needed for the revolt to begin. 571 Otero’s
participation in parliament is much better documented. The debates that took place
during the law examination in January 1847 provide more details on his stance, as well
as showing his intense interest and concern with the way in which the laws was being
shaped.572
In these debates we see Otero the legislator, whose main focus and interest was
on lawmaking and legislation, and it is these questions that preoccupy him the most. He
outlined the Commission’s proposal that the government be given ample powers to act
as it saw fit in the disposal of the Church mortmain properties in order to obtain the 15
million pesos desperately needed to sustain the war effort. 573 However, it was the
granting of such a power, that was Otero’s main objection to the law; it seemed to have
little or nothing to do with the fact that the properties to be seized and auctioned were
those of the Church. He felt that what was being asked of congress was that it abdicate
its power into the hands of the executive.574 This point alone would have stopped Otero
571 Galeana de Valdés, José María Lafragua, pp. 63-65.
572 For coverage of the debates as well as editorials and discussions on the law see El Monitor
Republicano for January and February 1847, compiled with specific focus on the laws and legislation of
this congress in Gonzalez Oropeza, La Reforma, pp. 248-565.
573 Otero, “Discusión en general,” Obras, II, p. 519.
574 Ibid., p. 520.
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from voting in favour of the law, and as he stated; “Creo, pues, que debemos votar en
contra de todas las facultades.”575 Otero was not the only one who called for a vote
against the law. Fellow deputy José María Lafragua, a sometimes moderate, a
sometimes radical, also voiced his objections stating that “no podría votar contra la ley
por defender las manos muertas, sino porque la ley ni destruía el principio, ni producía
el dinero y sí traía consigo mil disgustos.”576 Again, the opinion being proffered was not
one in defence of the Church or its properties, the objections stemmed from more
practical matters such as the impropriety of the law.
Otero reiterated that his objections were not to the State disposing of
ecclesiastical properties, as he firmly believed that these were public goods and, as such
it was the state’s duty to concern itself with its investments. In his opinion, the law
allowed the state to sell and mortgage the properties held by the Church. His objection
was that without setting out a distinction between these properties –he gave as an
example to be used for charity, hospitals and orphanages– any power over them given to
the State by congress could be equated with the latter’s indifference. He argued that
congress would merely be stating “todos estos bienes tómalos y destrózalos.”577 Otero
argued that the term bienes eclesiasticos encompassed too wide a range of Church
assets. He believed that it needed to be clearly defined for a better understanding of
what was available and what could be done with it. He argued that these bienes could be
loosely divided into non-productive and productive. The first referred to “valores de
Iglesias, de conventos y de objetos propios para el culto,” the value of which he
estimated to be about 45 million pesos.578 With an undertone of sarcasm, he stated
during the debate that it was evident that the government was clearly not proposing to
575 Ibid.
576 Lafragua, “Decreto de desamortización de Lafragua como Dipuatdo por Puebla, Revolución de la
Ciudadela y Rebelión de los Polkos,” in Galeana de Valdés, José María Lafragua, p. 61.
577 Otero, “Discusión en general”, Obras, II, p. 520.
578 Ibid.
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sell these, as they were used to uphold the country’s faith, which was of great
importance. This left only the non-productive section of the ecclesiastical goods for
consideration. In this category Otero inserted “capitales impuestos, fincas rústicas y
urbanas.”579
In analysing the utility of these fincas as a means of raising money, Otero took
one step further. He argued that what was being proposed by the January law had
already been attempted once before, in circumstances much more favourable than those
in Mexico in 1847. At that time it had been suggested that the Church goods could be
used in order to raise capital and balance the country’s internal debt. However, a
problem had emerged then, and was still present in 1847; many of the goods owned by
the Church were rented out and it was imperative that any change of circumstances, be
it sale, auction or lease, took into account these tenants and did not affect them
adversely in any way. The earlier suggestion referred to by Otero had been argued by
Mora at the time. He believed that so much had been borrowed against properties that
the Church was the virtual owner of most private property in rural areas.580 Here, again,
Otero’s moderation is evident when he pointed out that although owned by the Church,
these properties were, in fact, still in the hands of individuals who were housed in them
and used to provide their livelihoods. If the executive simply decided to auction off
these properties in order to raise money for the war effort, then it would be directly and
detrimentally affecting all those who were tied to them in one way or another.581 There
was no desire to expropriate Church property if it was going to have an injurious effect
on the people who lived off the properties or owed money on the lands in question. He
did believe that it was the prerogative of the state to mortgage or sell such properties but
was pointing out that it should not be done simply for the sake of it.
579 Ibid., p. 520-21.
580 Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano, p. 141.
581 Otero, “Discusión en general,” Obras, II, p. 521
187
Zavala, in the early 1830s had argued for the immediate seizure and public
auction of Church property and estates in order to make up the treasury’s shortfall.582
Mora, however, counterclaimed that such arbitrary seizure and sale would have a
detrimental effect on all those people who were linked economically, by rentals or debt,
to the Church. Furthermore, Mora argued, that the lack of money available within
Mexico for the purchase of such properties would mean that, if they could be sold at all,
it would have to be for a pittance, which would not raise any money at all.583 This
argument was repeated almost exactly by Otero in 1847. Otero was of the opinion that
the executive would find no one willing to buy these properties. They were only being
sold because of the government’s inability to secure a national loan, to furnish their
desperate and immediate need of funds to support the army, and with no one in Mexico
in any position to make a purchase of such magnitude, the only other option was to
secure a loan abroad. In Otero’s opinion, the urgency of the situation ruled out this
possibility, as it took time to negotiate with a foreign power, and time was something
they did not have.584 Otero was clearly aware of the argument that the wealth of the
clergy underwriting any such loan would provide sufficient guarantee to reassure the
lender. In view of his alleged involvement in the Polkos rebellion, Otero’s answer to
this can be interpreted as a veiled threat, when he pointed out that with this sale
se han ofendido los intereses del clero: que éste no se conforma, y que un país
donde son tan frecuentes las revoluciones, no sería difícil que un revolucionario
queriendo halagar esta clase hiciera volver las cosas al estado que estaban antes,
y he aquí destruida esa garantía.585
As he normally did when criticising legislation, Otero was happy to present an
alternative; a national general contribution. He argued that, like their parents before
them, it was essential that each and every Mexican be willing to sacrifice all for the
582 Hale, El Liberalismo Mexicano, p. 142.
583 Ibid., p. 143.
584 Otero, “Discusión en general,” Obras, II, p. 522.
585 Ibid.
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national cause.586 This demonstrates that his preoccupation was not with the Church or
its properties as such but with what he saw as the impracticality of a forced loan or
property auction in the circumstances. In addition, it is clear that Otero was unwilling to
support the law on legislative grounds. He felt that it did not benefit the country, and
required congress to transfer its constitutional power to the executive, which ran
contrary to all his political principles. In 1847, as the nation fought a losing battle
against the invading forces, Otero was firmly convinced that a man “no tiene más que
una senda que tomar, para que su nombre quede ileso, que es la de seguir firme en sus
principios.”587
Another area of Church influence often under debate in early independent
Mexico was that of education. More often than not schools were dependant on the
regular orders, as were the colleges.588 The financial position the Church enjoyed meant
that it was able to ensure that its hold upon the people was strengthened through non-
financial non-political means. Education was one such area. Otero believed that under
Spanish rule, not only did the clergy control primary education across the nation, but
they dictated upper class access to learning by controlling higher education and
monopolising the teaching of the sciences, thereby creating what Otero referred to as a
monopolio del pensamiento.589 Otero believed that the educational backwardness was to
be blamed on the unenlightened teaching in Church dominated schools where, although
philosophy, law and theology could be studied, the contents of these subjects were
antiquated and outdated.590 Anne Staples argues that this view –of education being
monopolised by the Church and the clergy, was in fact a myth, spread by José María
Luís Mora as a means of supporting his call for education reforms in the 1820s and
586 Ibid., p. 523-524.
587 Ibid., pp 519-520.
588 Bazant, Alienation, p. 10.
589 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 30.
590 Otero, “Discurso, 1841,” Obras, II, p. 409.
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1830s.591 Either way, Otero maintained the liberal belief that Mexico after independence
was marching on a road to progress, which meant that the nation was ready for change,
and as these changes were reflected in the education system, the grip of the clergy
would be weakened.592 He believed that ignorance and superstition dominated during
the colonial period, especially under the influence of the Inquisition, which had tried to
stem the introduction of new ideas and ideologies into the Spanish Americas. However,
because these ideas were available to the rest of the world, especially France, Britain
and America, their spread to the colonies was inevitable.593 Taylor subscribes to the
view that, although in the years leading up to Independence such works were becoming
more available, circulating widely and spreading ideas that challenged the monarchy’s
hold, “they lacked the momentum of a political programme or a cultural imperative.”594
Otero was convinced that the Church’s monopoly had been undermined even
during the colonial era when, despite its stranglehold, and despite the best efforts of the
colonial government and the Inquisition, new ideas began to seep into New Spain.595
According to Otero’s argument it followed, therefore, that once independence had been
achieved, the clerical grip on the area of education began to weaken. Suddenly these
new ideas led to the assertion that the colonial system of education had become
outdated and unsuitable for the needs of a nascent independent nation. José María Luis
Mora who supported, and indeed introduced, educational reforms in 1833, held the view
that clergy’s interference in education meant that the nation would remain stagnated. He
described education as being “entorpecida en su marcha, mutilada en sus ramos y
restringida en su extensión por los temores y resistencias sacerdotales” and stated that
“las tendencias del clero son perniciosas a la educación pública e impiden su difusión y
591 Staples, “Clerics as politicians,” p. 234.
592 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 33.
593 Otero, “Discurso, 1841”, Obras, II, p. 409.
594 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p. 23.
595 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, pp. 30-31.
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mejoras”.596 Otero’s support for a strong middle class to run the country meant that he
was in favour of the laicisation of education as, without progress in this area, there
could be no educated middle class to do so.
The laicisation of education had therefore been a priority for those radical
liberals who sought to forge a nation after independence. The political classes, who
equated themselves with their French, British and American counterparts, sought a new
means of educating themselves and the future generations of Mexican leaders. Otero
was not the only one to hold such views. From the very beginning reformers and the
progressive thinkers, later referred to as radicals, called for a removal of Church
influence from education. These matters were discussed in the sessions of the 1824
congress and the foundations of Otero’s beliefs can be found in the speeches of the
deputies there. Manuel Cresencio Rejón, who would go on to share the podium with
Otero on more than one occasion, stated “la ilustración haría progresos más rápidos si la
enseñanza se dejase libre,” a sentiment which would eventually be echoed in the 1857
constitution, the 3rd article of which would simply state “La enseñanza es libre.”597
As the secularisation of education became a reality in the years that followed
independence from Spain, another of the Church’s major influences on society was
weakened.598 During these years, new systems were instigated with varying degrees of
success.599 Anne Staples asserts that these many educational projects, flourishing in the
newly independent nation, were of vital importance, and seen by the political men of
596 Jose María Luis Mora, Revista Politica, in Obras completas, II, p. 380-381.
597 Sesión del 4 de Mayo de 1824, in Daniel Moreno (Ed.), Manuel Crescencio Rejón, Pensamiento
Politico (Mexico City, UNAM 1996), p. 32. Anne Staples, Recuento de una batalla inconclusa: la
educación mexicana de Iturbide a Juárez (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2005), p. 23.
598 Lilian Briseño Senosiáin, Laura Solares Robles, Laura Suarez de la Torre, Valentín Gómez Farías y su
lucha por el federalismo 1822-1858 (Mexico City: Instituto Mora/Gobierno del Estado de Jalisco, 1991),
p. 230.
599 There is not sufficient scope in this study to explore the vast and intricate world of education in 19th
century Mexico, so only brief examples, and only those relevant to Mariano Otero, are given. However,
for a thorough analysis of such systems, at both local and national level, see; Staples, Recuento.
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those decades as a means of fulfilling their hopes for the future.600 For these men
education was a way to instil morals, specific knowledge and refined manners in future
generations.601 These morals, as Staples points out, were to be those of the Church, as
the consensus following independence was to “conservar, en el ámbito educativo, la
rectoría moral de la Iglesia.”602 This, again, leads back to Otero’s distinction between
the Church’s role as a moral guide and the necessity to remove it entirely from the
political sphere. The laicisation of education was an essential goal in Otero’s opinion,
but this did not mean that the future generations could not be instilled with the moral
and spiritual benefits of the Roman Catholic faith.
One educational experiment which affected Otero directly, was the closure of
Universidades and their replacement by Institutos at a state level. 603 Otero’s own
education bore witness to this; he studied at the Instituto Científico del Estado, in
Jalisco. The Instituto was created in 1826, by the then state governor Prisciliano
Sánchez, whose educational reforms led to the closure of the Real y Literaria
Universidad de Guadalajara, as well as the Colegio de San Juan Bautista, of Jesuit
origin. This Institute was officially opened on 14 February 1827 using funds which had
been re-routed from the University and the College, and its first director was a French
citizen, Pierre Lissaute, who was renowned for his profound anticlericalism.604 The
mission of these Institutos was to give their students a vast and in-depth knowledge in
key areas, but in most cases, the courses ended up by reflecting the common carreras
600 Ibid., pp. 11, 28.
601 Ibid., p. 16.
602 Ibid., p. 26.
603 These Institutos were created in the 1820s as new centres of higher education, and had, for the most
part, a secular bent. For further information, and a specific focus on the Instituto in Jalisco, see Staples,
Recuento, pp. 64-77.
604 María de Lourdes Alvarado, “El claustro de la universidad ante las reformas educativas de 1833,” in
Enrique González and Leticia Pérez Puente (Eds.) Permanencia y cambio: universidades hispánicas 1551
– 2001, Vol. I (Mexico City: UNAM, 2005), p. 282 and Leticia Perez Puente (Ed.), De Maestros y
Discípulos. México. Siglos XVI-XIX (Mexico City: UNAM, 1998), pp. 205-207, Staples, Recuento, pp.
73-77.
192
offered elsewhere and, more often than not, these studies were interrupted for military,
political or economic reasons.605 The education he received at the Instituto would have
been seen by the more conservative of his contemporaries as a radical one, lacking the
hitherto essential philosophical base and a mastery of Latin.606 With this educational
background, it is easy to see why Otero argued that the removal of the areas of learning
and education from Church control was necessary for Mexico to stand side by side with
the great nations of Europe. Despite these firm beliefs, Otero never actively campaigned
for educational legislation and, as noted above, made no in-depth analysis on education
reform; he merely identified it as an area in which the Church, having had a monopoly
in colonial times, lost influence with the advent of independence. Perhaps he felt that
other areas, such as military involvement or the fight for federalism were more
important, but it is quite certain, when writing in the 1840s, that he believed that with
the exception of moral matters, any residual influence the Church maintained over
education was slowly but surely, being wrested from it.
Perhaps not so hotly debated a topic, but still important, was that of the clergy’s
hold on people through its charitable organisations and the concept of charity. Otero
asserted that “las ideas religiosas y el poder del remordimiento” established these
charitable bodies in Mexico as a refuge for “las miserables clases oprimidas,” thereby
providing the Church with ties to all people.607 Otero includes orphanages, hospitals and
poor schools under this heading. Though subtly critical of the Church’s monopoly of
certain aspects of life in Mexico, as a Catholic, Otero emphasised its moral and
charitable benefits at every stage. He argued that;
es también indudable que la humanidad les debió inmensos beneficios; porque
no solo realizaron las fundaciones privadas que se les encargaban, sino que los
bienes mismos que se les dejaban para sí, los emplearon muchísimas ocasiones
605 Staples, Recuento, p. 70-71.
606 Ibid., p. 74.
607 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 31.
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en aumentar el número de esos establecimiento de piedad y beneficencia:
también es indudable que en los infortunios y persecuciones de la multitud, el
clero se constituyó siempre, ya en protector de los miserables, ya en defensor de
los sacrosantos derechos que se ultrajaban… ¡cuántas veces los ministro del altar
se interpusieron entre el verdugo y las víctimas!608
Because none of these destitute classes held the vote in Mexico in the 1840s –where
property and income were essential for suffrage, it is understandable that Otero did not
see the Church’s influence over them as anything other than an action of charity and
spiritual guidance. So, although the Church had great influence over these people, none
of it could be described as political and, therefore, it was of no great concern to Otero.
As a Catholic, he acknowledged the Church’s supremacy only in matters of morals and
faith, and the religious side of Mexican everyday life. He was insistent that it should be
barred from the secular territory of politics and the state. For this reason there is no
contradiction, when he attacks the Church on one occasion and defends it on another.
As has been shown in the previous chapter, Otero’s veiled criticisms of the army
and the clergy were made in the early 1840s. However, perhaps because the political
threat he perceived to stem from the Church was considerably less than the one he
believed the army posed, Otero was willing to openly guarantee the interests of the
Church. Otero had been scarred by the events of 1833-34 –when the radical reforms of
the Valentín Gómez Farías government had led to a backlash which pushed the nation
into a decade of centralism and chaos.609 This idea of openly guaranteeing Church rights
was to become one of the main conservative objectives during the 1850s. Alamán, in his
letter to Santa Anna in 1853, stated that he strongly believed that it was essential to
uphold Catholicism and to do so though safeguarding Church property, support for
608 Ibid.
609 In a letter to Ignacio Vergara on 4 June 1842, Otero looked back at the events of 1833 and recalled his
opposition to the reforms introduced by the radical factions, stating “en 1833, cuando eran sansculotes
tantos que usted conoce, usted y yo les hicimos la guerra; pero entonces como ahora, se la hacíamos en
nombre de la libertad que deshonraban y no en el del retroceso, que odiábamos”, Letter from Mariano
Otero to Ignacio Vergara, 4 June 1842, in Otero, Obras, I, p. 154.
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Catholicism and acceptance that the pope alone, as head of the Catholic Church, had
power over the area of Church administration. With this in mind it is clear that any
statement that Otero made on upholding the rights of the Church would immediately
make him too conservative for the radicals, and the fact that he felt such support should
include exceptions, would make him too radical for the conservatives.
During the debates on the proyecto constitucional in congress in October 1842,
Otero said, that in view of the recent turmoil, a minority on the commission believed
that, to preserve peace, the Church should be given “seguridades francas y completas”
and written into the constitution. They felt that by doing this, any cause for alarm which
could lead to unrest and revolt, had been entirely removed. If the minority view were
successful, Otero believed that the constitution that would emerge would be the first
step towards a stable nation, and it would outline the guarantees that he promised the
Church. In doing so, Otero was openly safeguarding a variety of Church interests.
Firstly, he was saying that their fueros and related privileges would be safe. It is
difficult to reconcile Otero’s beliefs in equality before the law with his support of the
fueros. At no point did he state that they should be abolished, but on those occasions
where he defended them, or emphasised their necessity, he always seemed to soften his
statement by arguing that these were being safeguarded in order to demonstrate to the
clergy that not all reforms were radical, and not all were an attack on them. If this was
his reasoning, then what Otero was doing by safeguarding the fueros, was ensuring that
the Church had no cause for complaint against reforms and, therefore, no grounds to
back a revolt. We know Otero believed that all reform had to be gradual, and while it is
impossible to know with any exactitude, it is possible that he felt that by leaving the
fueros untouched until a later date, a legislator might be able to reform other areas of
clerical influence without producing a backlash.
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Otero’s belief in the supremacy of the constitution was unfaltering. He argued in
1842 that the recent attacks upon Church rights in some states would cease as soon as
the new constitution was established, as it would ensure that to all intents and purposes
there would be centralismo for the Church; it would respond only to the federal
government, and it would be this same government, and no other that would have the
power to deal with ecclesiastical affairs.610 Otero went on to argue, in this same speech,
that the minority on the Comisión de Constitución had gone even further in reassuring
the Church, convinced that the great majority of the population desired it, Catholicism
was declared the only religion of the state. Finally, Otero argued that they were willing
to go one step further by guaranteeing the bienes eclesiásticos. Here Otero explained his
arguments in parliament for his fellow deputies to hear; he did not believe that
ecclesiastical property brought with it the same basic guarantees as private property. He
even went so far as to argue that he would never vote for any law that sought to remove
the inalienable right of the civil powers to decide what was best for these Church bienes,
both for investment and conservation purposes. However, in order to demonstrate to
those who believed that in their desire for a federalist constitution, the minority were
being overly radical, Otero and his minority deputies were willing to ensure that the
bienes
con que se provee al culto nacional y se mantienen tantos establecimientos de
piedad y beneficencia deben ser de tal suerte asegurados que no quede ni el más
ligero temor de que, absorbidos por el desorden espantoso de nuestra hacienda,
formen la escandalosa fortuna de una docena de impudentes especuladores,
dejando sin recursos esos objetos de la primera y más alta importancia.611
Here, once again, Otero demonstrated his moderation. Though he held what were
considered to be radical beliefs on the freedom of the state to take over Church property,
as he would demonstrate openly in 1847, he was willing, in view of the situation in
610 Otero, “Discurso, 11 Oct, 1842”, Obras, I, p. 325.
611 Ibid., pp. 325-326.
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Mexico in 1842, to concede on certain points. It is obvious that Otero felt that it was
essential to strike a balance between the most necessary reforms, and ensuring that they
did not threaten any group who, by starting a counter group, could not only overturn any
progress but could throw the country into further chaos.
While Otero described the position of the post-independence Church as being
strong enough to be defined as a clase, he did not believe that the Church had sufficient
power to constitute a political faction.612 Anne Staples supports this view of the Church
in the early national period; it did not present a united front, and its participation in
politics, though widespread, was as varied as were its members.613 Otero did, however,
identify it as a risk factor, specifically when it aligned itself with one or another faction
in order to protect its interests and, by doing so, tipped the balance in favour of its allies.
Otero was to experience this manoeuvring first hand when in 1847 the Church backed
the Polko rebellion in order to oust Valentín Gómez Farías from power. Lafragua said
of that union, “el clero de México, explotando en su provecho los disgustos de algunos
cuerpos y el descrédito de la administración, empleó el dinero que dice ser de la Iglesia
en corromper a los empleados para que traicionaran al gobierno.” 614 Lafragua’s
statement clearly highlights the position of the Church as an ally and backer but with
insufficient political power to stand alone. With this in mind, it is easy to understand
why it may it be argued that Otero was willing to court the Church in the early 1840s. If
the constitution openly guaranteed the Church’s rights while leaving key aspects such as
government power over the bienes open to debate, this faction would be removed from
the power struggles which so often threw Mexico into disarray. In harness with his
612 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 44.
613 Staples, “Clerics as Politicians,” p. 225.
614 Lafragua, “Decreto de desamortización de Lafragua como Dipuatdo por Puebla, Revolución de la
Ciudadela y Rebelión de los Polkos,” in Galeana de Valdés, José María Lafragua, p. 64.
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plans for the removal of political power from the military, there would be hope for
peace and stability which, in turn, would allow the country to progress and develop.
Further analysis of Otero’s thought also supports the theory that by the 1840s he
believed that Church decline was inevitable. In the colonies, the wealth it had
accumulated by the means detailed above, its hold on education and the power it
acquired through charitable involvements, ensured that the Church established itself as
one of the bastions of the Spanish colonies.615 However, Otero went on to argue that the
Church’s position in colonial Spain was impossible to maintain once independence had
been achieved. Even the slightest change or move forward, would weaken the Church’s
stranglehold, in the same way that it had within the old colonial organisation.616 For
Otero, the downfall of the Church as a political player had begun at the end of the
previous century. He believed that the series of events leading up to it included the
expulsion of the Jesuits and the dissolution of certain other Orders, the amortización of
Charles IV, as well as the loss of economic power from the disasters of independence
and the fall in value of its rustic properties. Another contributing factor to this reduction
in its profits came from the decrease in the contributions, be they voluntary or
compulsory ones, which it was accustomed to receiving and which, in Otero’s view,
was directly linked to the flood of new ideas and the greater freedom they brought with
them. Otero argued that the loss of large amounts of capital could be directly linked to
its loss of political power.617
It was not just the political powers of the Church that had declined. Otero
believed that its moral influence had also lessened. Following independence certain
aspects that had been neglected during colonial rule became the focus of attention. One
was education, and the increase and improvement in primary and secondary educational
615 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p.31.
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid., p. 43.
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facilities removed much of the influence the clergy had traditionally held over the
younger generations.618 As already pointed out, Otero himself benefitted from these
changes, and as a result can be seen as a strong advocate, despite his Catholicism, for
the secularisation of education.
Consequently Otero believed that the Church had finally achieved its rightful
place, with “la influencia moral de una religión sublime y consoladora; pero ésta en
nada apoyaba las pretensiones temporales y los privilegios políticos que sus ministros
habían conservado.”619 This further supports Otero’s theory that in order to be able to
fight to uphold and maintain what political privileges it still enjoyed, the Church had no
other recourse than to ally itself with political factions.620 Otero said that when the
nation was at peace, pinpointing the years from 1823 to 1828, no such allies were
forthcoming. If there were peace, no group needed the financial support from the
Church and, therefore, it would find nobody to back its grievances. In times such as
those the Church had no means of defending itself from attacks upon its privileges other
than by suplicas y ruegos.621 As a moderate, Otero believed that any reform should be
slow and progressive in order to avoid the immediate backlash that was inevitable if
effected more radically. It is not strange therefore, that he should consider the events of
1829, with the chaos caused by the challenge to the results of the electoral process, and
1833, with the liberal radical reforms carried out by the Valentín Gómez Farías
administration, as turning points in the Church’s reacquisition of political power.
Having said that, what power it did manage to recover, however, was slight, and it was
in a position where it could only “dominar en calidad de aliado, y de aliado que estaba a
618 Ibid.
619 Ibid., p. 44.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
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merced de sus compañeros de poder.”622 Even then, what little protection it was able to
enjoy from its fleeting alliances was precarious. As Otero noted, each time its interests
came into conflict with those it was aiding, its allies would always favour their private
interests over those of the Church.623
Therefore, in the years that followed the Church was able to accomplish little.
Otero argued that despite the fact that it enjoyed more freedom than it ever had under
the Spanish monarchy, the real elements of its power were waning. Its bienes were
diminishing, what small measures it won that might stem the tide of free thought were
never implemented, and the general feeling slowly spread that a savage reform was
needed to bring the unjust system of collection and distribution of enforced
contributions and ecclesiastical rents under control.624
For Mariano Otero, as for most, if not all, of his contemporaries, the Church was
a major component, which needed to be taken into consideration, politically and
socially, in the decades following independence. It was during this time, when
constitutions were experimental and liable to amendments, when political systems were
supported or rejected, when revolts and revolutions became just as powerful a tool for
change as legislation, that political men were forced to analyse and discuss matters of
separation of Church and state. Otero firmly believed in the inevitability of the
separation of Church and state in independent Mexico, and consequently his writings
deal less with this aspect of the new nation. Unlike the army, the state of the nation or
the battle for federalism, for Otero the questions of Church and religion were already
changing, and therefore needed less input from the nation builders and legislators.
Indeed the separation of Church and State became a reality with the 1857 constitution,
622 Ibid.
623 Ibid., p. 46.
624 Ibid., p. 44.
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and had it not been for his untimely death, it is likely he would have actively
participated in the reforms which were to sever the last remaining ties.
As with every aspect of the history of Mexico in the nineteenth century, there
were ever changing factions and political stances towards the Church that can only be
defined by their specific times. Otero’s opinions and ideals, like those of many of his
contemporaries, shifted in response to the events he experienced. It is impossible to
confine his political thoughts with regard to the Church in a single definition –the
situation in Mexico was not the same in 1842 when a victorious revolt led him to a
position in the chamber of deputies, as it was in 1847, when the threat of external forces
was insufficient to put a damper on partisan considerations.
In conclusion, if we take as a starting point the key issues which Costeloe
identified as being at the centre of the debates of politicians on Church-State relations in
the years following independence, it is easy to see that Otero was no exception. The
reduction of the religious orders, the amendment and eventual abolition of the fueros,
the confiscation and management of Church properties and wealth and the wrestling of
education from the grasp of the Church are all dealt with in Otero’s writings.625 As was
the case with most, if not all, of the political figures of the mid nineteenth century,
Otero combined his profound Catholicism with his anti-clericalism by separating issues
of faith from issues of state. In addition, Otero’s historical method can be seen in his
analysis of the Church just as clearly as it can in his discussion of the state of the nation.
He firmly believed that in order to understand the Mexican Church as it stood in the
decade of 1840, it was essential to understand the roots of the problem. Without a
profound historical analysis it was impossible, in Otero’s view, to attack the strong
position the Church maintained in the political life of the country. As such, where
625 Costeloe, Church and State, pp. 1-4.
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Alamán, in the early 1850s, could be seen to use the historical position of the clergy as a
means of bringing together a fractured nation, insisting upon the Church as a bastion in
any government which was to succeed, Otero’s analysis of the history of the Church
from colony to independence to republic, painted a picture of gradual, but steady
weakening of its power and influence in political matters.
He painted a picture of a fractured Church divided into factions that often stood
in opposition. According to Otero these divisions became increasingly more apparent
until the Church split over independence; the higher ranks supporting the royalists, with
the lower clergy supporting the independence movement. This split led Otero to equate
the lower clergy with the plight of the people, as priests in parishes who only sought to
deal with faith, removed from politics, and the higher clergy with riches and a constant
desire to hang on to political influence.
The triumph of the independence movement meant that, in Otero’s opinion, the
position of the Church, came under the influence of the state, leaving the higher ranks to
struggle for any foothold that could be achieved in the new nation. He dwelt little, for
example, on the issue of the patronato since he believed that in the 1840s this issue had
been completely resolved by the fact that in Mexico, as in other modern nations, the
Church had to be separated entirely from the state, leaving the patronato as nothing
more than a relic of the colonial order. In addition, Otero noted that the Church’s
political heyday had been in the early 1770s and it had been steadily decreasing since
then. As such, though there were areas where the Church had great influence, most of
these were no longer political. Otero did, however, identify certain aspects which
needed to be addressed; Church wealth, particularly its property ownership, education,
and the influence it exerted through its charitable works.
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The issue of education, according to Otero, had been key in the years
immediately following independence from Spain. However, by the time he was writing,
in the 1840s he felt that most issues had either been addressed or were following a
natural path to a solution. With Independence, Otero argued, the grip on intellectual
thought which the Crown had exercised during the time of the Inquisition had been
weakened, and the subsequent liberalisation of ideas and education was inevitable. As
has already been mentioned, Otero’s own education bore witness to this, and it is
understandable that while he felt it was essential to highlight education being free from
Church influence, by the 1840s he felt this was already happening. In much the same
way Otero used the issue of charity to highlight an area of positive Church influence,
and an area where their power was moral and not political. However, he was a politician,
above all, and it mattered little how much power the Church exercised through its
hospitals, refuges or orphanages as those who benefited from it were disenfranchised,
and this power did not translate into political influence of any kind.
It is because of this and the Otero’s views on the state of Mexico in the 1840s
that his greatest concern was for the Church’s wealth through its enormous property
holdings. He believed this was one of the only avenues left for it to hang on to political
influence and, by the financial backing of revolts and pronunciamientos, to have some
of it restored to it. However, and despite events such as the Polko revolt of 1847, Otero
believed that the Church was a mere puppet of its allies and posed little risk in its own
right. Its wealth had come to the forefront in the 1840s as an empty treasury led the
political classes to explore other avenues of income. This issue reached its peak during
the US invasion, when the troop commanders and the government became increasingly
desperate to obtain money to fund the war effort. Otero felt that the mortmain properties
were responsibility of the state, and as such should be managed by the government. In
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1842 he put forward the moderate opinion that these properties should be auctioned and
divided, so as to benefit the largest possible number of people. However, he also
insisted that this had to happen slowly, and with Church consent. Five years later,
during the war with the United States he maintained his position. Despite criticism that
he was involved in the Church-backed Polko revolt, and, therefore, pro-Church, he
insisted in parliament that he was voting against the enforced sale of mortmain
properties, not because he did not believe it was within the powers of the State to
dispose and manage the properties as it wished, but because he felt that it would not in
any way aid the war effort. His stance was not a contradictory one; he simply responded
to each situation as it arose and in accordance with his moderate beliefs.
Like many, if not all of his contemporaries, his political ideology was based on
experimentation and the matters he had to deal with, at specific times. He strongly
believed, as a moderate, that reform was essential, but that it had to be slow, so as not to
incite a backlash. He had seen what happened when radical reform was introduced
during the 1833 Farías administration and was convinced that if any progress were to be
achieved, it should be through gradual change. In addition, unlike the army, Otero did
not see the Church as a powerful, latent threat, he looked upon it as little more than an
unruly entity, ready to back anyone and anything that brought it closer to power. Even
then he did not believe it posed any a real challenge to the ongoing moves to separate
Church from state. He was willing to go so far as guaranteeing the rights of the Church
in the 1840s. He included it in the constitution and insisted upon it throughout his
political career, believing perhaps that if he was able to appease the Church through
these concessions it would avoid the political upheavals that so plagued Mexico. Under
peacetime conditions, Otero could then focus on removing the army from political
power, or improving the state of the nation through constitutional reform.
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6.
Federalism
After three centuries of colonial rule, one of the most important questions facing the
embryonic nation on the advent of independence was a decision on the most suitable
system of government. Initially it toyed with a constitutional monarchy but by 1823 it
had become clear that this had failed. There was an obvious need to explore other forms
of government if it were to retain its newly gained independence and stand alongside the
other free nations of the Americas and Europe. Pronunciamientos, constitutional
projects, and writers argued over the various proposals and projects that emerged.
Centralism and federalism were the main rallying cries of those years but circumstances
evolved, positions shifted, alliances changed. Some of the ardent federalists of the
1820s would go on to be the centralists of the 1830s. 626 Even within the staunch
supporters of one or the other systems, divisions could be found on key issues such as
apportioning power between regional governments and the central state or how such
power should be split between the three branches of government, legislative, executive
and judicial. It is therefore possible to say that there were as many individual
constitutional projects as there were politicians. A federal republic emerged from these
debates but it too was doomed to failure and was replaced by a centralist charter in 1836.
It was followed by a brief flirtation with a santanista dictatorship 1841-1843, during
which a movement to reintroduce federalism, led by deputies of the 1842 Constituent
Congress, was quashed by a series of military pronunciamientos in December of that
year. Instead, with congress having been replaced by a Junta de Notables in 1843, many
626 Josefina Z. Vázquez goes so far as to argue that by 1845 Alamán was “uno de los principales
conspiradores monárquicos”. He was not alone. Though definitely in the minority, some individuals did
believe that a monarchy was the only way of ensuring Mexico’s survival as an independent nation.
Josefina Z. Vázquez, “Centralistas,” p. 122.
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of whom had been handpicked by Santa Anna, a second centralist constitution arose out
of the Bases Orgánicas. Three years later, facing the threat from the United States, the
country turned to federalism once more, with the reintroduction of the 1824
Constitution. In the midst of the US invasion in 1847, it was expanded by an Acta de
Reformas that was to remain in force until the promulgation of the great liberal
constitution of 1857.627
In order to reach a better understanding of Otero’s views on federalism, it is
essential to take a closer look at the development of these different systems of
government and at the federalist debate before moving on to Otero’s analysis of the
situation as it stood in the 1840s. This will include his support of the 1824 federalist
charter and his criticism of the 1836 centralist constitution. The first he hailed as having
united a country divided by Iturbide, ushering in a period of peace and progress,
although he admitted it was flawed and unsuitable for the 1840s. The latter he
considered to have been one of the main causes of all the ills that had befallen Mexico
since independence. This section will also look at Otero’s attitude as a deputy for
Jalisco, a renowned radical federalist state, and his defence of a federalism that was
more than just a copy of the one advocated by the United States. The second part of the
chapter will look at Otero’s legislative output, and the way he put his beliefs into
practice when drafting constitutions in both 1824 and 1847. It will examine his
definitions of the individual requirements of both the states and the central authority, as
well as his arguments for the distribution of individual and overall powers. The states,
for example, should have complete control over their treasuries, whereas the central
authority must have the sole command of the means of repelling foreign threats. Finally,
627 The constitution of 1857, “established equality among citizens, a federal and representative political
system, and an ambitious project of secularization and disentitlement of corporative property –both the
Church’s and that of indigenous communities”. Pablo Piccato, The tyranny of opinion, Honour in the
Construction of the Mexican Public Sphere (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 5.
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the chapter will demonstrate that while Otero’s stance was unwaveringly federalist, he
was advocating a federalism inline with the needs of the time and not simply a rehash of
an older version.
In order to understand his reticence to simply reintroduce the 1824 constitution
in the 1840s, it is necessary to look at the background to the federalist argument. The
establishment of a new system of government in the years following independence was
no easy task because “las guerras españolas y la lucha independentista heredaron una
economía estancada y una bancarrota hacendaria, acompañadas de una población
heterogénea, dividida y carente de experiencia política.”628 Indeed, the struggle for
independence itself had been characterised by different groups and regions promoting
and fighting for their own specific interests. 629 The population was spread across
provinces which had also inherited this division, strengthened by the introduction of the
1812 Constitution in the colonies during the struggle for independence. Once the failure
of Iturbide’s empire had become apparent, a new system of government was needed,
and there was heated debate throughout the states on “soberanía, la organización del
poder publico y la construcción de la nación.” 630 There was consensus that the
monarchy should be replaced by a republic, but it was the form this republic should take
that raised tempers; should it be federalist or centralist? 631 Meanwhile an interim
government was appointed. The provinces were unwilling to surrender any of their
autonomy to a central government and Guadalajara, followed closely by Zacatecas,
Oaxaca and Yucatán, refused to acknowledge the authority of congress in Mexico City
628 Josefina Z. Vázquez, “A manera de introducción,” in Josefina Z. Vázquez, (Ed.), El establecimiento
del federalismo en México (1821-1827) (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2003), p. 16.
629 Jaime E. Rodríguez O. and Virginia Guedea, “La Constitución de 1824 y la formación del Estado
mexicano,” Historia Mexicana, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jan. - Mar., 1991), p.521.
630 Jaime Olveda, “Jalisco: el pronunciamiento federalista de Guadalajara,” in Vázquez, El
establecimiento, p. 191.
631 Timothy E Anna, “Inventing Mexico: Provincehood and Nationhood after Independence,” Bulletin of
Latin American Research, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Mexican Politics in the Nineteenth Century
(1996), pp. 9-10.
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and of the interim government. 632 Guadalajara, true to its reputation as a radical
federalist state, announced that “no había ley, tratado ni compromiso que obligara a las
provincias a depender del centro,” only a matter of days before they declared
themselves to be the “estado libre, independiente y soberano de Xalisco.”633 However,
even the most extreme of states seemed to accept “la presencia de una idea fundadora de
Estado, la voluntad de crearlo y la existencia de un sentido de pertenencia a una nación
en ciernes” but with the proviso that any nation so created must also accept each state as
“un centro de poder con la fuerza y la experiencia suficientes para autogobernarse.”634
By 1823 most of the provinces were convinced that the only way to combine these
demands was through the establishment of federalism.635 However, while this was the
majority opinion, there were also those who supported a system whereby all the power
would be held by a centralist government, or even a moderate confederation that would
have followed more closely the US design, devolving some power to the states while
maintaining a great deal under the control of the central government.636
Unity prevailed when a compromise was reached between the centre and the
provinces and it was this compromise that led to the 1824 federalist constitution.
However, whereas this charter “ratificaba el régimen basado en una soberanía
compartida entre la federación y los gobiernos estatales,” it doomed the system to
failure from the very start, as it limited “las facultades fiscales del gobierno federal, lo
que propició su debilidad.”637 Vazquez compares this to the federalist example of the
United States, arguing that whereas the federalism of their northern neighbour
632 Josefina Z. Vázquez, “El establecimiento del Federalismo en México, 1821-1827,” in Vázquez, El
establecimiento, p. 29
633 Communication between the Diputación of Guadalajara and Lucas Alamán, on 5 June 1823, quoted in
Vázquez, “El establecimiento,” p. 30.
634 Olveda, “Jalisco,” p. 198.
634 Vázquez, “El establecimiento,” p. 29.
635 Rodríguez O. and Guedea, “La Constitución de 1824,” p.518.
636 Ibid., pp. 520-521.
637 Vázquez, “A manera de introducción,” p. 16.
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consolidated unity, Mexico’s interpretation of federalism was state sovereignty, first
and foremost, with very little power residing in the central government. 638 In her
opinion, this is what has led many historians to refer to this constitution as a “pacto
semiconfederal.”639 However, whatever the interpretation of federalism in 1824 “no
resultó suficientemente sólido para dar nacimiento a un Estado nacional fuerte y
tampoco pudo evitar las tensiones entre las entidades y el gobierno federal, pero salvó la
integridad de la nación.”640
Differences, temporarily lain aside under the Plan de Iguala, resurfaced after the
collapse of the monarchy and the political divisions that surfaced were not resolved by
the 1824 constitution. Factionalism and division increased over the following years,
often challenging and undermining the established system of government. Furthermore,
the states did not uphold their side of the federalist bargain. Assigned a financial
contingente for the upkeep of the central government, it was often paid late, paid in part
or not paid at all, leading to a weakened central government.641 This situation was
further exacerbated by the outright refusal of many of the states to implement any
national law they considered detrimental to their autonomy.642 It gradually became
apparent that it was seriously flawed and, as early as 1830, there were calls for reforms
or even for something entirely new altogether.643 The 1836 constitution strengthened the
638 The constitution, for example, enabled the central congress to pass laws, “conservar la unión federal de
los estados, y la paz y el orden público en lo interior de la federación; mantener la independencia de los
estados entre sí en lo respectivo a su gobierno interior; y sostener la igualdad proporcional de
obligaciones y derechos que los estados tenían ante la ley.” Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño “El congreso
nacional,” p. 141.
639 This theory also supports the assertion that Mexico’s first federalist constitution was not merely a copy
of that of the United States. Vázquez, “El establecimiento,” p. 34.
640 Olveda, “Jalisco,” p. 213.
641 Ibid.
642 Ibid.
643 For an in-depth analysis of constitutional reform in the early 1830s, see Catherine Andrews,
“Discusiones en torno a la reforma de la Constitución Federal de 1824 durante el primer gobierno de
Anastasio Bustamante (1830-1832),” Historia Mexicana, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jul. – Sept., 2006), also useful
for a better understanding of the discussions taking place during this period is Michael P. Costeloe,
“Federalism to Centralism in Mexico: The Conservative Case for Change, 1834-1835,” The Americas,
Vol. 45, No. 2 (Oct., 1988).
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central government, but it still provided the departamentos, formally estados, with their
own government and an administrative junta departamental and therefore, “solo
modificó el federalismo establecido en la [constitución] de 1824, pero no lo reemplazó
con un centralismo fuerte.”644 This constitution too failed to solve the nation’s problems
and the 1840s “estuvieron marcados por la búsqueda, a la vez desesperada e infructuosa,
por dar solución a la inestabilidad política, por hallar aquella “Constitución” que
asegurara orden y libertad a la joven nación.”645
It was during this time that the debate on federalism, centralism, monarchy or
even military dictatorships escalated, and it was then that Otero came to the forefront
when he presented his ideas and ideology on the national stage.646 From his very first
political position as deputy to the Constituent Congress for the fiercely radical state of
Jalisco, Otero fought indefatigably for the federalist cause.647 Writing during the early
summer of 1842, he added his voice to the general clamour for change, convinced that
both the 1824 and the 1836 constitutions had failed equally in answering the needs of
the nation in the ensuing decades.648 Although Otero was well aware that the 1824
constitution was not flawless, he admired it greatly, particularly as the embryo of
Mexican federalism. Given the benefit of hindsight, it was not difficult for his
generation to see the imperfections of both constitutions. By the early 1840s the call for
reform required a response and, although the Revolución de Jalisco demanded changes
to 1836 centralism, most of the moderate federalists naturally favoured the
644 Andrews, “Discusiones,” p. 105.
645 Noriega and Pani, “Las propuestas ‘conservadoras,’” p. 175.
646 Pani and Noriega point out that with the fall of Iturbide pro-monarchical ideas slipped out of public
debate and did not resurface until the 1840s. As Otero gave them scant importance, they are not discussed
in detail here, but they were indeed a reality. Ibid.
647 For the role of Jalisco and the other provinces in bringing about the federalist constitution of 1824 see
Nettie Lee Benson, La Diputación provincial y el establecimiento del federalism mexicano (Mexico City:
Colegio de Mexico, UNAM, 2nd Ed. 1994) as well as Ivana Frasquet, Las caras del águila. Del
liberalismo gaditano a la república federal mexicana (1820-1824) (Castellón: Universitat Jaume I, 2008),
specifically pp. 339-360.
648Otero, Ensayo, p. 12.
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reintroduction of federalism but suitably adjusted to the requirements of the nation in
the 1840s.649 Otero was of the opinion that the 1824 constitution had been the best
solution to the situation in Mexico at the time. Mexico had been free of Spanish rule for
only three years, after an eleven year struggle to achieve independence. The republic,
Otero argued, had been built upon the ruins of Iturbide’s throne, and its situation was
precarious, under constant threats of reconquest by Spain, while, he said “nosotros
débiles, inexpertos, sin recursos y sin organización estábamos expuestos no sólo a todos
los peligros de la debilidad, sino también a los de la división y la anarquía.”650 This was
Otero’s view of Mexico on the eve the 1824 federalist constitution was signed and, yet,
he felt it ushered in a rare moment of peace and tranquillity. Zavala agreed but argued
that this moment of stability was short lived. He also accused the men who wrote it of
merely copying the main points from the United States, arguing that it was not
applicable to Mexico and that, therefore, “falta mucho para que las cosas, la esencia del
sistema, la realidad corresponda a los principios que se profesan.”651 Alamán, on the
other hand, thought the 1824 constitution introduced disorder into a nation which had
been stabilised by Iturbide, insisting, in the last years of his life, that the only way
Mexico would ever solve its problems would be through the regeneration of the
traditionalist values of the colonial period under a constitutional monarchy.652
With the introduction of federalism, Otero believed, somewhat idealistically,
considering the pessimism with which he described the state of the nation, that Mexico
649 A glance over the pronunciamientos of 1840 and 1841 shows the contrasting view between Paredes y
Arrillaga, together with Victoria and Santa Anna who were determinedly against federalism, and Gómez
Farías’s call, in July 1840, for “la Constitución de 1824 reformada,” as well as the calls for federalism
reflected in the men elected to form part of the 1842 congress. For full texts of the pronunciamientos,
planes and actas of 1840 and1841, see The Pronunciamiento in Independent Mexico, 1821 – 1876,
available at http://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/index.php. For the election process and
composition of the 1842 Congress, and an analysis of the men who comprised it see Noriega Elío, El
Constituyente.
650 Otero, “Discurso 11 de Octubre de 1842”, Obras, I, p. 304
651 Zavala, Ensayo Histórico, p. 299.
652 Brading, “Creole Nationalism,” p. 159.
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had begun to develop in leaps and bounds. Agriculture, industry and commerce
flourished overnight and rapidly spread their wealth. Roads were built, ports opened and
vacant areas of the country colonised. Intellectual advancement also occurred, with
vertiginous speed, accompanied by improvements in primary and secondary education,
and the printing press. Judicial administration progressed; as did the legislatures, and
slowly, garantías sociales and criminal legislation became established.653In Otero’s
opinion, this was all the direct result of federalism giving each state the freedom to
allocate its resources to the areas of most importance to it, ensuring that each state could
develop its own interests while, at the same time, freeing the central government to act
in the best interests of the nation as a whole. This was the balance that had caused the
country to experience, at least briefly, peace and progress. This was the vision of the
federalism and its successes that underlay his optimism in 1842, and again in 1847.
Federalism had worked well in the past and would, therefore, work for Mexico in the
future. This view contrasted sharply with the centralist perception of those federalist
times, namely that “it had not brought economic prosperity but rather poverty and
recession giving rise to political and factional division which, in turn, had led to
constant rebellions and pronunciamientos.”654 Not only that, administrative costs had
risen as state bureaucracies had developed across the nation and had been met through
increased taxation, a direct negative impact of federalism on the people of Mexico.655
However, in order to underpin his conviction of federalism as the saviour of a
desperate nation, he had to discredit any other available options. The most important of
these, the one that had been in place since 1836, was centralism. The failures of the
centralist constitutions were therefore central to Mariano Otero’s analyses of the ills of
653 Otero, “Discurso 11 de Octubre 1842,” Obras, I, p. 312.
654 Michael P. Costeloe, “Federalism to Centralism in Mexico: The Conservative Case for Change, 1834-
1835,” The Americas, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Oct., 1988), p. 176.
655 Ibid., p. 177.
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the nation that he presented in congress in the Ensayo and in other publications. Otero
argued that the centralist constitution had emerged from a congress that, taking
advantage of the powers bestowed upon it by federalism, had destroyed it by bringing
another constitution into being. He was concerned that a precedent had been set
whereby any constitution could be ignored, dissolved or replaced with no further ado.656
Moreover, as Otero saw it, the years Mexico had spent as a centralist republic had only
demonstrated that the reasons given for shattering the federalist constitution and
replacing it by centralism, had been nothing more than empty excuses.657 In their call
for centralism and its subsequent institution, the enemies of federalism had used the
state of the nation –a bankrupt treasury, constant upheavals, social instability– as the
reasons why change was so urgently needed. And yet, no more than seven years later, as
he sought to demonstrate in the Ensayo, conditions in the nation remained the same; if
federalism had been to blame for the state of the nation in 1835, centralism had been
equally culpable in 1842, and for exactly the same reasons. Backing up his assertion
with specific evidence, he compared the text published by the committee calling for
centralism with the text of the 1841 Jalisco pronunciamiento.658 In his opinion, both
documents, depicted Mexico as a country where all parts of the republic were groaning
under the weight of contributions and taxes; commerce, industry, property ownership
were all decimated by excessive taxation; the administration was run entirely on
cronyism. The public debt increased substantially year on year while magistrates and
civil servants went unpaid. The border states suffered from constant incursions by the
656 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 77.
657 The argument for centralism was that “a new form of government would bring back national unity and
end the factional divisions and multi-party politics which had caused so much instability and
administrative disruption. Law and order would be guaranteed with the streets and highways made safe
for decent people. Above all, the traditional values of the family, respect for the nation's once venerated
institutions, the spirit of public service and public morality in general would be restored. The precepts of
the only true faith would again be taught in schools and the corruption of youth by the modern heresies of
the day stopped.” Costeloe, “Federalism to Centralism,” p. 184.
658 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 78 - 80.
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indios barbaros, and administration after administration had failed to bring Texas back
into the national fold after its secession from Mexico. This, Otero argued, showed that
all that had been achieved in the seven years Mexico had been governed by centralism
was a worsening of the situation and, therefore, other causes and not federalism were
responsible.659 It was not difficult to discern these other causes. They ranged from party
politics and factionalism to the intervention of the army in affairs of the state.
Federalism, on the other hand, had enjoyed temporary success, whereas there had been
no sign of improvement, no ray of light under the centralist regime. And Otero had
personal experience of the ills centralism brought to the estados. He, and his fellow
Jalisco deputies, brought with them the experiences of seven years under centralism,
“regidos por una administración digna de las épocas de barbarie y en la que oímos
proclamar los principios del más bárbaro oscurantismo ¿nosotros hemos de venir a votar
aquí todavía el centralismo?”660 With centralism, he said, concentration of power in the
centre had led to the estados being abandoned, so that their wealth and prosperity had
suffered, reducing them to penury and misery which had had a snowball effect on the
country as a whole. This argument summed up Otero’s overview of the failure of both
systems, and provided the necessary rhetoric in 1842 to back his call for the
reinstatement of federalism but with the necessary reforms, dictated by the experiences
of the past.
Furthermore, in order to refute the criticisms that the federalism of the 1824
constitution was nothing more than a copy, and a poor one at that, of a system that was
original and particular to the United States, Otero explored the origins of federalism and
confederation. He pointed out that variants of a federalist system were to be seen in
659 Ibid., pp. 78 - 80.
660 Otero, “Discurso 11 Octubre 1842,” p. 316.
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Europe for centuries before the United States even existed,661 dismissing the argument
that the politicians of the years after independence had merely imitated the decisions of
their northern neighbours, “como los norteamericanos, cedieron a una ley universal, a
una ley que nunca desmentida era la obra de la naturaleza, y no la de los hombres.”662
Establishing centralism would have been to ignore the true nature of the relations
between the different parts of the nation, to disregard past experiences and to brush
aside future needs.663
The specifics of the federalism he envisaged were developed in congress, when
he faced the challenge of writing and defending the proposed federalist constitution.
Federalism was essential, as Otero saw it in 1842, to repair the damage from the revolts
and revolutions that had become so widespread, to remedy the rifts caused by class
divisions and party politics, and to mend the damage from political incursions by the
army or the Church. However, congress, whose job it was to reconstitute the nation,
was under threat from the very start from those same men whose rallying call to revolt
had been precisely the replacement of the existing constitution. As an outspoken
advocate of federalism, Otero was aware that the situation was serious.664 He knew that
those in power would never allow congress to proclaim an openly federalist constitution.
Here was an immoveable Otero, unwilling to compromise on the introduction of
federalism, in stark contrast to the moderate stance he held on the Church or on military
involvement in politics where he was happy to make concessions, such as the protection
of the fueros, in order to achieve his goals. The threat of failure in 1842 was not
sufficient to dampen the young legislator’s spirits and he argued that his conscience, to
use his own words, me grita that the only constitution that could save the nation was
661 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, pp. 81-83.
662 Ibid., p. 83.
663 Ibid.
664 Otero, “Carta a Vergara,” Obras, I, p. 154.
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one that gave the estados the faculty to promote their own welfare, which he was
convinced would otherwise not, and indeed could not, ever be properly protected by a
central government.665
This separate empowerment of the states was at the very core of Otero’s
federalism. It was essential when drawing up and writing the constitution, that congress
should take into account the particularities of Mexico and the radically different states it
comprised, meeting the “necesidades conocidas de la nación.”666 Otero was quick to
agree that “nadie,” ─in reference to public opinion─ wished for the reestablishment of 
the 1824 constitution but it was irrefutable that “el principio de organizar en las diversas
secciones del territorio autoridades suficientemente facultadas para atender a sus
necesidades locales, es un principio tan fuerte y universalmente adoptado, como lo fue
el de la independencia nacional” lay in federalism.667 It was Otero’s opinion that it was
the only obvious way to combine the needs of the country with the will of its people.
The discontent and upheaval since independence had taught Mexicans that the particular
composition of the country required a system that would foster a consensus among the
social elements. 668 Past experience had shown Otero that the fundamental problem
resided in the “repartición del poder publico en las diversas partes del territorio,” and
had deep roots, reaching back into the colonial administration, and he believed that it
was obvious even then that the administrative authority of the nation could not and
should not be concentrated in one place.669 With independence, this need became even
more pressing, as the colonial system was repudiated and the different colonies
pondered their future. At that point, Otero argued, such heterogeneous elements could
665 Ibid.
666 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 75.
667 Ibíd., p. 81.
668 Ibid., p. 75-76.
669 Ibid.
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have chosen to become separate entities but they had raised their voices in unison, from
all corners of the Mexican territory, culminating in the federalist constitution of 1824.670
Having established the antecedents of federalism within the Republic, all that
was left for Otero attending the 1842 congress was to work on the exact wording of his
proposals. Though Otero was aware that speed was of the essence, he remained true to
his earlier convictions and would only back an openly federalist proposal and for these
reasons, affixed his signature and his vote, to the Voto de la Minoría. The Constitutional
Commission, in charge of drafting the new constitution, had splintered, with four
members backing a proposal that did not openly call for federalism, and a minority of
three, including Otero, supporting one that did. This Voto de la minoría appears to have
been written, for the most part, by Otero, although it was also signed by his fellow
deputies, Juan José Espinosa de los Monteros, from Guanajuato, considered, at the time,
to be “el primer jurista de la república,” and Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, also from
Guanajuato, who occupied important positions in various administrations.671 In this
Voto they set out the reasons for their dissent from the majority, and how the provisions
should differ. Otero, however, felt it necessary to justify his actions further and
published a series of articles defending his position in El Siglo XIX.672
During that famous three hour speech in congress, which led Guillermo Prieto to
label him a great orator, Otero outlined his criticism of the majority proposal, while, at
the same time, defending his decision and opinions. He argued that the two proposals
presented two diametrically opposed systems. 673 The cause of this schism in the
Constitutional Commission was more than just a word, it was the “bases fundamentales
670 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, p. 76.
671 Cecilia Noriega Elío, El Constituyente, p. 197, 201.
672 These were originally published on 2, 3 and 8 October 1842 in El Siglo XIX, and can be found in
Otero, Obras, I, p. 203-257.
673 Otero, “Discurso 11 Octubre 1842,” Obras, I, p. 264
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del sistema, los primeros principios sobre la organización del poder público.” 674 It was
essential to know whether power would be divided among all sections of the Republic,
so that each could fulfil its individual needs, leaving all that concerned the overall
relationship to the central power or whether the central power was to be absolute,
leaving the estados powerless.675 For Otero, “ni la soberanía del pueblo, ni el sistema
republicano, ni la democracia, ni la división de poderes; ni las formas del sistema
representativo estaban a discusión.”676 All that remained, therefore, was to “fijar los
límites del poder general y del poder que se deje a cada sección de la República para sus
necesidades interiores.”677 The crux of the issue for Otero was to debate whether there
was “en efecto dos poderes, uno para cada localidad y otro para toda la nación; pero
ambos verdaderamente diversos, independientes y bastante bien organizados o si el
local no es más que una derivación más o menos amplia del general; pero siempre
emanado de él, sujeto a sus determinaciones y subalterno e inferior en su órbita.”678
Otero’s federalist stance, as outlined in the minority proposal, guaranteed that
the states would be permitted to organise their administration as they saw fit within the
parameters established by the constitution –el sistema de gobierno republicano
representativo, popular– but specifically stated that two or more public powers could
never be merged, nor could a state ever appropriate any faculties other than those
outlined in its own constitutions.679 The Voto de la Minoría called on congress to
sanction a constitution which gave the Estados the necessary powers to meet their
requirements while, at the same time, organising “un poder común bajo las formas más
674 Ibid., p. 264.
675 Ibid., p. 300.
676 Ibid., p. 266.
677 Ibid.
678 Ibid.
679 Public powers would be legislative, executive and judicial. Voto de la minoría, Título IV, Sección
Única, Artículo 23; De los estados de la federación, and Título V, sección única, Artículo 27; Del poder
supremo de la nación, in Obras, I: p. 185.
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convenientes para conservar la unidad de esta nación.”680 This was essential, it argued,
in order to cater to a nation of such diverse territories and peoples, each with its distinct
necessities, but insisting time and time again that the freedom to fulfil them did not
come, and must never come, at the expense of the ties that bound them. Such a
combination of state sovereignty under the umbrella of the general government could
only be found in a federal system. Well aware that the previous federalist experience
had its flaws, it called for reforms based on “la experiencia de los sucesos y la voluntad
de la nación,” which would provide the necessary stability and cohesion to avoid further
chaos and lead to Mexico attaining a position among the great nations of the world.681
Naturally, in order to guarantee freedom, the states would be subservient to the central
government but, in exchange, it would have to ensure the ties that bound the states
together to form a whole “no debiera ser para ellos un pacto de desolación.”682 This
federal system would assuage the old resentments felt by the states under centralism and
in doing so avoid “el triste porvenir de la anarquía y la division.”683
Having dealt with the demands of the states, the Minority turned to the needs of
the central government, ensuring that “hemos declarado constitucionales y generales los
más liberales principios que pudieran desearse para la firme garantía de esos derechos; y
por eso también hemos establecido en términos claros y precisos la división de los
poderes interiores, de suerte que éstos nunca pudieran ni confundirse, ni salir de sus
facultades ordinarias.”684 Some of the proposals they went on to describe included
limitations on the scope of the power wielded by state governors, designed to limit their
ability to become dictators. According to Otero, the state legislatures had, in the past,
been considered by many as cause for concern –often being seen to be in direct collision
680 Otero, “Voto de la minoría,” Obras, I, p. 174.
681 Ibid., p. 174.
682 Ibid., p. 176.
683 Ibid., p. 174.
684 Ibid., p. 175.
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with the general power– but would also be subject to constitutional constraints to ensure
they did not encroach beyond their boundaries. Furthermore, and to fully protect the
nation from any abuse, the central government would retain the right to annul any and
all laws or actions that in any way attacked, violated or ignored the constitution. It
would also give the central government complete authority over those issues it
identified as of national importance, such as foreign relations, and it would act as the
guarantor of the constitution.685 These proposals would ensure that the states remained
powerless against the whole.686 By way of contrast, and in order to pacify the states
once more, by ensuring that this same central government did not abuse any of the
powers it would derive from the constitution, Otero and his fellow deputies, established
a right of man whereby he would have “el derecho de quejarse de cualquier acto de los
poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo de los Estados, ante la Suprema Corte; poder tutelar de
las garantías civiles.”687 In Otero’s mind, this meant that the issues people had with the
federalist system and the fears it had caused in the past had been addressed, not simply
with rhetoric and common sense, but with checks and balances written into the
constitution itself.
Specific powers would regulate the ties between the different states, to enable
them to enjoy true liberty and freedom but, Otero insisted, they also were also united by
a “pacto sagrado.” 688 This consolidation of their rights and freedom regulating the
relations between them should also be the prerogative of a general authority invested
with the necessary powers to maintain it.689 Obviously there were other issues, too, to be
addressed at a national level including “los negocios eclesiásticos, el sistema de pesos,
medidas y monedas y el derecho de amonedación, las reglas de naturalización, la
685 Ibid., p. 176.
686 Ibid.
687 Ibid., p. 175.
688 Otero, “Examen analítico,” Obras, I, p. 248.
689 Ibid., p. 250.
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adquisición de bienes raíces por los extranjeros.”690 However, for Otero there was a big
difference between poderes, foreign relations and national unity, and the more general
ones. The first would be managed and implemented by the central government; for the
second, the central government would issue the regulations, but they would be
implemented by each state individually. 691 This, would be the full extent of the
involvement of the central authority. Everything else, civil legislation, criminal
legislation, commercial legislation and all the-day-to-day running of the state would be
the responsibility of its own government and legislature. 692
The disbandment of the Constituent Congress meant that the specifics Otero
outlined in the Minority Proposal displaying the practical side of his federalist stance
and which he believed could be put into practice in 1842, never materialised into
anything tangible. Nevertheless, the importance of federalism stayed with him, and
remained at the core of his political ideology. His central theme would always be the
need to empower the states, by giving “a cada Departamento facultades para organizar
sus rentas, la administración de justicia, y su gobierno interior, sujetándolos sólo a bases
generales,” but other aspects of federalism concerned him too.693 For a start, he delved
deeply into one of Mexico’s greatest problems, but one which he also believed was one
of its greatest assets; the sheer size of its territory and the differences in its people.
Otero argued that any system that was to govern Mexico adequately would have to take
these vast differences into consideration; it was impossible to govern a northern border
state in the same way as the capital. The interests of each would vary and, in some cases,
be entirely opposed.694 In Otero’s opinion this alone rendered centralism untenable, as it
could never hope to address the needs of each and every specific grievance with general
690 Ibid., p. 250.
691 Ibid., p. 250-251.
692 Ibid., 251-252.
693 Otero, “Carta a Vergara”, Obras, I, p. 155.
694 Otero, “Discurso 11 Octubre 1842”, Obras, I, p. 308.
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regulations issuing from the capital.695 Otero saw Texas as a prime example of the
failings of centralism –if Texan grievances had been addressed, ensuring they
maintained strong ties to a central government while allowing them to make their own
decisions via a federalist constitution, the 1835 secession from Mexico could have been
avoided. 696 Centralists, like Alamán, contradicted Otero, arguing that federalism
weakened the nation and specifically blaming federalism for the origins of the national
divisions that had rendered Mexico powerless to stop the United States seizing half of
its territory.697
Otero was concerned that there might be clashes between the centre and the
estados at some point or other, but concluded it was not inevitable, as checks and
safeguards could be incorporated in the constitution to guard against central interference
in state affairs. In addition, he thought it essential to establish a supreme court.698 He
believed there was a general fear within certain political circles that if the states were
given their very own legislative powers by federalism, as they grew stronger and more
prosperous, it would be only a matter of time before they called for total independence
from the union. Otero, however disagreed, believing that the Estados would be as
protective of their own independence within federalism as they would be of the ties that
bound them and ensured their general interests.699
The treasury was one of the areas in which Otero felt the states needed to be
given sufficient concessions, as “está la vida de las naciones, en ella está la clave de la
libertad política y ella decide, de tal suerte de la realidad del poder público que en los
tiempos en que la ciencia del gobierno estaba muy atrasada, los pueblos descubrieron,
695 Ibid., p. 309.
696 Otero, Ensayo, p. 66 -67.
697 Brian Hamnett, “El partido conservador en México, 1858-1867: la lucha por el poder,” in Fowler and
Morales Moreno (Eds.), El conservadurismo, pp. 215-216.
698 Otero, “Examen analítico,” Obras, I, p. 252.
699 Otero, “Discurso 11 Octubre 1842,” Obras, I, pp. 323 - 324.
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como por una especie de instinto, que su libertad estaba en razón directa de su
influencia en el sistema de hacienda.”700 He firmly believed that “un gobierno sin erario
será siempre un vano simulacro de poder,” so that one of the key issues to be addressed
with the establishment of federalism was that of taxation and the management of public
funds.701 This was very much a radical stance. It was also held by most of the local
elites in the Estados, who assumed their demand for political autonomy would bring
with it fiscal autonomy. This was of particular importance to the richer states who felt
their wealth was being siphoned off by a centralised government. 702 Centralists
countered this argument with their criticism that under federalism fiscal autonomy
weakened the central government as states would frequently avoid making their
financial contributions the centre leaving it indebted and poverty-stricken.703 This was
why Otero argued that it was so essential to establish openly how resources would be
distributed between the centre and the states. Mexico could not afford to commit the
same mistakes it had under the 1835 centralist constitution which had led to the Estados
existing in miserable conditions while forced to contribute to the centre. Otero insisted
that the Minority proposals guaranteed that the Estados would have complete power to
make their budgets, and to establish the level of contributions, and that these would
remain with them, with no risk of their being expropriated by the general power.
Believing that an attack or attempted invasion by the United States was
inevitable, Otero’s final area of concern was a situation where the states and the central
government faced an external enemy. Otero argued that it was Mexico’s northern
700 Ibid., p. 268.
701 Otero, “Examen analítico”, Obras, I: p. 254.
702 Ibid.
703 A prime example of this was the states’ obligation, under federalism, to support the nation by paying a
contingente. However, much of the time, if it were paid at all, it was late and rarely paid in full, Olveda,
“Jalisco,” pp. 200, 213.
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territories that were most under threat. 704 He compared Mexico to its northern
neighbours and found that where one was full of vigour and strength Mexico, with the
same natural benefits, was sinking under the weight of its troubles.705 Aware of this, in
1842, four years before the declaration of war with the United States, Otero called for
the nation to focus on ensuring “la integridad nacional, recobrando la parte usurpada, y
tomando las medidas necesarias para que las demás inminentemente amenazadas tengan
recursos para resistir las agresiones, e interés en conservar la unidad nacional.”706 If the
North American encroachment was to be halted, Mexico had to become its equal,
should the day come “en que no sólo corran la suerte de Texas esos Departamentos
abandonados a la desesperación que son hoy nuestra única barrera, sino que, como decía
el señor Gutiérrez Estrada, se rece la liturgia protestante en las catedrales del
interior.”707 The sentiment was quasi-prophetic. By 1847 not only did the United States
flag fly above the national palace in Mexico City, but it had been amply demonstrated
that the nation, if it existed at all, did not form a cohesive unit. The re-introduction of
the 1824 federalist constitution with its Acta de Reformas had managed to save the
central government, but each Estado had protected its own interests refusing, at times,
to send aid to others until it was too late, or until the state in question was under direct
threat. This was proof, for Otero, that federalism was essential in order to bind the states
together while giving them the liberty to decide for themselves what was important to
each individual state.708
By 1847, as the US forces closed in on the capital, it became apparent to Otero
that the reforms to the Constitution were a matter of urgency and could not be left until
after the end of the conflict. Should the advancing enemy be successful, Otero knew the
704 Otero, Ensayo, Obras, I, pp. 66-67.
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nation would need guidelines to enable it to survive as an independent nation. As a
member of the Congressional Constitutional Commission, he dissented from the
majority opinion; his fellow commission members all agreed to re-instate the 1824
federalist constitution “mientras no se publiquen todas las reformas que determine
hacerle el presente Congreso.”709 For Otero, however, “mientras” was too uncertain a
time frame. He was aware that the nation was facing an unprecedented threat to its
independence and as such, congress might well be running out of time. The proposals
he presented to congress, as his Voto Particular, barely differed from what eventually
became law. In them, we can Otero’s federalist ideology put into practice. The Acta de
Reformas establishes the powers to be held by the central government.; Article 11, for
example, states: “Es facultad exclusiva del congreso general dar bases para la
colonización, y dictar las leyes conforme a las cuales los poderes de la Unión hayan de
desempeñar sus facultades constitucionales.”710 The 1824 constitution gave the states
ample powers, and all the Acta added to this was that no state had any further rights that
those expressly cited in the constitution.711 At the same time, it also curtailed the powers
of the central government to those derived only from the constitution.712 In both cases,
the constitution was to be the ultimate and supreme authority. Despite the states being
given considerable autonomy, the centre was protected from any attack by a state law
promulgated in direct contravention of the constitution as it could and would be
declared null and void by the central legislature. 713 But, once again, this apparent
restriction was counterbalanced by a similar article delineating the complaint process
should any law issued by the central congress be deemed unconstitutional by any of the
709 Emilio O. Rabasa, Historia de las Constituciones mexicanas (Mexico City: UNAM, 2004), p.52.
710 Acta Constitutiva y de Reformas de 1847, 21 Mayo 1847, Article 11.
711 Ibid., Article 20.
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713 Ibid., Article 22.
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stat legislatures.714 Furthermore, if any part of the constitution were to be reformed, it
required at least two thirds of both chambers to approve it, in two separate and
contiguous congresses. The same Article also stated that “las reformas que en lo
sucesivo se propusieren, limitando en algún punto la extensión de los poderes de los
Estados, necesitarán, además, la aprobación de la mayoría de las legislaturas.”715 Even
then, the final article of the Acta ensured that there could be no alteration or reform to
the basic constitutional tenets that established the independence of the nation, its form
of government –republicano, representativo, popular federal– and the division of powers,
be it those pertaining to the general government or those to the states.716 The Acta de
Reformas is Otero’s most well known accomplishment, as in it can be seen the origins
of the amparo, however, it also the only practical application, on a national level, of his
federalist ideology which combined elements of his radical position –protecting the
independence of the states– compromised by the needs for cohesion of a nation whose
very independence was being threatened.
Otero’s uncompromising stance on federalism was in strong contrast with his
moderate views on such matters as the role of the military or the Church in affairs of the
state. He was only ever willing to admit to a federal republic and he showed no
reticence in making his views known. Whereas in other areas his moderation pushed
him to a safe middle ground, where realpolitik won over his personal ideology, his
defence of federalism was aggressive, even when faced with hostile opposition.
Representing Jalisco, one of the first states to adopt an openly radical federalist stance
following independence, and inspired by equally radical jaliscienses ilustres, it is no
surprise that when it came to the organisation of political power Otero, too, favoured a
714 The article specified that the complaint must be made within one month of the law being passed, and
permitted any of the state legislature to file a complaint. If this happened, all state legislatures would be
required to analyse the law in question and reach a verdict on it. Ibid., Article 23.
715 Ibid., Article 28.
716 Ibid.
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radical federalist model. He believed that a compromise must be reached between the
centre and the states, and, like the federalists of 1824, he never doubted that despite
provincial autonomy, the states constituted a whole. He criticised the centralist system
as responsible for the deterioration of the nation, because he believed it was impossible
for the central government alone to issue laws applicable to each and every state. The
diversity in the land and people that made up the Mexican nation meant that laws which
benefited one state could so easily be detrimental to another. He believed that the states,
and only the states, should be able to legislate according to their needs and their desires,
a position he always qualified with the argument that such legislation should never
negatively affect either the whole or any other part of it. His theoretical stance was very
much in favour of state autonomy with loose ties to a centre whose main purpose was to
safeguard the common good. However, when it came to reforming the 1824 constitution
in 1847, he veered closer to moderation, seeking to ensure a balance of power which
was what he felt that was most needed by the country at that time.
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Conclusions
The historiographical tradition, prevalent in Mexico in the 1960s, gave the impression
that in the country “se enfrentan, desde 1810, dos proyectos: […] uno es liberal,
popular, republicano, secular, progresista, revolucionario, de izquierda y bueno. El otro
es conservador, elitista, monárquico, clerical, retrógrado, reaccionario, de derecha y
sobra decir que malo.”717 This was the legacy of a liberal history which provided a
linear version of events, a monochromatic view of the preceding 150 years where the
reader could follow a continuous line of liberal achievements, from independence to the
present day, ignoring, as they did so, any negative aspects that might mar this splendid
panorama. In this view, the early national period was punctuated by the great liberal
heroes –from the fathers of independence to Juárez– battling constantly against the
forces of conservatism threatening from without and within. This is why the image of
Otero that emerges from the writings of Jesús Reyes Heroles in the late 1960s is of a
young ideologue, tirelessly championing the liberal cause, fighting unceasingly for
liberty, equality and progress.
But the 1840s was not like this. It was a period torn by factional disputes as each
vied for power in its own interest. The Mexican intelligentsia were split among
santanistas, puros, moderados, conservatives, etc. There was no overall consensus on
what Mexico needed to produce prosperity and achieve true nationhood. An
undisciplined military force pursued its own aims or was harnessed to push through
another’s; revolts, uprisings, pronunciamientos were the order of the day and the law
lacked the balances and checks to restrain them. Government was haphazard; only
Hererra’s completed its full term; congresses were dissolved to suit political
expediencies. The country was at an impasse.
717 Erika Pani, “‘Las fuerzas oscuras,’” p. 17.
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Nor was Mariano Otero the one dimensional hero that Reyes Heroles described.
A consummate politician indeed, tireless in his championing of liberalism and
federalism certainly, but one with the political savvy to know when to bend with the
wind. The man that takes shape in this thesis is more than just a politician. He is a
family man; a doting father and loving husband whose letters to his wife were filled not
only with affection, but with his views on the events of the day. A man of the provinces,
a jalisciense, he established a busy law practice in Guadalajara, but this did not deter
him from setting up an extensive network of useful contacts that was to stand him in
good stead when he ventured further afield. It was extensive enough not only to keep
him informed of business matters in his absence, but ensured he was kept abreast of
political events at a state level. Many of these contacts were also personal friends who
kept him well supplied with the local fare. As his influence in the capital increased he
was able to return the compliment by smoothing the way for relatives, friends, and even
acquaintances, seeking an advantageous position in the capital. He was known as a
masterly orator from the beginning when he was chosen to give the 16 of September
1841 commemoration address in Guadalajara. Young though he was, he was not so
inexperienced that he did not milk the opportunity for all it was worth, seizing the
opportunity to market himself in the capital by printing copies of his speech and
distributing them to the major national newspapers in Mexico City. There can be no
doubt that this masterstroke contributed to a reputation that preceded his arrival in
Mexico City where he was welcomed at the highest levels, including an invitation to
Otero and his family to share the home of Manuel Gómez Pedraza, a former president.
He was immediately offered a position as political editor on El Siglo XIX, a new but
widely read and influential daily newspaper published by Ignacio Cumplido,
coincidentally a fellow jalisciense. At this point Mexico hovered between revolution
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and constitution, there was no congress and, in its absence, the majority of its functions
were being carried out by the Junta Departamental and Otero rapidly became a member.
Elections were called to establish a Constituent Congress and Otero’s network ensured
that he was returned as the deputy for Jalisco. It was in this atmosphere that he wrote his
Ensayo, a first introduction to his ideology which, unsurprisingly, was published by
Cumplido.
As he became embroiled in the machinations of the capital, a different Otero
emerges. He was fearless in putting forth his view when he firmly believed it was for
the good of Mexico, and showed himself to be a strong believer in the precept that the
end justifies the means, even resorting to anti-constitutional measures when it suited
him. Plotting behind the scenes during the Polkos rebellion under the guise of protecting
Church interests, he had an ulterior motive ─removing Valentín Gómez Farías as 
interim president. Despite being hailed as the standard bearer of the moderate
movement, he was willing to betray his fellow moderados when it suited his purpose.
This was particularly noticeable when the moderates in congress were scheming to
ensure it remained inquorate in order to block radical proposals but Otero was quite
willing to bargain with the Oaxaca deputies to ensure his Acta de Reformas was passed.
The duality shown in his private and public persona was reflected in his political
ideology. Far from Reyes Heroles’ clean-cut liberal hero, Otero’s standpoint is not so
easily defined. He was a brash newcomer, who was an important figure from the
moment of his first foray into national politics. The first years of his political career
were distinguished by his youthful idealism, although he was well aware of the harsh
reality of the situation from the very beginning. His optimism would be tempered by the
events of the second half of the decade, but until the day he died he actively sought to
put his beliefs into practice. As Otero saw it, Mexico was in tatters. His historical
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analysis enabled him to uncover the roots of cause and his liberal ideology provided the
theory. Putting it into practice, however, he was constantly forced to temper his
distinctly radical political ideology with a moderate practical approach. On all but one
occasion, the introduction of that Acta de Reformas in 1847, he took a moderate stance,
not from the power of his conviction but because it was the only way that even the most
minimal of changes could be introduced in the charged political climate of 1840s
Mexico.
He was willing to compromise if he felt the situation was not ready for too
abrupt a change. Like most radical thinkers, he ardently believed in the absolute
separation of Church and state and that education should not be the province of the
clergy. However, like most of his fellow moderates, reality steered him towards a
moderate position. The Mexican Church had money, and money bought influence.
Concessions could be made so that the Church could retain its fueros and privileges in
exchange for its support in bringing down his political enemies. The time was not ripe
for reform; any move in that direction would lead to the Church feeling threatened. This
viewpoint was characteristic of the moderato faction he headed, who favoured slow,
steady reform, avoiding a reactionary backlash at all cost. He was also of the opinion
that this was one problem that would be solved by time.
He was forced to the same conclusion when dealing with the role of the army
which he blamed for many of the revolutions and pronunciamientos which had created
so much uncertainty and unrest and so often challenged constitutional legitimacy in the
years following independence. As such it was essential that the army be reformed, its
fuero abolished and its political influence curtailed. It should be constitutionally limited
to a defensive role, sent into action only under the auspices of the central authority. It
became clear to Otero that any such reforms were impracticable in the current political
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climate because the reality of the 1840s was different; a series of pronunciamientos in
1841 toppled the presidency; in 1842 the Constituent Congress was shut down by a
military movement and, in the years that followed, pronunciamiento after
pronunciamiento constantly challenged the constituted order. Otero was not alone in
seeing army reform as impossible in the current political climate. Fellow moderates,
such as the president José Joaquín de Herrera, also held back in order to ensure that the
army's reaction would not upset what little stability could be achieved by the legitimate
government.
Federalism was his overriding passion. And here he was a radical. As a federalist
he believed that much of the political power should remain in the hands of the states
and, therefore, favoured strengthening the civic militia and introducing a local police
force, and giving them further responsibilities. His beliefs reflected the ideas of the
original federalists of 1824, modified for the reality of the 1840s, whereby the states
were given sovereignty, and political power resided with them through their own
legislature and governor and they retained control of their individual budgets and
taxation. The central government remained responsible for the whole and for its
defence. Only a strong constitution could uphold these aims. Federalism was the one
aspect of his ideology that he never attempted to moderate. And he was fearless in
proclaiming it. Even in 1842, when he was aware that the Constituent Congress in
which he was serving was under threat, he openly declared himself a federalist and
fought for the introduction of a federalist constitution, knowing full well that by doing
so he was inciting a backlash from those against it. The political situation was such that
after a decade of struggling against a centralist system, many federalists were placated
by the reinstitution of the 1824 federalist charter in 1846. Otero, however, was willing
to stand alone against congress in insisting that reforms were attached to it, reflecting
232
the needs of the nation at that time. His steadfastness in this matter stemmed from this
firm conviction that under federalism each state could produce a constitution analogous
to its individual needs, the central legislature would do the same at a nation level,
providing a surprisingly simple solution to so many of the problems facing Mexico.
Federalism was a widely held conviction among the moderates. However, although
Otero's beliefs did not deviate from their common goals, his insistence on the
reintroduction of federalism and reform to the 1824 constitution meant he was not only
opposing his political rivals but also his own party.
Otero’s political position was fluid, reacting to the events and the circumstances
of the time. As Fowler states, “there were no such things as conservatives and liberals.
In broad terms, there were a variety of heterogeneous traditionalists, moderate, radical,
and santanista factions, all of which changed and evolved as the hopes of the 1820s
degenerated into the despair of the 1840s.” 718 Not only were they not “grupos
coherentes que conjugaban intereses concretos, en base a una serie definida de
principios,” but since the end goal of most of these men was to stabilise the nation, it is
not difficult to understand why “las diferentes facciones o corrientes de opinión a veces
son dificiles de caracterizar, porque tienen mucho en común.”719 Therefore although a
definite moderate faction can be identified in Mexico in the 1840s, and Otero was
firmly positioned among them, they shared a reformist agenda constantly tempered by a
reality that demanded slow, moderate change in order for progress to be maintained.
However, like all those politically active during the decade, Otero held his own
individual beliefs which changed and shifted with the circumstances, and not always in
line with moderate thinking.
718 Fowler, Mexico in the Age of the Proposals, p. 267.
719 Vázquez, “Los años olvidados” p. 314.
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In the face of all these obstacles Otero’s tangible legacy was slim. His Ensayo
remains to this day his better known and most quoted work used by political and social
historians alike as a point of reference. His Acta de Reformas, which he so diligently
defended, had the immediate effect of ensuring a constitutionally legitimate body could
be formed in the middle of the US invasion and, in the long term it formed the
groundwork for the later 1857 Liberal Constitution. The amparo established in article
25 of the Acta, and introduced on a national level, immediately guaranteed a right of
man, protection of the individual against the state, a precept which, although modified
by time, still forms the basis of Mexican judicial process to this day. However, what this
thesis demonstrates is that his political beliefs, his compromises, his theories and his
failures are just as important as his achievements and his legacy in helping us
understand the failures and frustrations that were characteristic of the decade. His life
and ideology provide us with a glimpse of the reality politicians experienced in the
1840s, whose projects failed, more often than not, or came under attack. Great theories
were discarded in favour of practical solutions or viable compromises. Otero was from a
generation of men who were building the new nation, defining the political system and
solving problems, quite frequently by a simple method of trial and error. While he was
indeed a great orator and a skilled legislator neither could save him from the dejection
and despair he felt at the end of the decade, as his ideology was battered time and time
again by the political expediencies he was forced to accommodate.
Erika Pani argues that historians seek to “armar ‘ideologías’ y ‘doctrinas’;
pedimos a los políticos del pasado teorías coherentes, posturas consistentes y
pensamiento sistemático. No debe sorprender que, al revelar incongruencias y desfases,
el historiador se confiese a menudo, a pesar de la riqueza e interés de sus hallazgos,
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decepcionado.”720 Mariano Otero reveals no such incongruencies or deceptions. He was
steadfast in his ideology, logical in his approach and consistent in his stance. He did his
utmost to shape his times but they were against him. Perhaps he was ahead of them.
720 Pani, “Las fuerzas oscuras,” p. 16.
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